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# Potebnja's Views of the Structure of the Work of Poetic Art: A Critical Retrospection*

JOHN FIZER

### 1. *Structural Affinities between Language and the Work of Poetic Art*

In 1862 Alexander A. Potebnja, then a young adjunct in linguistics at Kharkiv University, in his most acclaimed work on literary theory, *Mysl' i jazyk* (Thought and Language), wrote: "Evidently the symbolism of language may be called its poetry (*poetičnost'*), while the oblivion of the internal form seems to us to be the prose (*prozaičnost'*) of the word. Should this comparison be true, then the question of the change of the word's internal form will turn out to be identical with the question of the relationship of language with both poetry and prose, i.e., with literary form in general."[1]

From this assumption it was but logical for Potebnja to infer that an inquiry into the structure of language, that is, the word, was simultaneously an inquiry into the structure of the poetic work. What, then, is the word? As an articulated sound, derived from the depth of human nature or "as an eternally repeated work of the mind, it enables the thought to express itself."[2] By rendering sensory percepts verbally it

* This article is a part of a monograph, *A Metacritical Inquiry into Alexander A. Potebnja's Psycholinguistic Theory of Literature,* now in preparation.

1 *Mysl' i jazyk,* in A. A. Potebnja, *Èstetika i poètika* (Moscow, 1976), p. 174. *Mysl' i jazyk* appeared in 1862 both as a series of separate articles in the journal *Žurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveščenija* and as a book. It was reprinted in 1892, 1913, 1922, 1926, and in 1976. This last edition, based on one of 1913, also includes a fragment of Potebnja's *O nekotoryx simvolax v slavjanskoj narodnoj poèzii,* fragments of *Recenzija na sbornik "Narodnye pesni galitskoj i ugorskoj Rusi,"* compiled by Ja. F. Holovac'kyj, *Jazyk i narodnost',* fragments of *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* the second chapter from *Iz lekcii po teorii slovesnosti,* and *Černovye zametki o tvorčestve L. N. Tolstogo i F. M. Dostoevskogo.*

2 Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 17 vols. (Berlin, 1903–1936), 7:46. Likewise Humboldt wrote that "language, as the sum total of its creation, is in each case different from what is uttered." Also, language "can persist only in a brief span of each thought process, but in its totality it is independent of the

situates them within the collectively held system of reality; it develops and transforms images of the perceived objects into corresponding concepts; it creates new thoughts and either expands or condenses the existing ones. Speaking metaphorically, Potebnja wrote: "If we compare the creation of thought to the making of cloth, then the word will be a weaver's shuttle which introduces the weft into the base threads as well as takes over the slow weaving."[3] The word, therefore, is more than either a minimum unit of distinctive sound-feature in language, as Bloomfield defined it, or a different linguistic integer in need of syntagmatic connection, as de Saussure held. Rather, it is a homogeneous semiological act, complete in both morphology and syntax. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Potebnja's principal mentor, compared it to "the complete flower bursting from the bud to which the complete product of language belongs."[4] Possessing the "property of self significance (*Selbstbedeutung*), it is necessarily analogous to language as a whole."[5]

As an act of speech, the word is to be discerned from language — from the collectively shared system of morphological relations which regulate all semantically intended verbal constructs. Potebnja contended, much earlier than Ferdinand de Saussure and in explicitly psychological terms, that "speech exists only as part of a larger whole, i.e., language, and [that] in order to comprehend speech one needs the presence in his mind (*duša*) of the multiple relations between the phenomena given in this speech and those which at the moment of the speech [performance] remain, so to say, beyond the threshold of consciousness."[6] This system of relations "possesses the flexibility (*Geschmeidigkeit*) to receive everything and, in turn, to lend expression to everything."[7] It is "the building organ of the thought,"[8] a living creativity which at every moment of our speech directs its performance.

For Potebnja the word, that is, speech, consisted of three com-

process." *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development,* trans. G. C. Buck and F. A. Raven (Miami, 1971), pp. 41–42.

[3] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 167.

[4] von Humboldt, *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development,* p. 50.

[5] von Humboldt, *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development,* p. 39.

[6] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* vol. 1 (Kharkiv, 1888), p. 34.

[7] von Humboldt, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:256.

[8] von Humboldt, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:53.

ponents: (a) external form, i.e., the articulated sound, (b) internal form, i.e., the modality by which the word's content is transmitted, and (c) content, or idea.[9]

External form, while indivisible from internal form, is nevertheless distinct from it. As a constituent of the word's triune structure, it points to a particular signification not by its synchronic givenness, but "because previously it pointed to a different signification."[10] For example, the word *versta* (verst = 3,500 ft.) refers to a measure of distance because of a former meaning: it had referred to the furrow, which, in turn, referred to the "turn of the plough," and so on, until, consciously or unconsciously, we are no longer able to determine its diachronic series, which is nevertheless encoded in the collective memory of each linguistically homogeneous community. Hence, Potebnja observed, the articulated sound is not merely a sign which refers or implies this or that object, but rather a sign of a sign or a form of a sign. This derivational development is particularly cogent in the case of homonyms which in spite of their identical articulation generate different significations, as in, for example, the Ukrainian *mylo* 'soap' and *mylo* 'kindly'. Were the articulation of these two words their sole semantic marker, inevitably they would have produced semantic ambiguity. But inasmuch as *mylo* in both cases derives from different diachronic series, such ambiguity is virtually impossible for members of the same linguistic community.

The internal form of the word is the particular mode by which its intended content or realities are presented. Being polymorphous, these realities are usually rendered only by one of their attributes; hence words or specifically nouns are metonymic representations or linguistic reductions of these realities.[11] For example, the word *stol* ('table') refers to an object with many attributes, which is, however, represented only by a single one, that of "covering," encoded in its root *stl*; the word *okno* ('window') refers to an object with such components as sills, glass, etc., but is represented solely by *oko* ('eye'), thus implying an object through which one looks; to continue, the word *tuča* ('cloud') is represented by the attribute of pouring, en-

[9] Potebnja refers to these as moments (*momenty*), aspects (*vidy*), and elements (*stixii*).

[10] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 5.

[11] Humboldt illustrates the reductive nature of the internal form with the following examples: "German word *Vernunft* reposes the notion of taking (*das Nehmens*), in *Verstand* that of standing (*das Stehens*), and in *Blüte* that of welling forth (*das Hervorquellens*)." *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development,* p. 71.

coded in the root *tu* ('to pour, to flow'). Such representations (*predstavlenija*), Potebnja contended, are always ethnic (*narodnye*).[12] "The internal form of each of these words directs our thought differently,"[13] Potebnja concluded, since each language contains its own unique world view.[14]

Considered psychologically, rather than linguistically, the internal form of the word is the focus of the "sensory image" that is usually experienced in sense perception. But inasmuch as such an image contains a series of attributes, which are in need of unity, normally only one of these attributes will dominate and generate the sense of a unified object. In this way, within our consciousness the dominant attribute functions as a partial representation or as a sign of the intended object. As such, it is the image of sensory images rather than the image of the object.[15]

The internal form of the word, due to its reductive function, greatly facilitates cognitive process. Without it, this process would be impeded. By reducing the polymorphic nature of intended realities to one of its attributes, the word becomes a communicable sign and can then be used in syntactic concatenations and in formations of symbols and concepts. "Sign in the word," Potebnja wrote, "is a necessary substitute of the corresponding image and concept (both for the acceleration of thought and for the broadening of consciousness)."[16] In communicative processes such as speech, writing, and reading, many words lose the palpableness of their internal forms. "In most of them

[12] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike*, p. 9.
[13] *Mysl' i jazyk*, p. 175.
[14] Humboldt discussed the relationship between language and the nation's spirit in his *Agamemnon* and *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development*. Elsewhere, he wrote: "Die Sprache ist gleichsam die äusserliche Erscheinung des Geistes der Völker; ihre Sprache ist ihr Geist und ihr Geist ihre Sprache, man kann sich beide nie identisch genug denken" (*Gesammelte Schriften*, 7:42). Of course, Humboldt was not alone in equating language with the soul of the nation. German romantics and philosophers of the first half of the nineteenth century, notably Herder and Fichte, did the same: cf. J. G. Herder, *Sprachphilosophische Schriften* (Hamburg, 1960), and J. G. Fichte, *Reden auf die deutsche Nation* (Berlin, 1808). In this century, Humboldt's thesis that language forms "the intermediary world" between man and the external world and thus encodes in its structure the particular ethnic Weltanschauung has been embraced by a number of German linguists, philosophers, and psychologists. Notable among them are the philospher Ernst Cassirer, in his *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, 3 vols. (New Haven and London, 1973), and the linguist Leo Weissberger. In the United States this thesis has been adapted, independently of Humboldt's linguistics, by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf.
[15] *Mysl' i jazyk*, p. 147.
[16] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike*, p. 7.

the connection with the previous ones is neither sensed by the speakers nor even known to scholarship."[17] Their signification "attaches itself directly to the sound, so that the connection between them seems to be arbitrary."[18] Hence it is to be assumed that their internal form is "completely empty (contentless) and that it acts as zero does in the Arabic notation of quanta: thus the difference between 3. 30. and 0,3 depends upon the empty spot at 3 designated by zero."[19] However, internal forms in such words do not remain mute forever. They might be resuscitated either by our attention to their dormant images or by the syntactic context in which they happen to occur.

Thus, while the external form and signification remain forever the inevitable conditions of the word's existence, the internal form, in most of the cases, tends to expire. As Potebnja wrote:

> Already at the very origin of the word, there was inequity between its signification and representation, i.e., the mode of this signification: *signification always contains more than does representation.* The word serves only as a fulcrum for the thought. But as the word is being applied to ever new cases, this inequity grows correspondingly. The relatively broad and deep signification of the word . . . tends to tear itself from the relatively insignificant representation . . . but in this tendency it produces but *a new word.* . . . the development of the language occurs through the dimming of representation. . . .[20]

The internal form performs the following functions: "(a) it provides [us] with an awareness of the unity of complexes given in perception; (b) it establishes the unity of relations of complexes given [to us] only in their elements; (c) it facilitates generalization by removing what is immaterial [idealization] and thus increases the distance between human thought; and (d) it creates the category of thought objects."[21]

The third structural component of the word — the content, signification, or idea as an empirical given — subsists rather than exists in itself, since both external and internal forms of the word are more its indication (*ukazanie*) than its reproduction.[22] And yet, interchange-

[17] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 7.
[18] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 7.
[19] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 7. Cf. H. Steinthal, *Grammatik, Logik, und Psychologie* (Berlin, 1858), p. 334.
[20] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 302. Potebnja's definition of the functions of the internal form displays the explicit influence of Kant's definition of transcendental schema, which is something like an empirical or sensible counterpart to the pure category. Such a counterpart is the fulcrum about which Potebnja speaks.
[21] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 301.
[22] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 6.

ably, both forms attain their identity by bringing into our consciousness either this or that signification.

What and where, then, is signification? Is it in language, that is, speech, or in the creating and perceiving consciousness? In Potebnja's view, it is in both, as they coalesce. "The articulated sound," Potebnja wrote, "pronounced by the speaker and perceived by the listener, stimulates in the latter a memory of his own similar sounds which, in turn, invoke in his consciousness the thought about the object."[23] However, inasmuch as both participants in the act of speech experience different sensory perception and apperceive the speech forms differently, the intended signification of the articulated sounds is necessarily at variance. While generating different objects, "the thoughts of both will have a common point of contiguity: i.e., representation (if it exists), and the formal signification of the word."[24]


"By signification one understands two distinct things, one of which, being the subject matter of linguistics, we shall call the close, and the other — the subject matter of other sciences, the extended (*dal'nej-šee*) signification."[25] The internal form is a sign of the close signification. Being intersubjectively similar, this signification occurs in the consciousness of both the speaker and the listener, provided, of course, they both "belong to one and the same people."[26] As such, it is "the formative organ of thought." Were it not for the continuous tendency of language to dim (*zatemnjat'*) its internal forms and thereby to develop imageless words, people, as ethnic collectives, would forever remain locked in their particular perceptions of the word. Nonetheless, this dimming of internal forms does not necessarily progress toward a total extinction of imaginative thought, since, as Potebnja put it, "the development of language occurs both as *dimming* of representation and, due to new perception, as emergence of new imaginative words."[27]

The oblivion of the internal form or "the emptiness of the close signification"[28] reduces the word into pure form or sign of thought, rendering the external form the sole carrier of signification. Thus, the triune structure of the word becomes a dual one. In this case the signification, depending upon the rigor of semantic conformity, may

[23] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 139.
[24] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 8.
[25] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 8.
[26] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 9.
[27] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 303.
[28] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 8.

oscillate between personal-subjective and scientific-objective thoughts. "The difference in the degree of objectivity of thought is identical with the difference in the degree of its abstraction,"[29] i.e., in the degree of the dimming of the word's internal form.

The extended signification of the word, unlike the close one, is semantically diffused. In speech, it cannot be brought to a common semantic denotation. This signification is at variance for both speaker and listener, even though their thought processes are anchored in one and the same utterance. Potebnja wrote that this "can be expressed by two triangles whose angles b, a, c and d, a, e, having a common apex a and being formed by the intersection of two lines, be and cd, are inevitably equal but everything else may be infinitely different."[30]




Apex a represents the close and two triangles — b, a, c and d, a, e — the extended significations. Each act of speech therefore contains the close signification, the apex, and the extended signification — the triangles. From this one should infer that thinking only in images, i.e., in close significations, hardly exists in actuality. To put it differently, both thought and speech, cognitatively and linguistically, are disproportionate quantities. Consequently, as Humboldt observed, "keiner denkt bei dem Wort gerade und genau, was andre. . . . Alles Verstehen ist daher immer zugleich ein Nicht-Verstehen, alle Übereinstimmung in Gedanken und Gefühlen zugleich ein Auseinandergehen."[31]

The distinction between the close and extended significations of the word was of key importance to Potebnja's literary theory, myth, and folklore. These "phenomena of language," pursued either individually or collectively, attain their uniqueness through the two above significations. In poetry, myth, and folklore, words with explicit representa-

29 *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 195.
30 *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 140.
31 von Humboldt, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 7:64–65.

tions dominate those without it, while in prose/science and scholarship, words with zero representation "are the only building material."[32] An exception to this paradigm is the intentional ambiguity in such literary constructs as satire, irony, anecdote, and fable, in which one internal form is simultaneously intended to indicate two distinct significations.[33]

All this seems to amend Potebnja's basic contention that poetry is thinking only in images and prose/science is thinking only in imageless words. By accepting his definition and correlation of the two variables of signification as valid, we must infer that imaginative thinking does not and cannot exist without prosaic thinking, in the same way that the apex of a triangle cannot exist without the triangle itself.

## 2. *Structural Constituents of the Work of Poetic Art*

Most of what has been said about the word in and out of the syntactic setting is applicable to the verbal arts. Potebnja observed:

> Generally, in poetic, i.e., in artistic work, there are the same elements as in the word: *content* (or idea), which corresponds to the emotional image or the concept developed out of it; *internal form, image,* which indicates the contents and which corresponds to the representation (which has significance only as a symbol, an implication of a certain aggregate of sense perception or of the idea), and, finally, *external form,* in which artistic image is objectified.[34]

In brief, the similarity between the two is as follows:

| *the word* | | *the work of literary art* |
|---|---|---|
| external form (x) | ⟷ | external form (x) |
| internal form (y) | ⟷ | image (y) |
| signification (z) | ⟷ | content/idea (z) |

The three constituents of the work of poetic art are coextensive and interdependent. "The external form is indivisible from the internal one, it changes along with it, ceases to be itself, and yet it is, nevertheless, completely distinct from it."[35] The interdependence of *x, y, z*

32 *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 195.
33 *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* vol. 4 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1941), p. 96.
34 *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 179.
35 *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 175.

implies that: (a) in artistic configuration they have no value separately; (b) they are determined at once rather than sequentially; (c) such simultaneous determinations permit no radical variability in their configuration; (d) in case "the consciousness loses the connection between the sound and significance, sound, aesthetically speaking, ceases to be the *external* form,"[36] simply becoming a mechanical disturbance in the air; and (e) each work of poetic art, in terms of its givens, *x* and *y*, is unique and can be rendered in no way other than its own, i.e., cannot be translated, paraphrased, or adapted, since all such transpositions involve structural transformations.[37]

### 3. *The External Form of the Work of Poetic Art*

By the external form of poetic art we are "to understand [such] verbal form which is significant in its constitutive parts."[38] What does this terse definition mean? By significant parts, Potebnja meant the selection and collocation of words which enhance the emergence of the imaginative link between their euphony, their internal representation, and the intended content. The external form of poetic art, in order to be significant, must objectify in itself the artistic image, and thus be an indication of the intended thought or signification, "a hint at the certain totality of emotional percepts."[39] Otherwise it will be but a referend of an act of reference. Consequently, "the form of the work of poetic art is the word with the unity of sound and signification, rather than [merely] the sound, i.e., its primary external form."[40]

Psychologically, external form is an object of sensory perception, while internal form and signification is an object of cognition. How-

[36] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 176.
[37] Potebnja, in spite of his indebtedness to Humboldt, did not share his enthusiasm for translation. Humboldt believed that "das Übersetzen, und gerade der Dichter, ist vielmehr eine der nothwendigsten Arbeiten in einer Literatur, theils um den nicht Sprachkundigen ihren sonst ganz unbekannt bleibende Formen der Kunst und der Menschheit, wodurch jede Nation immer bedeutend gewinnt, zuzuführen, theils aber, und vorzüglich, zur Erweiterung der Bedeutsamheit und der Ausdruckfähigkeit der eigenen Sprache" (*Gesammelte Werke,* 7 vols. [Berlin, 1841–52], 3:14). Potebnja, on the other hand, believed that poetic text is untranslatable, that "translation from one language to another is not a transmission of one and the same thought, but a stimulation of a distinctly different one" (*Jazyk i narodnost',* p. 265).
[38] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 309.
[39] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 179.
[40] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 178.

ever, to affect the synthesis of the aesthetic phenomena, the two processes, perception and cognition, are to be seen as complementary. Separately, they are either empty or sterile. Hence, external forms which arouse only bewilderment, anger, fear, and excitement and do not yield to semantic decoding are aesthetically inferior to those forms which function as cognitive spectra. Aesthetically significant and valent forms, then, are inevitably bound with cognition, or, as Kant would have it, the experience of the sensory impressions is possible only by the knowledge of the intellect. Therefore the structural concatenation of *x* with *z* via *y*, as a rule, precludes the aesthetic autonomy of any of these three constituents of the work of art. Such an autonomy may occur only during the deliberate severance of *x*, *y*, *z*. This severance, however, may mean, as far as the poet's creative act is concerned, a radical suspension of both an imaginative propensity of the poetic language and its semantic function and, as far as his *Lebenswelt* is concerned, an interruption of his filiation with his linguistic and ethnic milieu. To Potebnja, the creation of poetic forms, when free from a specific history and genesis and detached from subject, is a purposeless task. Does this mean that Potebnja's theory could not and cannot accommodate poetic avant-gardism, if one understands it to be artistic forms which, due to their idiocratic character or overcoding in a given linguistic milieu, do not yield intersubjectively shared significations? In terms of the above, external forms that are either "ahead of time" or "behind time," rather than "in time" are hardly aesthetically significant to Potebnja. "Everything," he wrote, "that narrows the realm of observed phenomena, renders points of view one-sided, limits the means of expression, leads to the downfall of arts."[41] Even though works of poetic art are "created by minds which are superior to the people,"[42] they nevertheless are intended for the people's aesthetic gratification. Therefore "the weakness and absence of poetry" stands in direct proportion to "the alienation of the literary class from society, the restriction of observed phenomena, the partiality of point of view and the paucity of means of expression."[43]

In sum, aesthetically significant external form is impartible from internal form. Jointly, as empirical givens, these forms excite our sense receptors, which in turn set into motion a complex apperceptive

[41] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 376.
[42] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 376.
[43] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 376.

process. Our apprehension of the signification and value of the intended phenomena and events ensues out of this process. External forms, or sensory-motor patterns, are the *terminus a quo* in this process. Without them no aesthetic experience can occur, yet it is the mode of these patterns that exerts a dominant influence upon this experience. Should they, for example, be interchangeable in every essential respect with those already existing in the perceiving mind and thus fuse unimpedingly with them, apprehension of them will be either considerably marginal or retarded. Potebnja observed: "A series of objects, a′, b′, c′, which are known to us and which present themselves to our perception gradually, will not be seen as long as they fuse unimpedingly with our previous percepts a, b, c; but if instead of the expected percept d, an unknown x, rather than a corresponding d, occurs, then the perception of the former, whose fusion with the previous one is being impeded, will be apperceived."[44] However, aesthetic apprehension of the external forms does not necessarily result out of a simple modal dichotomy between what is given and what is already known, as, for instance, the romantics and, in this century, the Russian formalists contended. The process of aesthetic apperception is far more complex than this. According to Potebnja, external forms which, as we would say today, are aesthetically overcoded or, in formalist terminology, are alienated do not as a rule prompt the apperceptive process. Distributed on the imaginary axis $x \rightarrow y$ between radically overcoded and explicitly familiar forms, only those which invoke unity of disparate images in our consciousness will be apprehended as aesthetically significant. Such forms are normally not to be found on either pole of the axis, but rather somewhere at its center.

As objectively given components of poetic work, these forms transform and perfect the corresponding aggregate of our mind and thereby function as a creating rather than as a merely transmitting medium of significations,[45] as *energeia* rather than *ergon*. To be aesthetically significant, they must, to use current language, be permeable to the semiotic approach.

[44] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 123.
[45] Humboldt described the relationship this way: "The mutual interdependence of thought and word clearly illuminates the truth that languages are not really means for representing already known truth, but are rather instruments for discovering previously unrecognized ones" (*Humanist Without Portfolio: An Anthology of the Writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt* [Detroit, 1963], p. 246).

### 4. *Internal Form of the Work of Poetic Art*

Poetry, Potebnja stated, is thinking in images. "Without image there is no art, and especially there is no poetry."[46] Image, internal form, representation, symbolism, or whatever one chooses to call the mode by which language seeks to evoke the sense of tangible realities, is then of central importance in the poetic text.

However, while it was relatively simple to define the internal form of the word, inasmuch as Potebnja equated it with its etymon, the image of the work of poetic art eludes easy definition.[47] His theory, in spite of the central importance of internal form to it, gave no definition of the image. What follows, as a result, is believed to be an impartial elaboration of the image based on his theory as a whole.

Heeding Humboldt's axiom, "*Das Wirkliche in ein Bild zu verwandeln* ist die allgemeinste Aufgabe aller Künst,"[48] Potebnja elevated the artistic image to a central category in his poetics. What, then, is this category? The internal form of the word, to reiterate, is its closest etymological meaning, a relatively constant mode or a representative sign of the object. Within the work of poetic art, which is a syntactic fusion of *mots pleins,* the emerging image is either a progressively constructed collocation of such *mots* (*sovokupnost' obrazov*) or a transcendent configuration of them. The two images, both theoretically and pragmatically, are dissimilar. The first resembles an algebraic group and depends upon the combinatory system of the given syntax, or, as Potebnja called it, the "modality of combination." Its elements, in varying degree of their completion, are distributed throughout the text. The second is a kind of nonadditive whole which is intentionally created at the strategic points of the text or at the conclusion of it.

These two types of images may perform two distinct functions: the first aims at establishing a similitude between the textual representation and the intended reality, and the second at "the disproportion between representation and its signification."[49] In conventional terms, the first intends at a realistic and the second at a symbolic rendition of reality. In the first, "the poetic image . . . can be a faithful reproduction of reality, i.e., its contents may not include anything that cannot

[46] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 353.
[47] For a historical survey of internal form, see Gustav Špet, *Vnutrennjaja forma slova* (Moscow, 1927).
[48] von Humboldt, *Gesammelte Schriften,* 2:126.
[49] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 340.

be included in sober scientific thought or in daily, insignificant perception."[50] In the second, on the other hand, "the poetic image, every time it is perceived and enlivened by the one who comprehends it, tells him something different and something more than what it directly contains."[51]

While recognizing the psychological and aesthetic possibilities of both processes, Potebnja favored the second as the intellectually superior. He observed: "To those to whom poetic image is the focus of ten, twenty, thirty separate cases and to whom these cases have fused and formed abstract conclusion, to those poetic image is more pithy and significant than to those to whom it says only what it contains."[52]

Primordially, the link between image and signification was quasi-scientific or mythical, i.e., the image was directly transferable into signification. Their connection required neither validation nor verification — it was admissible on faith. The signifier and signified functioned as semantic substitutions or semantic inversion. Once the two ceased to form an equation and became comparisons, however, their connection became poetic. Historically, this transition from myth to poetry began "with man's ability to realize and to retain the difference between the subjective beginning of the cognizing thought and that of its progression, which one can call (not precisely) reality, world, object."[53] Accordingly, in myth, the signifier and the signified can be expressed as $A \equiv X$ and in poetry as $A = X$.

Images of both types are the linguistic means, or, as Potebnja put it, the leap from representation to signification. As long as they remain "constant predicates to [their] changing subjects or constant explanation of the changing explanandum,"[54] they remain aesthetically sig-

[50] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti.* An example are the images in the following poem of A. A. Fet:

| | |
|---|---|
| Облаком волнистым | With a wavy cloud |
| Пыль встает вдали; | The dust rises in the distance; |
| Конный или пеший — | Is it a rider or a pedestrian — |
| Не видать в пыли. | One cannot see in the dust. |
| Вижу: кто то скачет | I see: someone is galloping |
| На лихом коне. | On the dashing horse. |
| Друг мой, друг далекий, | My friend, my far-away friend, |
| Вспомни обо мне! | Remember me! |

[51] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 341. In Potebnja's view, "Ein Fichtenbaum steht einsam," and Lermontov's and Tjutčev's translations of it, illustrate the disproportion between representation and signification.

[52] *Iz lekcij po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 521.

[53] *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 435.

[54] *Iz lekcij po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 484.

nificant. Should they figure as equivalences of the intended realities, however, as they did in myth, they automatically assume a didactic role.

Poetry, that is, the creative arts and myth, and prose, that is, science, were not completely unrelated, as conceived by Potebnja. While structurally they are indeed different, functionally they are but two modes of cognition. "Both depart from reality . . . to something that does not belong to it." Consequently, "reality and idea are common constituents of poetry and prose; in both of them [our] thought strives to introduce connection and completion into the diversity of the emotional data; but the different means and results peculiar to them demand that both these quests of [our] thought support and complement each other as long as mankind is 'striving.'"[55] As to their means and results, Potebnja observed:

> The common formula of poetry (respective art) is $A$ (image) $< X$ (significance), i.e., between image and signification there always exists such inequality that $A$ is lesser than $X$. The establishment of equation between $A$ and $X$ would destroy the poeticalness, i.e., would convert the image into a prosaic designation of a particular case, deprive it of the relationship to something else, or would even convert it into a scientific fact and its signification into a rule. $X$ in relation to $A$ is always something different, often even heterogeneous. Poetic thinking is an explanation of a particular by another heterogeneous particular. Thus if prose is *allegoria,* in a broad sense of this word, then both prose, as an expression of the elementary observation, and science tend, in some sense, to become *tautologia.*[56]

In brief, the internal form of the work of poetic art is a linguistic component of the text, and as such should not be confounded "with another representation which is more known than defined, and which is the same as perception or emotional image, in any case, aggregate attributes."[57] By distinguishing the two, one as a linguistic *given* and the other as a psychological experience, Potebnja stands apart from those psychologistic positions that conceive of poetic images solely as experience of either the external or intraorganic realities which are determined by the ideosyncratic complexities of individual perceivers.

The poetic text, due to its internal forms, or, as phenomenological theory would have it, due to its aspects (*Anschaungen*), affects our perception and cognition and thus renders the intersubjective knowl-

[55] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 193.
[56] *Iz lekcij po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 367.
[57] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 7.

edge of it a continuous possibility. A constancy of the internal form does not, however, guarantee its permanence. In time it may, as it often does, lose its palpability, thus ceasing to elicit aesthetic responses and to generate corresponding significations. In this way the poetic text becomes but a historical artifact.

### 5. *Contents or Idea of the Work of Poetic Art*

"By contents of the picture or the novel," Potebnja wrote, "we understand a series of thoughts which are either aroused by images in the onlooker and the reader or which served as a basis of the image in the creator himself at the time of his creative act."[58] From this one concludes that the work of poetic art, as the autonomously existing artistic given, consists of two, rather than three, constituents: the external and internal forms. The third component, content or idea, exists only as a semantic potentiality. In order for it to emerge during aesthetic heteronomy, the work must possess "the strength of its internal forms" and the perceiver's mind (*duša*) must in turn be in need of structural coalescence. The content of the work of poetic art is therefore the result of a dyadic relationship. Unlike the external and internal forms, which exist objectively, the content subsists in the perceiving consciousness of the creator and the art consumer. Potebnja observed:

> During the creation of the poetic work, at the moment when *X* is being explained by means of *A*, *a* occurs. However, in comprehension, the listener or the reader is provided first of all with a sign *a*, which must be explained with the reserve of [his] previous thought, *A*. [To him] *a* ought to serve as an indication of *x* which is being cognized [by him]. The analogy between creative and cognitive acts indicates that we can comprehend poetic work to the extent we participate in its creation.[59]

Potebnja's position on the content of poetic work poses a series of difficult questions. Some are: (1) if the work of poetic art "consists only of symbols of the extralinguistic signification and, in regard to the latter, is only the form,"[60] then at what point of the "modality of combination" of these symbols does its content emerge — throughout its unfolding, from its beginning to its end, or only at certain points?

[58] *Mysl' i jazyk*, p. 176.
[59] *Iz lekcij po teorii slovesnosti*, p. 543.
[60] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike*, p. 65.

(2) Is the final content a "collocation of images"[61] of "close significations" of each sentence of the text, or is it the signification of significations, i.e., the content that transcends the sum total of its parts? (3) Is the perceiver's content a variable of the content intended by the author and thus dependent upon it, or is it a distinct constituent of mental processes that emerge as a cognitive response in each interpreter and thus is independent of it?

Potebnja's theory does not provide explicit answers to these and similar questions. Implicitly, however, the statement that "a complex artistic work is exactly the same kind of development of the main image as the complex sentence [is] the development of one emotional image"[62] infers the following arguments: (a) in the process of perception, the final content of the work of poetic art results out of the changes in structure and form that occur during the transition of individual images from their emergence to their conclusion, (b) that individual images, in order to yield content, are to be arranged in some relation of subordination and interdependence, and (c) that the main image is either a complex of subordinate ones or an idea of the intended object(s), apprehendable in the sensibly perceptible form. As to the process which leads to the emergence of such an idea, Potebnja, almost anticipating structural linguists, believed that the content of the work is formed sequentially. During each instant of perception, our consciousness holds only one of the text's semantic units and extracts signification available to it at that instant. Upon the completion of the perceptive act, it readjusts the accumulated significance to the central one. Potebnja wrote: "At the moment when we are pronouncing the last word of the sentence, we think directly only of the content of this word; however, this content indicates what it refers to and what it has derived from, i.e., first [it indicates] other words of the same sentence that preceded it, then [it indicates] the sense of the period, chapter, book."[63] Semantic units that preceded one in focus, Potebnja believed, retreat "beyond the limits of the threshold,"[64] and from out there, "some representations exhibit more pronounced influence upon the cognized [phenomenon], some less. Those that are unrelated to the thought occupying us at that moment cannot occur in the subsequent one, provided the external impressions do not interrupt the flow of our

[61] *Iz zapisok po russkoj grammatike,* p. 549.
[62] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 188.
[63] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 175.
[64] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 142.

thought and do not give it new direction. Each member of the cognized series of representations brings into consciousness the results of all the preceding ones. The more versatile the connections among the preceding members, the more significant are these results for us."[65] To put it the way Jan Mukařovský did,[66] the perception of the poetic text occurs simultaneously on both horizontal and vertical axes: the first is structured by the text, and the second by our apperception. Out of the interaction of these two processes results the transformation of the perception of the poetic text into a cognition of it. According to Potebnja:

New perception, while fusing with the preceding one, inevitably brings it into consciousness or at least creates an incomprehensible situation for us which we shall call movement; but due to the fact that the preceding perception was posited either together or in some connection with other [perceptions], therefore they, too, enter [our] consciousness. Thus via such fusion a tie occurs between those representations which in time and in sequence of their appearance in [our] *soul* were, originally, not tied together. Along with this device which arouses in [our] consciousness some previous representations, there is also a device which removes others; if, for example, a new perception *C* has most of the common points with one of the previous perceptions *A* rather than with *B* which is in consciousness, then *B* will be pushed out from the thought by *A* attracted to it. *A* and *B* are thus tied, the first with *D, E, F,* the second with *G, H, I,* and [therefore] can be regarded as the beginning of a series which through them enters consciousness; the thought, following the direction whose beginning is *A,* removes another direction *B,* but the identity of *C* with *A* and not with *B* is forever a definable and invariable quantity: it is changeable in the same way as the feeling which accompanies and changes the coloring of perception and, in turn, depends upon the imperceptible alterations in the content of the latter.[67]

From this rather obtuse description it is evident that the content of the poetic work, as it appears in our consciousness, is not an indiscriminate computation of all of the work's semantic components, but instead an intentional correlation of what is being selected, retained, transformed and, of course, amplified by our apperception. To borrow the Gestalt term, the potential content of the poetic work and its realization in our consciousness are seldom, if ever, isomorphic.

The disclosure of the content of the work of poetic art, in addition to being structured by its text and the reader's apperception, is also

[65] *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 135.
[66] Cf. *The Word and Verbal Art: Selected Essays,* trans. John Burbank and Peter Steiner (New Haven, 1977).
[67] Burbank and Steiner, *The Word and Verbal Art,* p. 136.

affected by the historical context in which it is intended and in which it is generated.[68] Inasmuch as neither the poet nor the perceiver can transcend their historicity, the disclosed content stands to be intersubjectively similar. Theoretically, while the content of the poetic work might indeed be "hardly a known quantity" (*mnimoizvestnaja veličina*), historically, the "content which we think, by belonging also to others," is bound to be similar.

## 6. *Summary and Conclusion*

The structure of the work of poetic art, being analogous to the word, consists of three fundamental components — external form, image, and content. The first two, as linguistic givens, constitute its constant artistic components, whereas the third is its variable semantic potentiality. All three exist in a peculiar synchronic simultaneity, so that suspension of one inevitably results in the suspension of all. Nevertheless, from the emblematic and the functional point of view, the image is the central component of the work's structure.

Poetic image, if constructed step by step, is a combination of selectively related representations contained in the *mots pleins,* and, if created at strategic points of the text, an internal form of a lexeme whose vividness dominates over other forms in a given syntactic surrounding. Historically, the former has been favored by narrative and the latter by lyrical texts. The aesthetic value of the poetic image is contingent upon the attribute of the intended objects or designata that subsumes and evokes their totality. Therefore, as such, all poetic images, irrespective of whether they are verbal substitutions or contiguities, are metonimic.

Insofar as all languages are imbedded in ethnic consciousness, poetic images *ipso facto* reflect the congenial structure of the world. Confronting poetic imagery, outer and inner, the human mind equates or correlates it with intended realities and conceives of it either as myth, or as distinct phenomena and thus as poetry. Images of the former are posited as equivalences and those of the latter as *tertia comparationis*

[68] Humboldt expressed this idea this way: "The mutual interdependence of thought and word illuminates clearly the truth that languages are not really means for representing already known truth, but are rather instruments for discovering previously unrecognized ones. The difference between languages are not those of sounds and signs but those of differing world views . . ." (*Humanist Without Portfolio,* p. 246).

or, in linguistic terms, as predicates with potentially multiple subjects, In reality, however, these two modes of perception are seldom clearly demarcated and therefore myth resorts to poetics, and poetry to prosaic imagery.

The content of the work of poetic art, insofar as it is represented attributively rather than totally, is incessantly *in statu nascendi.* A genuine work of poetic art generates multiple contents. However, within a linguistically congenial milieu, the generative power of images is contained by the commonly shared, relatively stable, and objectively given representations of reality contained in them. Therefore, the creation, perception, and cognition of poetic images occurs within the delimiting context of the collective vision of the world (*videnie mira*).

Content, if by it one understands, as Potebnja did, "an answer to certain *x*,"[69] is realized either progressively, i.e., from the beginning to the end of the temporal unfolding of the work, or abruptly, at specific points of the text. In the first instance, the content is the integral of the significations of all the preceding images and in the second, it is the differential of "a series of thoughts evoked by images,"[70] distributed throughout the text.

From the perspective of the current discussion of linguistic and literary structures, Potebnja's view might appear rather inchoate. However, in the context of the sensationalist psychology prevalent in his time, which insisted on what Ernst Cassirer called "the dogma of autarchy and autonomy, the self-sufficiency and self-evidence of perceptual knowledge,"[71] the view was audacious. In fact, Potebnja, far in advance of transformational structuralism, postulated the system of psycho-linguistic transformation whereby cognitive constructions are determined by linguistic structures.

In contrast to today's structuralists, who tend to eliminate the epistemic subject, Potebnja perceived it to be the very center of all mental operations. Even though this subject per se cannot be determined fully, since "after becoming the object of [our] observation it changes substantially and ceases to be itself,"[72] it is nevertheless an "internal eye" which, while unable to see itself, alternately focuses either on the stage of our mental experiences or averts from it. Hence the content of our consciousness, that is, cognized I (*soznavaemoe ja*)

69 *Iz lekcij po teorii slovesnosti,* p. 549.
70 *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 176.
71 Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* 3:205.
72 *Mysl' i jazyk,* p. 169.

or empirical I, which we know, cannot occur without the activity of the cognizing I (*soznajuščee ja*) or the pure I, which we do not know. This being the case, it was plausible for Potebnja to posit that the relationship between the former and the latter, at least in their developed form — i.e., as consciousness and self-consciousness — occurs through language. Thus, the "whatness" of the objective reality, while being transposed into the apperceptive mass of our consciousness, becomes pure linguicity, and as such is subjected to the determination of the language structure.

What then is the genesis of structure in the works of poetic art? Is it (a) contained in them simply because they are linguistic constructs, or (b) unilaterally imposed upon them by the perceiving mind, or (c) created during the dyadic intercourse between the poetic text and its aesthetic apperception? Potebnja definitely favored the third position. The triune structure of the work of poetic art, consisting of the external and internal forms and the content, emerges in the course of aesthetic apperception. Prior to the act of reading, the work awaits completion through the apperceptive act. Structure, in Potebnja's definition, is therefore a contingent creation. In order for it to emerge, the poetic text, consisting of two structural givens, must be actualized by the language of the epistemic subject. Hence, it is safe to impute that in Potebnja's theory, language, as a phylogenetic phenomenon, is the "structure of structures" which embodies poetic reaction and, for that matter, all verbal constructs with perfection and completion (*ideal'nost'* and *cel'nost'*) — in other words, with sense.

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# The Secretariat of Internationality Affairs (*Sekretariiat mizhnatsional'nykh sprav*) of the Ukrainian General Secretariat (1917–1918)

M. MINTZ

There is no question that the issuance of the First Universal by the Ukrainian Central Rada (*Tsentral'na rada*)[1] on 10 (23) June 1917 signified an important step in the Ukrainian national movement's struggle for either (a) partial sovereignty as an autonomous member of a Russian federation, or (b) complete sovereignty, should certain circumstances obtain. It is also certain that the decision of the Central Rada's executive committee five days later, on June 15 (28), to establish a "General Secretariat of the Central Rada" widened the breach between the Provisional Government in Petrograd and the emerging Ukrainian consensus. That breach then grew until the two sides were forced to come to terms.

The organs of Ukrainian public opinion quickly grasped the significance of the newly established institution. *Narodnia volia,* the newspaper of the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionaries, recognized that the General Secretariat was capable of implementing the decisions of the Central Rada, which was "a Ukrainian parliament, as it were."[2] Defining the General Secretariat's functions as being purely bureaucratic did little to disguise its real nature: the new institution constituted a government of the Ukraine. *Narodnia volia* described it thus:

> From now on, a special secretary-general will be appointed who will be responsible for every sector of public life in the Ukraine. Every secretary is responsible for his actions before the delegates and before the Central Rada. In addition, all secretaries in the General Secretariat are responsible to one another both in their own work and in joint undertakings.[3]

1 Later called the "Little Rada" (*Mala rada*).
2 As quoted in *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 153, 22 June 1917.
3 *Kievskaia mysl',* 22 June 1917. Obviously the wording merely hints at the issues and leaves much unsaid. See Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materiialy do istorii revoliutsii, 1917–1920,* 4 vols. (Vienna, 1921–22), 1: 77.

*Robitnycha hazeta,* the newspaper of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, was even more candid: "The *General Secretariat,* as the *provisional government* of the Ukrainian people, must bring about the establishment of an autonomous regime in the Ukraine" (emphasis in the original).[4] Of course, attempts were made to soften the impact of these proclamations, especially in the wake of hostile reactions from the Provisional Government in Petrograd and from the Russian community in the Ukraine. Ironically, such attempts only obscured the issue and ultimately enhanced its place in the public eye.[5]

The motivations behind the Central Rada's act of 15 (23) June 1917 are evident in the structure and responsibilities assigned to the General Secretariat. These encompassed internal affairs, military affairs, finance, agriculture, law, education, and internationality affairs.[6] Unfortunately, due to the loss or inaccessibility of archival materials relating to the Rada and Ukrainian political parties at that time, we cannot trace the development of initial intentions through the discussions and decisions that culminated in political and administrative policy. And although the available data allow us to ascertain the nature of the other secretariats, they leave much room for debate about the character and functions of one — the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs (*Sekretariiat mizhnatsional'nykh sprav*).

If one compares the structure of the General Secretariat established by the Central Rada with the cabinet of a sovereign state, the absence of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs is immediately apparent. One reason for its omission may have been the intent to establish an autonomous Ukraine within the Russian federation, which, of course, would have obviated any need for an independent foreign policy.[7] Had this been the case, however, it should also have figured in the discussions about a Secretariat of Military Affairs, which we know it did not. Moreover,

[4] *Kievskaia mysl',* 22 June 1917. Dmytro Doroshenko also uses the term for "government": see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917–1923,* vol. 1: *Doba Tsentralnoi rady* (Uzhhorod, 1932).

[5] See the response by Sergei Iefremov to Konstantin Vasylenko's article: *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 154, 23 June 1917. Iefremov maintained that *Narodnia volia* had published "a premature and possible inaccurate report" on the subject.

[6] *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 150, 18 June 1917. See also Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 77, who explicitly uses the term *Sekretariiat mizhnatsional'nykh sprav* and lists the office second, after the Secretariat of Internal Affairs, which is not the case in *Kievskaia mysl'.*

[7] In the *Vistnyk Soiuzu vyzvolennia Ukrainy* (hereafter *Vistnyk*), no. 160, p. 473, the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs is spoken of as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

the foundation for an independent alignment in foreign policy had been laid as far back as 19 April 1917, during the Ukrainian National Congress. In its discussion of border questions, the congress determined: "In order to ensure [just resolutions of border issues] it is necessary to invite not only the representatives of the warring nations to the peace conference, but also representatives of those peoples on whose territory the war is being waged, including the Ukraine."[8] Although unification of the Ukrainian people, then divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires (the so-called Galician question),[9] was hinted at, the decisive elements in the discussion were (1) the assumption that a non-Russian authority would have to invite representatives of the Ukraine to the conference, and (2) that this delegation would be independent, and not, as it was then assumed, part of the Russian delegation. Slightly more vague was the statement on the issue made in a memorandum submitted by the Central Rada to the Provisional Government and to the executive committee of the Soviets towards the end of May.[10] There can be no doubt, however, that from the outset the drive for an independent foreign policy, and the administration to implement it, went hand in hand with the Ukrainians' efforts to secure autonomy and sovereignty.

Given the absence of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the establishment of a Secretariat of Internationality Affairs — a body that has no equivalent in the cabinets of other governments — takes on particular importance. Was this office formed merely to deal with specific circumstances, or was it intended to substitute for a Foreign Office? Was its establishment the end result of a struggle between those who demanded the immediate realization of independence — including a Ministry of Foreign Affairs — and those who, after appraising the political situation, advocated moderation and compromise? Let us consider these questions by investigating, insofar as possible, both the goals that were entertained for the office and the changes that it underwent during the events of 1917.

Before a plenary meeting of the Central Rada, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, head of the Rada, stated:[11]

[8] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 40; Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 59.

[9] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 40.

[10] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 59; Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 81; also *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nyi vopros,* ed. Simon Dimanstein, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1930), p. 149.

[11] The session began on 20 June 1917; the declaration was made at the meeting of June 26. See Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 78, and *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 157, 27 June 1917.

> The goal of the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs is to unite the activities of all peoples in the struggle for an autonomous-federative regime in Russia and for the attainment of accord between Ukrainians and other peoples on this basis. In the initial stage, the secretariat's duty will be to convene a conference of representatives of the nationalities and districts in Russia and to prepare material for this meeting. A second problem will be to reach accord as quickly as possible with the democratic elements of the national minorities living within the Ukraine itself.[12]

The secretariat's functions were thus twofold: (1) to campaign for accord with other minority peoples in the Russian Empire with the aim of transforming it into a federative state; (2) to campaign for accord among all nationalities in the Ukraine, with the aim of forging a political consensus of all peoples living within its boundaries in the upcoming battle for autonomy.

It appears, then, that the Secretariat for Internationality Affairs was to promote national awakening throughout the empire, so that the nationalities' institutions would facilitate the evolution of a Russian federation. In fact, such national awakenings were imperative if a federation was to be formed, since without the consolidation of other minorities and their formulation of political demands, the Ukraine would face the Russian government alone. In that situation, bilateral negotiations could only have led to further radicalization on both sides. Without any prospect of federation, the Ukrainians would have been forced to move towards secession, or, at the very least, to reveal a desire to secede. The Russians, for their part, would have been overjoyed by such a move, since it could be dismissed out of hand as the pretensions of an upstart ethnic group. Doubtlessly the strategic value at this stage of demanding an autonomous Ukraine within a Russian federation was not lost on a goodly number of those involved in the Ukrainian movement.[13]

The secretariat's second task — regulation of relations among the national minorities within the Ukraine — was inextricably tied to the first, since the Ukrainian movement, by seeking to represent the entire Ukraine in the struggle for autonomy, had become a territorial move-

[12] *Kievskaia mysl',* 27 June 1917; Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 80; Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 107.

[13] The situation was accurately, although negatively, assessed by M. Lirov (Moshe Litvakov), who observed that Kiev had placed itself in the vanguard of "dividing the revolution on the national-territorial level." See *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 146, 14 June 1917. Litvakov would later change his position.

ment. Lack of dialogue with the Ukraine's own minorities would not only have played into the hands of the Provisional Government — which was eager to deny the Ukrainian movement's right to represent them — but also might have crippled efforts to forge a joint policy with the minority peoples on the all-Russian level. Then, too, failure to achieve accord with the minorities in the Ukraine could have prevented the meeting of the territorial conventions that were to lay the groundwork either for negotiations with the Provisional Government or for the transformation of the Rada into the temporary representative of all peoples living in the Ukraine.[14]

The delineation of the functions of the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs exclusively in terms of Russian and Ukrainian territorial considerations marked a victory for pragmatism over radical romanticism. Yet the delineation in no way jeopardized the development of a powerful and highly effective administrative body.

Sergei Iefremov, a member of the Socialist-Federalist Party (S-F's),[15] was appointed secretary of internationality affairs. Already on 27 June 1917 he was authorized by the General Secretariat to head a committee, organized by the Central Rada, whose task was to pursue dialogue and accord with the national minorities. Almost simultaneously, decisions were made about establishing a committee of representatives of the nations demanding federalism.[16]

The appearance of a high-ranking government delegation from Petrograd — including Kerenskii, Tsereteli, and Tereshchenko — and the opening of negotiations between it and the Central Rada on 30 June 1917, gave legitimacy to the Ukrainian national awakening, despite the battering administered during the negotiations to the proposed structure of the new Ukrainian executive bodies. Of concern to us, of course, is what happened to the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs. Unfortunately, neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian press provides much information about the bargaining itself. But the issue's prominence in discussion and debate is apparent in the series of formulas that appeared in the periodical press in the guise of official announcements and communiques. These were issued both when the

[14] See, for example, the article by Kovalevs'kyi in *Kievskaia mysl'*, no. 159, 29 June 1917.

[15] *Kievskaia mysl'*, 29 June 1917; for more information about him see Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy*, 1: 96ff.

[16] *Kievskaia mysl'*, no. 158, 28 June 1917.

Rada's delegation departed for Petrograd[17] and during the negotiations themselves.[18]

The proposal for a temporary government of the Ukraine, formulated on July 16, provided for a secretary general of nationality affairs as one of the government's fourteen secretaries:[19]

> In the Secretariat of Nationality Affairs, the secretary will have three vice-secretaries, one from the Russians (*velikorusskii*), one from the Jews, and one from the Poles. These vice-secretaries have the right to propose matters and the right to take part in the decision making process in the General Secretariat in matters concerning their peoples. The vice-secretaries for nationality affairs will be confirmed by a committee of the Rada.[20]

Striking was the retreat from the term "internationality" and the corresponding contraction of the secretariat's competence to matters between national groups in the Ukraine. Failure to mention nationalities in the Russian Empire as a whole did not mean, however, that the Ukrainians abandoned the endeavor to establish a dialogue with them: the problem was simply transferred to a committee appointed by the Rada.[21] Another new feature of the constitutional proposal was the collegial character of the secretariat, that is, the incorporation of its vice-secretaries in the General Secretariat.

During the negotiations in Petrograd, much time was devoted to achieving a settlement on the subject of the Ukraine's national minori-

[17] The delegation included Volodymyr Vynnychenko, chief secretary; Khrystofor Baranovs'kyi, secretary of finances; Moshe Rafes, inspector general and representative of the minorities (the Bund). See Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 96.
[18] *Kievskaia mysl',* 28 June 1917.
[19] The proposal was made in the *instruktsiia* (directive) for the operation of the Ukrainian General Secretariat that the Ukrainians were trying to have approved by the Provisional Government. It was rejected, however, and the Provisional Government put forward a directive of its own.
[20] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 96. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 124ff. The Second Universal stressed only the problem of coming to an understanding with the minority nationalities in the Ukraine. See *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 162, 4 July 1917; also see M. Silberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministerium un di yidishe avtonomie in Ukraine* (Kiev, 1918), p. 1.
[21] *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 167, 9 July 1917; see also *Vistnyk,* no. 163, 12 August (30 July) 1917, p. 258. On 5 September 1917, H. Liubyns'kyi reported on the activities of the committee in anticipation of the coming congress of nationalities: *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 217, 6 September 1917. A. Zolotarev argued that the unity of the functions of the secretary was maintained then as well; Cherikover Archives, YIVO Institute for Jewish Research (New York), p. 12552.

ties, to whom the Russians were anxious to grant greater proportional weight. One outcome was the proposal that a Russian be appointed the Ukraine's secretary-general for nationality affairs and that a Ukrainian be appointed vice-secretary in charge of Ukrainian national interests. Moreover, the Provisional Government's directive for the organization of a General Secretariat, specifically the Secretariat of Nationality Affairs, provides for three posts to be filled by vice-secretaries within the ministry.[22] The arrangement was intended to guarantee that each of the four largest peoples of the Ukraine would be represented either by the secretary or by one of his vice-secretaries.

There are major discrepancies between the text of the Provisional Government's directive and the Central Rada's proposal. Among them are the former's (1) vagueness about the national identity of the vice-secretaries, leaving the impression that a Ukrainian could very well serve as a vice-secretary at the same time that a member of another national group was appointed secretary-general;[23] (2) definition of Ukrainians as *one* of the Ukraine's largest peoples; (3) unwillingness on the part of the Provisional Government to grant the vice-secretaries any status whatsoever in discussions conducted within the General Secretariat, including those dealing with national minorities.

Another proposal for a secretariat was submitted by the Ukrainian Social-Democrat Tkachenko at a meeting of the Rada on August 13 (26), the day after Vynnychenko's resignation from the ministry.[24] That secretariat proved to be a forerunner of Doroshenko's cabinet. Formulated in compliance with the Provisional Government's directive, Tkachenko's proposal went so far as to advocate the appointment of Aleksander Zarubin, a Russian Social-Revolutionary, as secretary for nationality affairs. Vice-secretaries were to be M. Zilberfarb representing the Jews, M. Mickiewicz representing the Poles, and O. Shul'hyn representing the Ukrainians.[25] Only after Doroshenko won appointment, on August 17 (30), did he reveal his cabinet to the Rada.

22 For the text of the directive, see *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 190, 5 August 1917.
23 *Kievskaia mysl',* 5 August 1917; Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 124; Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 128ff.
24 Zolotarev relates that in the Ukrainians' preliminary discussions about framing a constitution, it was suggested that the office for nationality affairs be placed permanently in the hands of the Poles; Cherikover Archives, YIVO, p. 12556.
25 *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 198, 15 August 1917.

Zarubin was to hold the office of inspector-general in the Secretariat, whereas Shul'hyn was promoted to secretary-general of nationality affairs; there were now only two vice-secretaries — Zilberfarb representing the Jews, and Mickiewicz representing the Poles.[26] Why, we must ask, was no vice-secretary appointed to represent the Russians?[27]

When Doroshenko's declaration of principle failed to win solid support and he tendered his resignation, the Rada again turned to Vynnychenko. As president Vynnychenko did not reshuffle the cabinet he had inherited from Doroshenko; in fact, he requested the Provisional Government's immediate approval of the General Secretariat as already nominated.[28] In its agreement to the Provisional Government's directive, to which a list of Vynnychenko's cabinet was attached, the Rada again referred to Shul'hyn as "Secretary of Internationality Affairs." On the other hand, in confirming the cabinet the Provisional Government scrupulously referred to him as "Secretary of Nationality Affairs."[29]

The Rada's persistent use of the term "internationality" clearly indicates its intentions for that office. Even when forced to comply with the Provisional Government's demands, the Rada made sure to say that of the fourteen ministerial functions it deemed necessary to implement the Ukraine's autonomy, only nine were included in the Provisional Government's directive. Moreover, the Rada stressed that the sources of legitimacy and continuity in the Ukraine were the decisions made by high-ranking Ukrainian institutions. The same view was expressed during the inauguration of the new Secretariat of Nationality Affairs before the Little Rada on 29 September (12 October) 1917:[30]

The Secretariat of Nationality Affairs will protect (and ensure) the rights of

26 *Kievskaia mysl'*, no. 202, 20 August 1917; and Doroshenko, *Zamitky,* 1: 135.
27 I find it difficult to accept the explanation that the Russians rejected the appointment; Silberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministerium,* p. 1.
28 The only change was in the post of general secretary of labor. Sergei Vasilevskii had been proposed for the office by Doroshenko, but the demand of the Soviet Executive Committee in Kiev and of the trade unions that one of their own candidates be appointed had caused Vasilevskii to refuse the offer. Vynnychenko agreed, then, to nominate a non-Ukrainian. See *Kievskaia mysl'*, no. 202, 20 August 1917, and no. 203, 21 August 1917. See also Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 136ff., and Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 121. Ber Borokhov was mentioned as a possible candidate: see M. Mintz, "Ber Borokhov ve-ha-Ukrainim bi-shnat 1917," *Shvut* 4 (1977): 59.
29 *Kievskaia mysl'*, no. 194, 10 August 1917.
30 *Kievskaia mysl'*, no. 236, 30 September 1917.

national minorities from any restrictions, legal or actual, in both social and political respects; it will help in the reorganization of existing national institutions on the basis of democracy and freedom, and will erect new institutions to satisfy the needs dictated by national life. In all, the Secretariat of Nationality Affairs will monitor the national life of these peoples and will help foster good relations between them. *Along with this, the secretariat will defend Ukrainian interests within the Ukraine and beyond its borders.*

In conclusion the declaration reaffirmed that the Secretariat of Nationality Affairs would not cease to concern itself with internationality affairs, that is, those extending beyond the Ukraine's borders (the passage was emphasized in *Kievskaia mysl'*).

With the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, changes took place in the Ukrainian administration that culminated in the establishment of a wholly sovereign government. This was a gradual process, however, in which each stage had a rationale of its own. On October 31 (November 13) the Central Rada voted to increase the staff of the General Secretariat.[31] Its resolution based the continued existence of the General Secretariat on the authority that it derived from the Provisional Government. The designation of secretaries not previously authorized was justified with the contention that the Rada was doing what it had to do in face of the Provisional Government's collapse and its refusal to submit to the Bolsheviks.[32]

At this point, did the Secretariat of Nationality Affairs immediately revert to a Secretariat of Internationality Affairs? Apparently not. The Third Universal, issued on 7 (20) November 1917, referred to the "Secretariat of Nationality Affairs" as the body charged with writing a law on personal autonomy.[33] Beginning in December, however, the title "Secretary of Internationality Affairs" began to appear with increasing frequency in official publications dealing with the Ukraine and its relations with the regime in Petrograd and with other parts of the empire. The practice persisted as long as Shul'hyn's name was on the publications.[34] I have not located any explicit authorization for the change, but the formal arguments for it can be discerned in a document that the General Secretariat circulated after the Central Powers and Soviet Russia had declared a ceasefire.

[31] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 49, 50; Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 175, 177ff.
[32] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 15.
[33] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 52; Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 181.
[34] About the General Secretariat's response of December 5 (18) to the ultimatum of the Council of Commissars in Petrograd, see Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 216ff. On the General Secretariat's appeal to all governments of the new republics created on Russian imperial territory, see Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 86–87.

The memorandum in question, dated 11 (24) December 1917, begins: "The Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada of 7 November 1917 declared the establishment of a Ukrainian People's Republic and by this act granted it international status."[35] The document bears the signature of Shul'hyn as secretary of internationality affairs.[36] The Axis Powers used the term in their invitation to the General Secretariat, sent in December, to participate in the peace talks at Brest-Litovsk. On 20 December 1917 (2 January 1918), all the members of the General Secretariat signed the Axis Powers' authorization of a grain shipment: there, too, Shul'hyn was designated the secretary of internationality affairs,[37] whereas the general secretaries for national matters were listed only at the end of the document. From this we can conclude that "internationality affairs" now referred exclusively to the foreign affairs of the Ukrainian republic, although the Ukrainian government still abstained from using that term.[38] With the publication of the Fourth Universal on 9 (22) January 1918, the General Secretariat changed its name to the "People's Council of Ministers" and Shul'hyn took charge of foreign affairs with the explicit title "Ministr zakordonnykh sprav" (minister of foreign affairs).[39]

Of the many elements in the struggle between the Central Rada and the Provisional Government about the function and nature of the Secretariat of Internationality (or Nationality) Affairs, one in particular bears discussion: the attitudes of the two sides toward the rights of national minorities in the Ukraine.

The Ukrainians' argumentation was too intricate for presentation in full here. Our investigation is limited to the series of formal decisions and declarations made at stages in the development of the Ukrainian state. Let us begin with the Ukrainian National Congress, convened between 4–8 (17–21) April 1917. One key address, delivered by F. Matushevs'kyi, was entitled "The Rights of National Minorities and Their Guarantees."[40] Matushevs'kyi stressed the majority status of the

[35] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 95; Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 227.
[36] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 96.
[37] Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 98.
[38] Raising the rank of each vice-secretary of the secretary of nationality affairs to that of general secretary was intended to secure the proportional representation in the General Secretariat of the national minorities; see Silberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministerium,* pp. 41ff. This came soon after the expansion of the Secretariat; Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 2: 201.
[39] Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 269ff.
[40] Fedir Matushevs'kyi, a journalist, belonged to the Association of Ukrainian

Ukrainians and the minority status of the peoples living among them in the Ukraine. He argued that the Ukraine required national and territorial autonomy along with a guarantee of the rights of national minorities, including their right to self-government.[41] The congress's resolutions also mentioned a "complete guarantee of the rights of national minorities living in the Ukraine,"[42] but the phrase was not given any specific or official form.

The First Universal recommended that Ukrainians living side-by-side with other peoples immediately make contact with "the democratic elements of these peoples in order to join forces with them in the quest for a new and just life." Thus it expressed the hope that the non-Ukrainian peoples would cooperate with the Ukrainians in shaping an autonomous Ukraine. In addition, it promised that all peoples, through their representatives, would take part in the drafting of a constitution for the "Ukrainian Land."[43] Vynnychenko had already specified, in the General Secretariat's declaration of principle, that one function of the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs was the speedy establishment of dialogue with "the democratic elements of the national minorities." As was noted above, at the same session the Rada had approved the creation of a committee to seek accord with the national minorities, to be headed by the secretary for internationality affairs, Iefremov.[44]

Due to the negotiations with the Provisional Government initiated in the interim, the committee apparently functioned with some difficulty. Nonetheless, the Second Universal, in a spirit of openness, reemphasized the Ukrainians' commitment to rounding out the Rada's membership "on a just basis" with representatives from the revolutionary organizations of other peoples. It also spoke of the General Secretariat's diligent efforts to fortify the new government through "an accord with other peoples."[45] During consultations within the Rada and its committees about the drafting of a directive (or *instruktsiia*) for the General Secretariat, the principle of proportional representation in

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Progressives (TUP); Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 39, and Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy,* 1: 58.

41 *Vistnyk,* no. 151, 20 May 1917, p. 330.

42 Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 39.

43 Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 73ff.

44 *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 158, 28 June 1917.

45 Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 73.

the Central Rada was in fact adopted.[46] The most debated issue was the status of the minority secretaries in the General Secretariat and the scope of their authority. That issue deserves analysis here.

The Ukrainians, at the outset of negotiations, and the Provisional Government in Petrograd, from beginning to end, were in accord on one point: neither understood the inclusion of secretaries for minority affairs in the General Secretariat as the inclusion of elected representatives of their respective peoples who would supervise autonomous national institutions serving the needs of these minorities. In their view, the minority secretaries should receive ordinary portfolios according to their qualifications. In other words, their appointment should be contingent on (1) professional qualifications, and (2) allegiance to polititical bodies that could be termed "revolutionary democratic."[47] The minority secretaries would be part of the political coalition holding executive power in an independent Ukrainian government.[48] The secretaries were obligated, then, to stand up for the coalition's policies during votes of confidence in plenary sessions of the Rada and to step down from their posts if the General Secretariat received a vote of no confidence.[49] The General Secretariat was to prevent the passage of legislative or administrative acts that would deprive a minority of their rights. The organization of minorities was to remain voluntary in nature, but any such organization was to be designated a juridical entity with rights recognized by law. Had such measures actually come into effect, they would have minimized the tension between the assertion of the Ukraine's autonomy, on the one hand, and the principle (accepted by all sides in theory) that no constitutional changes were to be introduced before the convening of an all-Russian constituent assembly, on the other hand.

This orientation actually won approval during a joint closed meeting of the presidiums and representatives of the non-Ukrainian revolutionary parties as an equitable means of electing the four general secretaries representing the national minorities.[50] The final decision was

[46] This was noted in the party newspaper of the Fareynikte (see fn. 54, below), *Der yidisher proletarier* (Kiev), nos. 6–7, 7 (20) August 1917, p. 4.
[47] *Der yidisher proletarier,* 7 (20) August 1917, p. 7.
[48] That is, of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats (S-D's) and Social-Revolutionaries (S-R's).
[49] During the negotiations the Ukrainians considered offering permanent offices in the ministries to the minorities; the Poles were to have the Secretariat of Nationality Affairs; the Russians, the Secretariat of Labor; and the Jews, the post of inspector-general. See Zolotarev, Cherikover Archives, YIVO, p. 12547.
[50] *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 171, 14 July 1917. Those proposed were A. N. Zarubin

deferred to a committee meeting to be held July 14. That day, however, instead of an official meeting, a private consultation took place at which representatives of the Polish Socialist Party (left) announced that the Polish "Democratic Central" would appoint the Polish secretary.[51] The Polish candidate, then, was no longer a representative of a revolutionary party,[52] but, in theory, the representative of the Poles as a curia.[53] This development was exploited by Moshe Litvakov, representative of the Fareynikte (or Vereinigkte), the Jewish socialist workers' party uniting the Jewish socialists and the Zionist socialists.[54] He argued that by accepting the Polish nominee, the committee would be abandoning both the objective qualifications criterion and revolutionary unity and, in fact, adopting the principle of national representation. If the Poles were to be treated as a curia, then the Fareynikte, or United party, saw no reason for the Jews to adhere to the objective criterion: they, too, had the right to be recognized as an independent curia. The Jews, like the Ukrainians and the Poles, would not allow an external force to dictate who their representatives would be; each group wanted to organize its national life by themselves. Litvakov concluded with the demand that either all Jewish socialist parties elect the candidate for the post of Jewish secretary or that the entire Rada do so.[55] It is doubtful that Litvakov's proposal fell in line with the Fareynikte's basic aim of guaranteeing that a Jewish secretary supervise the development and maintenance of Jewish national-personal autonomy.[56] At this stage of the discussion such a possibility was

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from the Russian S-R's, a representative from the Mensheviks whose name was not recorded, Rafes from the Bund, and a representative of the Polish Socialist Party.

51 *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 172, 15 July 1917. On the creation of the Polish Democratic Central (PDC) and the role it played in the negotiations, see Henryk Jabłoński, *Polska autonomia narodowa na Ukrainie, 1917–1918* (Warsaw, 1948). The PDC was organized to be in radical opposition to the Polish Executive Committee (see fn. 53).

52 *Der yidisher proletarier,* 7 (20) August 1917, p. 7.

53 This was a point of sharp conflict between the PDC and the Polish Executive Committee or Polski Komitet Wykonawczy (PKW) (Jabłoński, *Polska autonomia,* pp. 26ff.). The latter was the umbrella organization of all Polish organizations created on 6 (19) March 1917. It was controlled by the Party of National Democrats (Endecja).

54 Fareynikte stood for "Fareynikte yidishe sotsialistishe arbeter partey" (FISAF), which translates as the United Jewish Socialist Workers' Party.

55 *Der yidisher proletarier,* 7 (20) August 1917, p. 8; also *Kievskaia mysl',* 15 July 1917.

56 Decisions in this matter were taken at the headquarters of the southwest district of the Fareynikte on 29 June 1917; see Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 86ff. The need to take a strong stand on personal autonomy required an explicit statement.

evidently not considered. Responding to Litvakov, Shul'hyn, as the candidate for secretary of internationality or nationality affairs, proposed that a committee representing Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians be appointed to settle the debate. Neither the arguments nor the protests of Moshe Rafes, spokesman for the Bund, had any effect. A committee of five representatives from each side was appointed.[57]

The committee met on July 15. At the outset Zolotarev, in the name of the southwest district of the Bund, proposed a compromise: the objective (*Gesheftlekher*) principle would still apply to the four minority secretaries in the General Secretariat, but assistant or vice-secretaries were to be attached to the secretary for nationality affairs who would be elected by the curias of the national minorities and would supervise their respective concerns. However, the national curias were still understood to include only the revolutionary democratic parties.[58] After prolonged discussion, the Fareynikte accepted the proposal.

The new procedure still had to be approved by the representatives of the Ukrainian factions if it was to receive the committee's authorization. In my opinion, the factions did not have the same reasons for accepting the proposal, nor did they see eye-to-eye about its practical results. The Fareynikte saw it as a package deal whereby they would withdraw their opposition to a Bundist candidate for secretary of nationality affairs in exchange for the possibility that a vice-secretary would be appointed from their own ranks, who could then give substance to a network of autonomous institutions. In other words, the Fareynikte saw the proposal as a golden opportunity to realize the kind of personal autonomy Jewish political parties had spoken of for two decades preceding the February Revolution.[59] The Polish representative may have looked upon the situation with similar hopes, but it is doubtful that to the Poles it appeared as the same kind of golden opportunity. Apparently the Russian representatives stood aloof from these developments, although the Menshevik representative may have been somewhat uncomfortable about rejecting the Bund's initiative. In fact, at the elections no Russian vice-secretary was chosen.[60] It became the Ukrainians' turn to act.

[57] *Der yidisher proletarier,* 7 (20) August 1917, p. 10; also *Kievskaia mysl',* 16 July 1917.
[58] *Der yidisher proletarier,* 7 (20) August 1917, p. 10. The formulation precipitated a debate about the position of the Zionist organization. On the attitude of the Bund, see Cherikover Archives, YIVO, pp. 12542–12552.
[59] In this connection, see the article on personal autonomy by Litvakov in *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 88, 1 April 1917, and no. 89, 2 April 1917.
[60] *Kievskaia mysl',* no. 173, 16 July 1917.

Why did the Ukrainians support the proposed settlement? The explanation probably lies in their realization that the more the national minorities — meaning, above all, the Jews — had a specific national interest in the on-going changes in the Ukraine, the greater their commitment to the Ukrainian national movement would be.[61] This was very apparent in the articles of the committee's summary statement, which were later incorporated into a constitutional proposal. With respect to the vice-secretaries, the articles maintained that (a) they are members of the General Secretariat, with the right to partake in discussions and decisions in matters pertaining to their respective peoples; (b) authorization of their appointments falls to the Rada;[62] (c) they have the authority to establish national councils of their national groups.

The articles established the vice-secretaries as members of the General Secretariat and made them responsible to it for their actions. In other words, the vice-secretaries were the appointed members of a government coalition upon whose fate their own depended. They were authorized to establish national councils representing the nationalities, but this did not confer any additional power on them nor did it remove them from the Rada's jurisdiction.[63] Thus, as the representation of the national minorities in the General Secretariat grew quantitatively — a development compatible with the Provisional Government's orientation — a new qualitative situation was also taking shape. Together these developments allowed the minorities to lay the foundation of an institution likely to have revolutionary influence on their status both in the Ukraine and beyond.

It is not at all suprising, then, that the directive of the Provisional Government completely ignored the articles dealing with the appointment of vice-secretaries. It did state, however, that the secretary and three vice-secretaries were to be chosen from among the largest national groups in the Ukraine, without giving preference to the Ukrainians. The vice-secretaries were not to be considered members

[61] Zolotarev, Cherikover Archives, YIVO, p. 12552.

[62] *Kievskaia mysl'*, 16 July 1917. The Bund's proposal mentioned only the right to decide matters concerning their own nationality. *Der yidisher proletarier,* 7 (20) August 1917, p. 10; Khrystiuk, *Zamitky,* 1: 96. The third article was not included in the constitutional proposal, although it had been agreed upon.

[63] Connected with this was the debate about the status of each representative as a state secretary, which was being demanded by the Zionists. See M. Postan's "Tsu der shtats-sekretar frage," in *Di yidishe avtonomie un der natsionaler sekretariat in Ukraine: Materialn un dokumentn,* ed. E. Cherikover (Kiev, 1920), pp. 20–34.

of the General Secretariat; rather, they were clerks with specific fields of competence whose appointment need not be by the Rada. They were explicitly called "representatives of the nationalities" — a designation which diminished the authority of the Rada and the Ukrainians.

It was with good reason that in responding to the directive of August 4, the Rada protested that the Provisional Government's guidelines for the General Secretariat "upset the unity of the Ukrainian peoples represented in the Rada" and called on all peoples of the Ukraine to join in "the organized struggle for their interests and to rally around the Ukraine's Central Rada."[64]

When the Provisional Government demanded that the Ukrainian representative body agree to proportional representation for national minorities in the Ukraine, it in no way intended to promote the establishment of autonomy for these minorities. Indeed, the Provisional Government could not even raise such an issue, since from its standpoint this would have been tantamount to a premature constitutional proposal. Its intent was only to remind the Ukrainians that the Ukraine was not nationally homogeneous and that its problems would not be solved by measures dealing exclusively with Ukrainians. Undoubtedly the Provisional Government sought to create a situation in which the Ukraine's secession would be blocked by the minority question. It assumed that the minorities would be a trojan horse in the Ukrainian camp, successfully frustrating any such attempt.

When the Ukrainian authorities were obliged to meet the challenge, they attempted to temper the anti-Ukrainian thrust of the Provisional Government's directive by converting the nationalities problem into an internal issue in an autonomous Ukraine. In other words, by localizing the issue the Ukrainian government tried to convert a liability into an asset. As an internal matter, personal autonomy could be offered and guaranteed by an independent Ukrainian government.

Although not immediately appreciated as such, this development was of far-reaching and momentous import. First, the Ukrainians had decided on matters that, according to law, only the constitutional law-giver of Russia could determine and then only after authorization by an all-Russian constituent assembly. Second, the Ukrainian proposal recognized the Jews as a national minority eligible for institutional autonomy, thus presenting the Provisional Government with an embarrassing fait accompli. The precedent could hardly have pleased

[64] *Kievskaia mysl'*, no. 194, 10 August 1917; Khrystiuk, *Zamitky*, 1: 118–19.

the Provisional Government, since it imposed recognition of the Jews as a constituent group in the Russian fellowship of nations; the door was thus opened for the extraterritorial institutionalization of other national minorities (for example, the Ukrainians in Russia).[65] Third, the Ukrainian system recognized not only the Jews as an extraterritorial people, but also the Poles and, even more importantly, the Russians living in the Ukraine. For the latter group, implementation of the system would have meant the withering of their ties to Russia even in the sense of constitutional status; it is small wonder, then, that they washed their hands of it. For the Jews, however, it was a great operative achievement, since henceforth not only would they be an extraterritorial unit, but one on equal terms with the Russians and Poles in the Ukraine.

This last fact aroused mixed feelings among the Jews. On one hand, there was joy at having attained such status, but on the other, there was concern and confusion about the implications of firm support for Ukrainian national aspirations. The Ukrainians, aware of this dichotomy, acted quickly and pursued their policy vigorously. The Jews, as the Ukrainians' partners (in an advisory capacity), were enthusiastic about laying the foundations for their autonomous institutions. Simultaneously, they saw their importance as a political factor increase not only in the Ukraine, but in Russia and abroad. Nonetheless, many Jews felt uneasy about processes which, they believed, would lead to the fracturing of an integral Russia. This vacillation between sympathy and hesitancy, inspiration and frustration, was without doubt a factor bringing about the bitter fate of Ukrainian Jewry in the years 1918–1919.

Even without access to primary materials, which would certainly facilitate a more complete treatment, it is clear that there is a link

[65] Of interest in this connection is the report of M. J. Pelissier of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was submitted on 28 October 1917. Pelissier was in Kiev from 2 (15) August on, and interviewed the key men in the Ukrainian government. Vynnychenko told Pelissier:

> Nous voulons montrer par son model, comment doit elle constitué la societé future des nations. C'est pourquoi nous avons admis à la Rada Centrale la representation de toutes les minorités ethniques qui vivent sur la territoire de l'Ukraine. Nous serons le premier pays du monde qui realisera probablement *l'Autonomie personnelle,* une question qui interesse particulierement les Juifs qui n'ont pas de territoire, mais qui sont en Russie une nationalité hebraïque, nettement determinée.

The report is now in the archives of the ministry in Paris: *Guerre 1914–1918: Russie-Ukraine,* vol. 694.

between the two problems dealt with in this article. Indeed, a coherence much like that of an integrated system can be discerned. When the efforts of the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs to achieve accord with the peoples of the former Russian Empire were discredited, or came to a halt, attempts to arrive at an understanding with the minority peoples of the Ukraine itself became much more important and intensive. Consequently, the importance of the role of Jews (as one-third of the population of Ukrainian cities) in securing an accord desirable to the Ukrainians grew. This, in turn, led to a heightened sensitivity about the Jews' national needs, which culminated in the demand for a settlement of the minority question in the framework of national personal autonomy.

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# Soviet Agricultural Policies in the Ukraine and the 1921–1922 Famine*

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For centuries the Ukraine has been a great grain-producing region, the famed "granary" of Europe. Yet one part of this rich agricultural region, the steppe or southern Ukraine, suffered an extreme shortage of food in 1921–1922. There famine marked the terminus of the Revolution of 1917, as a decade later, in 1932–1933, famine throughout the Ukraine would end the "Revolution from above" of 1929.

Several authors have already written on this topic.[1] Some have singled out drought as the famine's primary and immediate cause.[2] But in 1921–1922 drought affected the entire Ukraine, whereas only the steppe region experienced famine conditions. Also, the steppe itself had previously survived even more severe droughts — in 1869 and 1885, for example[3] — without such tragic consequences.

Undoubtedly, drought was a reason for the poor harvest that year, but it did not cause the famine. As another author, Herasymovyč, has pointed out, the main factor causing famine conditions in the steppe Ukraine in 1921–1922 was not weather, nor any other natural factor, nor even civil war: it was the Soviet government's policies in 1919–1921, specifically, its land and food requisition policies.[4]

From the very beginning of the Soviet regime, Bolshevik leaders viewed the Ukraine as a source of grain. A telegram from Lenin to

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1 Among them are H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919–1923* (Stanford, Calif., and London, 1935), and Ịvan Herasymovyč, *Holod na Ukrajini* (Berlin, 1922).

2 For instance, Fisher, *Famine in Soviet Russia,* p. 255.

3 *Itogi bor'by s golodom v 1921–22 gg.: Sbornik statej i otčetov* (Moscow, 1922), p. 253.

4 Herasymovyč, *Holod na Ukrajini,* pp. 35–82.

Ordžonikidze and Antonov-Ovseenko dated 15 January 1918 called for "grain, grain, grain!" and ordered that it be sent every day to Soviet Russia.[5] The purpose of the German-Austrian occupation of the Ukraine in 1918 was also to assure the export of grain, as promised by the Rada government in a secret protocol of 25 January 1918.[6] By an agreement made on April 23 of that year, the Ukraine was to supply the Axis powers with one million tons of grain and other products by the end of July.[7] In fact, only 65,000 tons were exported,[8] for in 1918 the food situation was extremely grave throughout the Ukraine, especially in Kiev and Odessa.[9] The Germans' difficulty in requisitioning grain was due mainly to peasant protest. In early June a peasant uprising exploded in the district of Zvenyhorodka, south of Kiev.[10] Eighteen partisan divisions comprising 25,000 men took up arms.[11] The uprising spread to the Taraščа district. During the German occupation, 30,000 German and Austrian soldiers were killed in the battle with Ukrainian peasants.[12]

In the spring of 1919, there were two Soviet military detachments in the Ukraine, in which the Bolsheviks and Ukrainian peasants fought side-by-side. One, centered in Kiev, was called the first Soviet Ukrainian division: it included peasants from Taraščа and Zvenyhorodka. The other, centered in Xarkiv and called the second Soviet Ukrainian division, comprised Hryhorijiv's peasant troops, the Maxno army, and the Dybenko brigade.[13] But soon afterwards cooperation between the Bolsheviks and the peasants ceased. The Bolshevik government had

[5] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, 5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958–1965), 50: 30.

[6] W. Bihl, *Österreich-Ungarn und die Friedensschlüsse von Brest-Litowsk* (Vienna, 1970), pp. 99–100. *Krax germanskoj okkupacii na Ukraine* (Moscow, 1936), p. 30.

[7] W. Groener, "Tagebuch und Aufzeichnungen Wilhelm Groeners," in Winfried Baumgart, comp., *Von Brest-Litovsk zur Deutschen Novemberrevolution: Aus den Tagebüchern, Briefen und Aufzeichnungen von Alfons Paquet, Wilhelm Groener, und Albert Hopman. März bis November 1918.* (Göttingen, 1971), p. 350.

[8] P. Borowsky, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918* (Lübeck/Hamburg, 1970), p. 190.

[9] Bihl, *Österreich-Ungarn,* p. 125.

[10] I. Kulik, "Revoljucionnoe dviženie na Ukraine," *Žizn' nacional'nostej,* 1919, no. 4 (12), p. 2. N. Suprunenko, *Očerki istorii graždanskoj vojny i inostrannoj voennoj intervencii na Ukraine* (Moscow, 1967), p. 61.

[11] I. Kapulovskij, "Organizacija vosstanija protiv getmana," *Letopis' revoljucii,* 1923, no. 4, p. 98.

[12] O. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1918* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1971), p. 187.

[13] *Iz istorii graždanskoj vojny v SSSR,* vol. 1 (Moscow, 1960), pp. 641–642, 668. "Iz istorii graždanskoj vojny na Ukraine v 1918 g.," *Krasnyj arxiv,* 1939, no. 4, p. 73.

proved to be very similar to the German troops where grain requisitions were concerned.[14]

### *The Land Policy of the Soviet Government in 1919*

On 11 February 1919, the Provisional Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukraine issued a decree calling for the nationalization of landowners' estates so as to organize state farms — in Ukrainian, *radhospy* (Russian *sovkhozy*). It was decided that sugar plantations and beet fields should also be nationalized.[15] The Third Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, which was held in March, also passed a resolution calling for the transformation of private land management to cooperative management and for the organization of *radhospy* and communes.[16]

In the spring of 1919, almost all estates in the Ukraine formerly held by landowners were duly reorganized. For example, in the Kiev province 1.9 million *desjatyny* (1 *desjatyna* = 2.7 acres) were nationalized, leaving only 80,000 *desjatyny* in private hands. By July of that year, 1,256 *radhospy* comprising 1,202,514 *desjatyny* of land had been organized.[17]

To quote the Soviet historian, P. M. Ponomarenko: "The Soviet authorities in power in the Ukraine in 1919 did not carry out a land policy in sympathy with the peasants there. Middle and poor peasants were allotted only small lots of land."[18] The peasants responded with opposition to the Soviet policy as a whole.[19] One writer, M. Kubanin, says that poor peasants were in the vanguard of the opposition.[20] Certainly these people, for the first time seeing the possibility of owning land of their own, did not embrace the Soviet policy of collectivization.

After the spring of 1919 revolts against Soviet power broke out throughout the Ukraine. In the Kiev province alone, five hundred

14 More detailed information on the Ukraine in 1919 can be found in A. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine* (New Haven, 1963).
15 M. Kubanin, *Maxnovščina* (Leningrad, 1927), p. 54.
16 A. A. Borodin and P. P. Bačinskij, "Kompartija Ukrainy v bor'be za osuščestvlenie rešenij VIII s"ezda RKP(B) po krest'janskomu voprosu," *Voprosy istorii KPSS,* 1960, no. 1, p. 75.
17 Suprunenko, *Očerki istorii,* pp. 195, 198.
18 P. M. Ponomarenko, "O politike partii v ukrainskoj derevne v 1919–1920 gg.," *Voprosy istorii,* 1956, no. 8, p. 106.
19 Suprunenko, *Očerki istorii,* p. 199, quotes one peasant as saying, "If management is large, we shall become tenant farmers again."
20 Kubanin, *Maxnovščina,* p. 55.

peasant uprisings occurred.[21] Among them was the revolt led by Zelenyj (pseudonym of D. Terpylo) in the Trypillja region. On 28 March 1919, the Soviet Ukrainian government issued a formal denunciation of Zelenyj's revolt.[22] According to a report dated April 1, the regions taken by the insurgents were mainly Ržyšiv, Trypillja, and Obuxiv. Two thousand men fought against the government with two cannons and forty machine guns. The roads connecting the city of Kiev with the southern regions were cut off. Those who commanded the Zelenyj revolt proclaimed their opposition to the land policy of the Soviet authorities and the forcible organization of communes. They also accused the Soviet authorities of expropriating all but a small amount of grain from the peasants.[23]

Toward the end of April and throughout May 1919, a large portion of the Soviet army was thrown against the Zelenyj forces. We do not know exactly how many men Zelenyj had, but since the Soviets, hard pressed on other fronts as they were, sent 6,150 men to fight against them, the number must have been fairly large. It is said that by the beginning of May, 14,000 Soviet soldiers were mobilized against the "bandits" in Kiev province alone, so we can conclude that the resistance of peasants was strong in many regions.[24]

In June 1919, the Soviet forces sent to suppress the peasants were defeated miserably at what later was called the "Tragedy of Trypillja." After the defeat fresh Soviet detachments led by Ja. Jakovliv[25] and Skrypnyk were sent to Trypillja. The region was occupied by July 2, and the Zelenyj forces fled south.[26] Though skirmishes continued until October, the uprising had been crushed. Zelenyj himself had died in battle.[27] Clearly, however, the land policy of the authorities had alienated the peasants from Soviet

[21] Borodin and Bačinskij, "Kompartija Ukrainy," p. 76.

[22] *Graždanskaja vojna na Ukraine, 1918–1920: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov,* 4 vols. (Kiev, 1967), 1, pt. 1: 697. *Kievščina v gody vojny i inostrannoj voennoj intervencii (1918–1920 gg.): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Kiev, 1962), pp. 184–85.

[23] V. Antonov-Ovseenko, *Zapiski o graždanskoj vojne,* 4 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1924–1933), 3: 340, 4: 171.

[24] Antonov-Ovseenko, *Zapiski,* 4: 174–76.

[25] In 1919–1920, Jakovliv was the head of the Katerynoslav and Kiev *gubkom* of the CP(b)U. He later became People's Commissar of Agriculture of the Soviet Union.

[26] *Graždanskaja vojna na Ukraine,* 2: 263, 792.

[27] *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b): Protokoly* (Moscow, 1961), p. 277. We do not know in which battle Zelenyj perished.

power. Later even Bolshevik leaders would admit that the majority of peasants taking part in the Trypillja uprising were poor.[28]

Although there were some attempts to stop the collectivization policy in the Ukraine as early as the spring of 1919, serious revision of land policy by the Soviet government began only at the end of that year. At the Eighth Party Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), which was held in Moscow from 2 to 4 December 1919, the problem of the Ukraine was discussed, particularly the failure of the land policy of 1919. Among the discussants were Ja. Jakovliv, Rakovs'kyj, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine, Manujil's'kyj, Bubnov, and Lenin. Jakovliv summarized events thus:

> The Soviet authorities were defeated twice in the Ukraine. The first time, they were defeated because of bad strategy. The Red Army, which is quite young, could not fight against the German army, which was throwing enormous forces into the Ukraine. The second defeat, however, was not strategical or military, but social and political. It was due to a policy which had not taken into consideration the situation of the peasants in the Ukraine.[29]

Jakovliv urged that the land policy of 1919 be revised and called for the implementation of the land decree issued in October 1917. He also argued that to the peasants state farms and collective farms were no better than the landowners' estates and that all land holdings of landowners must be liquidated.[30] Lenin supported Jakovliv, maintaining that cooperation with the Ukrainian peasants was imperative: "I believe we need their cooperation; therefore, we ought to divide among the peasants a larger part of the *sovkhozy*."[31]

Article 7 of the resolution on the Ukraine at the Eighth Party Conference dealt with land policy. It read: "The *radhosp* must be organized to the benefit of peasants and organized only in case of strict necessity. . . . Peasants should not be forcibly organized into communes and *artili* [workmen's associations]."[32] Based on this resolution, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee passed, in Xarkiv on

[28] *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* pp. 97, 115. The attitude of other partisan leaders against the land policy of the Soviet government was similar. The Borot'bist Shums'kyi was almost lynched when he mentioned the word "commune" at Hryhorijiv's camp. See Adams, *Bolsheviks,* pp. 272–74.

[29] *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* p. 80.

[30] *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* p. 85.

[31] *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* pp. 111–12.

[32] *KPSS v rezoljucijax i rešenijax s"ezdov, konferencijax i plenumov CK,* vol. 2 (Moscow, 1970), pp. 124–26.

5 February 1920, a law on land redistribution. It allowed all lands confiscated from landowners and monasteries by the Soviet government to be used by Ukrainian peasants without any payment on their part. The *radhospy* formed in 1919 could also be used by peasants having little or no land.[33] Clearly, the Soviet government was trying to make amends. As a result, 15.5 million *desjatyny* were distributed among the peasants. Land held by peasants in Katerynoslav and Tavrida increased, from an average of 8 to 13 *desjatyny*. On the other hand, the number of *radhospy* decreased from 1,185 to 640, and their land holdings fell from 1,104,600 to 340,759 *desjatyny*.[34] In 1920, the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Mykolajiv, Odessa, Černihiv, and Katerynoslav had 6,857,077 *desjatyny* of arable land. In these provinces land assigned to *radhospy* totaled only 16,302 *desjatyny*, to communes 253 *desjatyny*, and to *artili* 557 *desjatyny*.[35]

## *Grain Requisition Policy*

When a Soviet government was established for the second time in the Ukraine in 1919, Lenin wrote in *Pravda*:

> The victory of the Soviets in the Ukraine have opened for us the best perspectives. Now we are able to get enough grain. . . . The surplus grain in the Ukraine is enormous, and the Soviet government in the Ukraine offers to help us. Now we need not fear lack of foodstuffs . . . . We must send food requisition troops out there.[36]

From January 1919, the party's interest in the Ukraine seemed to concentrate on the problem of grain. On April 3, at a plenum of the Moscow soviet, Lenin stated, "The circumstances of the Republic are now better because we have 258 million *puds* [1 *pud* = 40 pounds] of grain in the Ukraine."[37] He also wrote:

> In the Ukraine there is an enormous amount of surplus grain. . . . The Bolsheviks in the north must assist their comrades in the Ukraine in their work of requisition. We ought to collect 150 million *puds* of grain on the strength of an efficient system and on the strength of arms by the first of June.[38]

33 *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo na Ukrajini v roky hromadjans'koji vijny: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev, 1957), pp. 59–61.
34 S. N. Semanov, "Maxnovščina i eë krax," *Voprosy istorii*, 1966, no. 9, p. 53. Kubanin, *Maxnovščina*, p. 132.
35 Calculated from *Statistika Ukrainy*, ser. 2, vol. 2, nos. 1–6: *Itogi sel'sko-xozjajstvennoj perepisi 1920 g.* (Xarkiv, 1922).
36 Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, 37: 465–68.
37 Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, 38: 250.
38 Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, 38: 68–69.

In Russia itself, the population was in desperate straits. On February 1, *Pravda* reported:

Soviet Russia as a whole is on the brink of starvation. But the Soviet Ukrainian Army has captured the left-bank region of the Ukraine. There Comrade Rakovs'kyj is the leader and he is the best friend of Soviet Russia. Now they are offering to send us grain, sugar, and other materials. . . . We must carry these goods away by all means.[39]

In March 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the RCP(b), Šlixter, commissar of food in the Ukraine at that time, received a memorandum from Lenin urging that the Ukrainian government transport 50 million *puds* of grain from the Ukraine to Russia, using extreme emergency methods if necessary; otherwise "we will all collapse."[40] In fact, the requisition of food in the Ukraine was soon controlled directly from Moscow, because on 12 January 1919, the Ukrainian People's Commissar of Food was made subordinate to the All-Russian People's Commissar of Food.[41] The amount of grain to be requisitioned in the Ukraine in 1919 was set at 139 million *puds*. Only 10.5 million *puds* was collected, however, and only 3 million *puds* — 6 percent of the proposed amount — was sent to Russia.[42] The requisition failed because the peasants refused to cooperate.[43]

At the end of 1919, Bolshevik leaders in the Ukraine analyzed why the requisition had failed so miserably. Jakovliv concluded:

The process of grain requisition was crazy and the real amount of grain held by middle-class peasants was not taken into consideration. Also we took a great amount of grain out of the Ukraine to Russia, and it provoked anti-Soviet feeling among the peasants, especially against the policy of grain requisition.[44]

From the peasants' point of view, many political organizations came out of the cities, and each one demanded grain. In this sense, to them the Soviet government was no different from that of Denikin or Germany. Soviet power in the Ukraine must explain, therefore, that it is not the agent of grain requisition for Russians.[45] Rakovs'kyj stated:

[39] "Za xlebom i uglem!," *Pravda,* 1 February 1919 (no. 23).
[40] A. G. Šlixter, "Bor'ba za xleb na Ukraine v 1919 g.," *Letopis' revoljucii,* 1928, no. 2, pp. 102–104.
[41] *The Trotsky Papers,* vol. 1 (The Hague and Paris, 1964), p. 558.
[42] Suprunenko, *Očerki istorii,* p. 213.
[43] James Mace, in an unpublished manuscript entitled "Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933," writes that the peasants reacted violently to the forcible requisition. Hryhorijiv called upon the peasants to "kill the hooknosed commissars" who wanted to take their grain to supply "the feeding stalls of Muscovy" (p. 40).
[44] *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* p. 84.
[45] *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* pp. 81, 84.

> We came to the Ukraine when Soviet Russia was experiencing the worst food situation. We approached the Ukraine from the point of view that we must use the Ukraine to a maximum in order to relieve the food shortage in Russia. Such an approach, however, had defects. The purpose of forming *radhospy* was also to take the maximum amount of grain from them.[46]

Bubnov stated that in 1919 Soviet power in the Ukraine was supported not by Ukrainian peasants, but by armed trains, and that grain requisition troops were moving with the armed trains.[47] Hence "in the summer of 1919, the Soviet government was crushed by Ukrainian peasants," in Manujil's'kyj's words.[48]

The Bolsheviks changed their land policy in the Ukraine at the Eighth Conference of the RCP(b) because they attributed the failure of the grain requisition to a policy which did not give land to peasants. In Jakovliv's words, "one of the reasons why we cannot collect grain efficiently is the mistaken land policy. It does not give land to peasants, but rather brought it under state control under the pretext of 'all for the nation.'"[49] Although the Soviet's land policy was modified in 1920 to the benefit of the peasants, the grain and food policy remained unchanged and, indeed, was pursued more vigorously.

On 26 February 1920, the Soviet government of the Ukraine issued a decree on food requisition that obliged peasants to sell grain to the Soviet government at official prices.[50] The amount of grain to be requisitioned and the manner of requisition were to differ from province to province, as shown in the following tables:

*Table 1*

Proposed Grain Requisitions
(in million *puds*)
1 January 1920 to 1 July 1920[51]

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Donec' | 1.10 | Odessa | 16.95 |
| Volyn' | 2.10 | Poltava | 24.00 |
| Katerynoslav | 37.90 | Podillja | 5.20 |
| Kiev | 13.55 | Xarkiv | 9.75 |
| Xerson | 47.16 | Černihiv | 2.80 |

46 *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* pp. 95–96.
47 *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* p. 102.
48 *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* p. 107.
49 *Vos'maja konferencija RKP(b),* pp. 113–14.
50 *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo,* p. 70.
51 *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo,* p. 71.

*Table 2*
Official Prices of Grain in 1920
(in rubles per *pud*)[52]

| *Province* | *Wheat* | *Rye* | *Oats* | *Barley* | *Millet* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Donec' | 48 | 37 | 37 | 34 | 45 |
| Katerynoslav | 48 | 37 | 37 | 34 | 45 |
| Volyn' | 56 | 44 | 44 | 39 | 49 |
| Kiev | 56 | 44 | 44 | 39 | 49 |
| Odessa | 44 | 34 | 34 | 31 | 41 |
| Poltava | 55 | 42 | 42 | 38 | 48 |
| Xerson | 44 | 34 | 34 | 31 | 41 |
| Xarkiv | 55 | 42 | 42 | 38 | 48 |
| Černihiv | 58 | 46 | 46 | 41 | 48 |
| Podillja | 53 | 43 | 43 | 38 | 46 |

As indicated, grain requisitions in Katerynoslav and Xerson were extremely heavy. Also, official prices in Katerynoslav and Xerson, as well as in Odessa and Donec', were considerably lower than elsewhere. Article 6 of the decree allowed local organizations to take a portion of the grain collected. In the Černihiv, Kiev, Xarkiv, Podillja, and Volyn' provinces they were permitted to appropriate 25 percent of the grain collected, but in the Katerynoslav, Odessa, Xerson, and Donec' provinces they were allowed only 10 percent.[53] It is evident that the southern provinces of the Ukraine — the steppe regions — were singled out in the requisition.

On April 15, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U decreed the formation of so-called *Komnezamy,* that is, *Komitety nezamožnyx seljan* (Committees of poor peasants). The Komnezamy were to be the executors of the party's land and grain policies in the villages. A decree of 9 May 1920, issued by the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, set the tasks of the Komnezamy as (1) distribution of land, (2) fulfillment of grain requisition quotas, and (3) vanquishing insurgents.[54]

[52] *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo,* p. 72.
[53] *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo,* p. 72. Suprunenko, *Očerki istorii,* p. 370. In 1919, too, official grain prices were fixed which differed from province to province; however, prices in the steppe region were equal to or higher than in Kiev or Černihiv. See *Sobranie uzakonenij i rasporjaženij raboče-krest'janskogo pravitel'stva Ukrainy,* no. 8, 9–11 February 1919, p. 119.
[54] *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo,* pp. 84–87. J. Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine* (Stockholm, 1960), p. 274.

The creation of the Komnezamy was an important step in the Sovietization of Ukrainian villages. Significantly, it was taken after the Soviet government acknowledged its complete failure in grain requisition. Membership in the new organizations was mostly non-Ukrainian, for example, at the first and second congresses of the Komnezamy less than a fourth of the delegates spoke in Ukrainian.[55] It is also noteworthy that the formation of Komnezamy proceeded much more slowly in the steppe regions, such as Katerynoslav, than in Kiev or Xarkiv.[56]

Apart from the formation of the Komnezamy, detachments charged with food requisition were sent to the villages. From April to September 1920, about 15,000 workers were mobilized for this purpose by the CP(b)U and labor unions in the Ukraine.[57] The Ukrainian People's Commissar of Food mobilized 5,953 persons for food requisition in 1920,[58] and in Xarkiv one-third of the members of the city soviet were mobilized for this purpose.[59] Food detachments were also sent to the Ukraine from Russia. From August to December 1920, a total of twenty-three food requisition units were active in Xarkiv province; among them were eleven detachments from Russia. In November 1920 there were five detachments from Russia and three local detachments in Poltava.[60] During the fall of 1920, a total of 262 detachments were requisitioning food in the Ukraine; nevertheless, less than one-third of the districts fulfilled their quota.[61] As legal grounds for the food requisition policy, two major decrees were issued by the Soviet government: a "decree on monopoly of food" in May 1918, and a "decree on food requisitioning" in January 1919. These two were essentially quite different. The first called for surplus grain to be taken from the peasants. Surplus was taken to mean any grain over double the amount needed by the peasants themselves; in other words, it was calculated according to the factual existence of grain and the needs of the peasantry. But the second decree changed this concept completely:

55 Borys, *Russian Communist Party,* p. 275.
56 *Komitety nezamožnyx seljan Ukrajiny, 1920–1933: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev, 1968), pp. 40, 100. M. I. Remnev, "Dejatel'nost' komitetov nezamožnyx seljan na Ukraine v 1920 godu," *Voprosy istorii,* 1954, no. 4, p. 97.
57 Suprunenko, *Očerki istorii,* p. 370.
58 L. N. Mel'nikova, *Bor'ba KP(b)U za osuščestvlenie prodovol'stvennoj politiki (konec 1919–seredina 1921 gg.)* (Kiev, 1972), p. 17.
59 Suprunenko, *Očerki istorii,* p. 370.
60 "Iz istorii bor'by prodovol'stvennyx otrjadov rabočix za xleb i ukreplenie soveckoj vlasti," *Krasnyj arxiv,* 1938, nos. 4–5, pp. 139–43.
61 Mel'nikova, *Bor'ba KP(b)U,* pp. 18–19.

surplus grain was now calculated exclusively on the basis of the needs of the state. The amount no longer had any relation to any real surplus and could be set wholly arbitrarily.[62]

A decree of August 1918 divided the grain collected by food requisition troops equally between the People's Commissar of Food and the troops themselves. Thus the troops were assured of eating well as long as they collected grain, a fact sometimes forgotten because their consumption of grain was not recorded. During the German and Austrian occupation of the Ukraine, half a million German soldiers and a quarter-million Austrian soldiers ate more grain than the amount sent back to Germany and Austria. The same can probably be said about the requisitioning troops from Russia in the Ukraine. Their activity was not confined to collecting food, however. Usually their first task upon coming to a village was to organize a Komnezam, of which they then were members as long as they stayed in that particular village.[63]

Harsh treatment, abuse, and outright theft by the requisitioning troops contributed greatly to peasant protest and revolt. In an effort to quell such demonstrations, an order was issued in February 1921 by the Soviet government prohibiting the troops from (1) making arbitrary arrests, (2) beating or threatening anyone with execution without sufficient reason, (3) distilling vodka from collected grain, (4) public drunkenness.[64]

On 6 September 1920, the Ukrainian People's Commissar of Internal Affairs widely broadened the responsibilities of the Komnezamy. They became not only the organ for Sovietization of Ukrainian villages, but also the executive organs of local government and the local police.[65] At the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Komnezamy, it was resolved that the most urgent task before the committees was to fight

[62] D. A. Baevskij, *Očerki po istorii xozjajstvennogo stroitel'stva perioda graždanskoj vojny* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 49, 56. E. G. Gimpel'son, *"Voennyj kommunizm": Politika, praktika, ideologija* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 58–60.
[63] *Vos'moj s"ezd RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1959), p. 250. Ju. S. Kulyšev and V. I. Hosač, *Partijnaja organizacija i rabočie Petrograda v gody graždanskoj vojny* (1918–1920 gg.) (Leningrad, 1971), p. 255. Also see N. Ponjatovskaja, "Prodovol'stvennaja politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva v 1918–20 gg.," *Ekonomičeskie nauki,* 1968, no. 12, p. 54.
[64] Ponjatovskaja, "Prodovol'stvennaja politika," p. 54. Gert Meyer, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Stadt und Land in Sowjetrussland zu Beginn der Neuen Ökonomischen Politik. Das Problem der Smyčka, 1921–1923" (Ph.D. diss., University of Marburg/Lahn, 1971), pp. 65, 82–85.
[65] *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo,* pp. 113–17.

against rich Ukrainian peasants (*kurkuli*) and bandits, especially the Maxno army, which was in control of the steppe provinces.[66]

At the end of 1920, there were about 6,000 Komnezamy in the Ukraine, comprising 820,000 members. One of their tasks was to disarm the Ukrainian villages. For example, in 1921, the village of Voznesens'k in the district of Oleksandrivs'k was asked by its Komnezam to hand over all weapons. The peasants came forth with 69 rifles, 9 pistols, 11 sabers, 65 sawed-off rifles, 18 bombs, and assorted other items. A few days later the village was searched by Komnezam members who found an additional 41 rifles, 35 sawed-off rifles, 14 sabers, 5 bomb, 15 pistols, and many rounds of ammunition. Several days later still another weapons search by the Komnezam yielded 11 rifles, 5 pistols, 1 bomb, 28 sawed-off rifles, and other items. Apparently, villages in the steppe Ukraine at that time had little grain but plenty of weapons.[67]

The amount of grain to be requisitioned in the Ukraine in 1920 was set at about 160 million *puds*. Over 100 million *puds*, or 62.5 percent of the total, was to be collected from the steppe regions, which, the Soviet government maintained, was least affected by the civil war and hence should have much surplus grain.[68] Though the requisition was conducted very strictly, the amount collected was grossly insufficient: it amounted to 9,721,000 *puds*, or again only 6 percent of the proposed amount.[69] The reason for the difficulty lay in the protests of the peasants. On 15 October 1920, Lenin stated:

> We obtained grain from Siberia. But we have not been able to get it from the Ukraine. In the Ukraine a war is going on, and the Red army is inevitably fighting with peasant-bandits. There is quite a lot of grain in the Ukraine. There should be more grain than in the Kuban region. But so far almost nothing has been taken.[70]

If the amount of grain actually requisitioned is compared to the amount proposed for requisition from 1918 to 1920, the same percentage — 6 percent — results, regardless whether the requisitioners were the Germans or the Soviet government.

[66] *Radjans'ke budivnyctvo*, p. 157. Remnev, "Dejatel'nost' komitetov," pp. 98, 103. On the Komnezamy see also S. Kagan, *Agrarnaja revoljucija na Kievščine* (Kiev, 1923).

[67] Kubanin, *Maxnovščina*, pp. 140–41.

[68] V. P. Jubkin, "Zdijsnennja prodovol'čoji polityky na Ukrajini (hruden' 1919–1920 pp.)," *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1961, no. 1, p. 22.

[69] Kubanin, *Maxnovščina*, p. 127.

[70] Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*, 41: 364–65.

In 1920 and 1921 the struggle between peasant forces and Soviet troops in the Ukrainian villages became so bitter and violent as to resemble a civil war. Vladimirov, the Ukrainian People's Commissar of Food Affairs, reported that 1,700 men requisitioning food in the Ukraine had been killed by peasants as of January 1921.[71]

The struggle between the peasants and the Soviet troops was most bitter in the steppe region, the primary target of the requisitioning. The steppe region, the so-called *čornozem* ('black soil zone'), is mostly flat and covers 44 percent of the whole Ukraine. From 1911 to 1915 on the average the steppe produced 40 percent of the Ukraine's grain, and a large portion was exported from the region,[72] as shown below.

*Table 3*

Agriculture in the Ukraine before World War I[73]
(annual average from 1909 to 1913)

| | *Whole Ukraine* | *The Steppe* | *Other than the Steppe* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sowed land (in thousand *desjatyny*) | 19,751 | 9,371 | 10,380 |
| Grain output (in million *puds*) | 1,186 | 498 | 688 |
| Consumption of seed | 158 | 75 | 83 |
| Grain export | 343 | 259 | 84 |
| Remaining grain | 685 | 164 | 521 |
| Population (in thousands) | 31,386 | 8,767 | 22,619 |
| Rural population | 27,355[74] | 6,951 | 20,404 |
| Remaining grain per person (in *puds*) | 21.8 | 18.7 | 23.0 |
| Remaining grain per person in village | 25.0 | 23.6 | 25.5 |
| Grain export per person in village | 12.5 | 37.3 | 4.1 |

[71] *Desjatyj s"ezd RKP(b)* (Moscow, 1963), p. 422.
[72] M. B. Gurevič, *Golod i sel'skoe xozjajstvo Ukrainy* (Xarkiv, 1923), p. 18. Kubanin, *Maxnovščina,* pp. 10–11.
[73] Gurevič, *Golod,* p. 20.
[74] The main reason for the decrease in population was the separation from the Ukraine of the Crimea, whose population in 1920 was 762,000. *Report on Economic Conditions in Russia: The Famine of 1921–22* (Nancy, France, 1922), p. 56.

Statistics show that in 1918 and 1919, the amount of grain produced in the steppe decreased much more than in other regions of the Ukraine. Rye produced per *desjatyna* there was 56.3 *puds* in 1915, but fell to 34.9 *puds* in 1919; in other regions of the Ukraine, however, production of rye per *desjatyna* in 1919 was 62.4 *puds*. Similarly, in 1915 spring wheat produced in the steppe region was 32.2 *puds* per *desjatyna*; in 1918 it fell to 16.0 *puds*, although other parts of the Ukraine produced 30.4 *puds* per *desjatyna* that year. Barley produced in the steppe had averaged 44.2 *puds* per *desjatyna* in 1915, but only 17.9 *puds* per *desjatyna* in 1918, when other parts of the Ukraine averaged 32.9 *puds*.[75]

The decrease in acreage sown may well have been the peasants' way of protesting against the requisition. They refused to cultivate and harvest grain that would be forcibly taken away from them. In the steppe region the average farm was larger than in other regions of the Ukraine, which explains why acreage of sowed land decreased more drastically there than in other regions. In spite of the decreases in acreage sown and in yield per *desjatyna,* however, in 1920 grain requisition was more severe in the steppe than elsewhere in the Ukraine. Given such a situation, it became inevitable that the peasants would revolt and that the amount of grain produced would fall still further. From 1911 to 1915 the average annual grain output of the steppe was 454 million *puds*; in 1921, it was only 47 million *puds* —just 10 percent of the prewar output. From 1911 to 1915 the other regions of the Ukraine had an average annual output of 625 million *puds*; in 1921, that average fell to 230 million *puds*.[76] Thus, in 1921 the steppe, which had been the most productive region prior to the war, was afflicted by famine. According to the calculations of M. Gurevič,[77] in 1921 the inhabitants of the steppe had produced food sufficient only to feed themselves for four months, as table 4 shows. Areas where grain output was under 5 *puds* per inhabitant were the lands south of Starobil's'k, Kup"jans'k, Zmijiv, Lozova, Kremenčuk, Čyhyryn, and Bobrynec'.[78]

[75] Calculated from *Statistika Ukrainy,* ser. 2, vol. 5, no. 1: *Urožaj Ukrainy za vremja vojny i revoljucii (1915–1919 gg.)* (Xarkiv, 1924).
[76] Gurevič, *Golod,* p. 23.
[77] A statistician in the Soviet Ukraine, Gurevič had formerly been an activist in the Jewish Bund there.
[78] Gurevič, *Golod,* p. 31.

*Table 4*

Food Situation in the Ukraine in 1921[79]

| | *Whole Ukraine* | *The Steppe* | *Other than the Steppe* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sowed land (in thousand *desjatyny*) | 12,690 | 4,992 | 7,697 |
| Grain output (in million *puds*) | 276.6 | 46.7 | 229.9 |
| Consumption of seed | 91.3 | 26.2 | 65.1 |
| Remaining grain[80] | 185.3 | 20.5 | 164.8 |
| Rural population (in thousands) | 20,892[74] | 7,103 | 13,789 |
| Remaining grain per person in village (in *puds*) | 9.3 | 3.9 | 12.0 |
| Months that the remaining grain suffices to support people and livestock | 7.4 | 3.1 | 9.6 |
| Months that the remaining grain suffices to support people (without livestock) | 9.3 | 3.9 | 12.0 |

Concurrently a very severe famine was occurring in the Volga regions. Indeed, according to the Moscow government, famine conditions existed only in the Volga provinces, not in the Ukraine, at the time. A decree dated 21 July 1921 by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee acknowledged that a state of famine existed in the Middle and Lower Volga provinces, appealed to the public for help, and established a Central Famine Relief Commission (*Pomgol*) attached to the committee itself. The famine commission was headed by M. I. Kalinin, the president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, who was aided by A. I. Rykov and L. B. Kamenev.[81] This commission and the Russian government wanted the Ukrainian government and people to assist the Volga provinces and to dispatch grain from the Ukraine to the Volga. On 2 August 1921, Lenin sent a letter to the Ukrainian peasants: "The well-protected Ukraine gathered an excellent harvest this year. Workers

[79] Gurevič, *Golod,* p. 33.
[80] Assuming no exports or requisitions.
[81] *Report on Economic Conditions in Russia,* p. 40.

and peasants of the starving Volga region expect help from the Ukrainian farmers."[82]

However difficult it may have been for Lenin to believe that a famine could occur in a land usually so rich in grain as the Ukraine, it had. The Moscow government persisted in estimating the crop at almost twice the figure accepted by local statisticians: M. Popov, chief of the Central Statistical Bureau of the Soviet government, estimated the total harvest at 580 million *puds*, against the 276 million of a statistician in the Ukraine.[83] At the outset, owing to delayed information from districts affected by famine in the steppe Ukraine, the Ukrainian government itself directed all relief efforts to the Volga. The steppe Ukrainians, starving themselves, were called on to supply grain to relieve the Volga region.

Between the fall of 1921 and August of 1922, a total of 1,127 trainloads of food were transferred to the Volga from the Ukraine.[84] More than 30 million *puds* were exported to the famine regions in Russia.[85] Meanwhile, in some provinces of the Ukrainian steppe the famine was at its worst, leaving many people dead in city streets and in villages. The policy of ignoring what was happening in the Ukraine and focusing all relief efforts on the Volga may not have been a deliberate one, but it certainly exacerbated the conditions of famine in southern Ukraine.

Until the fall of 1921, neither the Moscow government nor the Soviet Ukrainian government made any serious attempt to relieve the famine in the steppe Ukraine. But as the news from the districts affected by the shortage of grain became more and more disquieting, the condition of the population in the southern provinces became a topic of discussion. At the Sixth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, held in Xarkiv in December 1921, representatives from the southern provinces described what was happening in the steppe and appealed for help.[86]

At the end of November two investigators for the American Relief Administration,[87] L. Hutchinson and F. A. Golder, went to the

[82] Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij,* 44: 77.
[83] *Report on Economic Conditions in Russia,* p. 37.
[84] *Itogi bor'by s golodom v 1921–22 gg.*, p. 258.
[85] *Report on Economic Conditions in Russia,* p. 37.
[86] *Itogi bor'by s golodom v 1921–22 gg.*, p. 260.
[87] On the American Relief Administration, see Fisher, *Famine in Soviet Russia,* and B. M. Weissman, *Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia, 1921–1923* (Stanford, Calif., 1974). Information about southern Ukraine as an area

Ukraine. In Xarkiv they conferred with M. Skrypnyk, then commissar of internal affairs, who informed them that in the steppe Ukraine the food situation was much more serious than had been believed.[88] From officials of the Ukrainian Central Statistical Bureau in Xarkiv, the two ARA investigators got pessimistic reports about the availability of grain in the provinces of Odessa, Mykolajiv, Donec', and Zaporižžja.[89] Hutchinson was allowed to make an investigatory trip during late December and early January 1922. Travelling through southern Ukraine by car, he visited Katerynoslav, Odessa, Mykolajiv and Zaporižžja. He found "unspeakable" misery everywhere. The information provided by the statistical bureau in Xarkiv was confirmed. Hutchinson concluded that the famine conditions in southern Ukraine were as severe as those in the Volga region.[90]

At about that time the Soviet Ukrainian government officially recognized the five southern provinces as famine regions. In December 1921, official statistics registered 1,158,996 starving in the five provinces. In January 1922, the number of starving was 1,895,000; in February, 2,943,095; in March, 3,248,491; and in August, 3,664,902. The total population of the five provinces was 9,699,300. Thus, according to official statistics, 40 percent of the people living in the five provinces of the steppe Ukraine were starving in August 1922.[91] But according to the report of Captain Quisling,[92] who visited the steppe at the end of February, the number striken by the famine was much higher. On 1 March 1922, half of the population of Mykolajiv and 78 percent of those living in Zaporižžja were starving. In Zaporižžja death from starvation claimed from 30 to 40 people per day in each

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needing relief came to the ARA via emigrants from the Ukraine, especially Jews. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee asked the ARA to make an investigation in the Ukraine. The committee had much data about the frightful conditions among Jewish communities in the Ukraine. Fisher, *Famine in Soviet Russia,* pp. 246–47.

88 F. A. Golder, *On the Trail of the Russian Famine* (Stanford, Calif., 1927), pp. 119–23.

89 Golder, *On the Trail,* p. 120; for the negotiations between the ARA and the Soviet Ukrainian government, see ibid., pp. 113–21, and Weissman, *Herbert Hoover,* p. 93. In general, the ARA was very active and provided the primary assistance for those stricken by famine, as Kalinin explained. *Itogi bor'by s golodom,* pp. 4–5.

90 American Russian Relief Administration, *Relief Bulletins,* ser. 2, vol. 22 (1922), pp. 7–13.

91 *Report on Economic Conditions,* pp. 108–109.

92 Captain Quisling was a member of the staff of Fridtjof Nansen, who engaged in relief work in Russia in 1921–1923. The League of Nations also employed Quisling in refugee work in Russia. Later he became a Nazi collaborator in Norway.

county; in the city of Xerson (population 20,000), an average of 42 persons died from starvation daily, and in the city of Katerynoslav (population 160,000), the number was about 80 persons daily. According to Quisling, conditions were worst in Zaporižžja, where the straw of roofs was being eaten, all dogs, cats, and crows had already been eaten, and even the leather of harnesses and wood from furniture was being consumed. Quisling also reported incidents of necrophagy and cannibalism.[93]

According to official Soviet reports, in February the average number of calories consumed per person in Zaporižžja was 511, in Katerynoslav — 1062, and in Donec' — 1311.[94] The rates of birth and death reflected the conditions of famine: in January 1921, the city of Odessa recorded 231 births and 2,271 deaths; in April, 69 births and 3,749 deaths.[95] The report of the Ukrainian People's Commissar of Health registered 800,000 deaths from famine and related diseases in the Ukraine during the first half of 1922.[96] That was the worst period of the famine, since after the harvest of that year the situation improved, so the total number who died from famine was probably around 1 million.

A decade after the famine in the steppe Ukraine, collectivization, grain requisition, and military action would again result in famine in the Ukraine, but on a much greater scale. The situation then, however, lacked some factors that were important in the steppe Ukraine in 1921–1922, where seven years of war, revolution, civil war, and drought had made the state of agriculture extremely precarious. Nonetheless, the Soviet government in Moscow persisted in regarding the Ukraine, and especially the steppe Ukraine, as a region of abundant

93 *Report on Economic Conditions,* pp. 38–39. Description of one such event has made its way into Ukrainian literature: "nače cucenjata,/za neju bihaly ta skabučaly:/xliba, xliba/I ot odnoho razu/(ne znaju, jak ce stalos' tak —/čy žal' jij serce stysnuv duže,/čy, može, tronulas' uma)/Vona ditej tyx pokolola/i stala jisty . . ./Narod zbentežyvsja/počuvšy ce." Myxajlo Draj-Xmara, *Poeziji* (New York, 1964), pp. 97–98.

94 From official reports on calories consumed by workers and peasants during the civil war, it is apparent that during 1918 and 1919, workers and city dwellers were starving and peasants were eating well, but during 1920 and 1921, it was the peasants who were starving. For example, in the spring of 1918 the average number of calories consumed by a worker in Petrograd was 1,500, whereas the average consumed by a peasant in Tambov was 4,200. In the winter of 1920, however, the average number of calories consumed by a worker in Petrograd was 3,400, but in Zaporižžja it was 511. See *Sbornik statističeskix svedenij po SSSR, 1918–1923* (Moscow, 1924), pp. 122–23, 128–29, 377, 396–97.

95 *Itogi bor'by s golodom,* p. 255.

96 *Report on Economic Conditions in Russia,* p. 55.

harvest and as a supplier of grain. By ignoring the real situation there, and by forcibly imposing harsh food requisition quotas on people who were themselves starving, the Soviet government bears much of the responsibility for the famine that took a million lives in the steppe Ukraine in 1921–1922.

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# The Foreign Relations of the Ukrainian SSR

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## I.

When President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev agreed in 1974 to open consulates in Kiev and New York City, it appeared that the policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union was acquiring some of the subtlety that had characterized American attitudes toward Eastern Europe since the 1960s. Washington's attempts at "bridge-building" and "peaceful engagement" and its encouragement of "different roads to socialism" in the Soviet bloc marked a positive shift from the Cold War policy of treating the "satellites" as little more than appendages of the Soviet monolith. They also represented a major step forward in American awareness of the complexity of dealing with Communist states.

On 9 January 1980, however, President Jimmy Carter ordered the withdrawal of seven United States consular officers from Kiev, in reprisal against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, thus unwittingly dealing a far more serious blow to American than to Soviet interests. The real and potential benefits of encouraging a "Ukrainian road to socialism" by extending even such minimal diplomatic recognition to the Ukrainian SSR would surely have outweighed whatever disadvantages may have accrued from recognizing the Soviet status quo. An American consulate in the Ukrainian capital could have reduced the international isolation of the Ukrainian republic, underscored the distinctly Ukrainian character of the Ukrainian party and state, and, as a result, increased centrifugal tendencies within the Soviet Union. At the very least, a consulate in Kiev would have given the American and international media better access to the Ukraine and to news about the Ukrainian dissident movement.

Even if general Soviet-American political considerations are set aside, the size, economic weight, and international activity of the Ukrainian SSR argue for Washington's acknowledgement of its poten-

tial importance to American interests. It goes without saying, of course, that the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations ("foreign policy" is clearly too strong a term) are a function of those of the Soviet Union. That reality, however, is hardly a reason to regard such a state of affairs as desirable, inevitable, or immutable, especially since historically the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations have undergone (and therefore can undergo) significant variations in response to outside stimuli.

Western interest in the Ukraine's foreign relations is apparent in a growing body of scholarly literature. In English, books by Vernon Aspaturian, Konstantyn Sawczuk, and Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj are devoted either exclusively or primarily to the Ukraine's involvement in foreign affairs.[1] Yaroslav Bilinsky, Roman Szporluk, Robert Sullivant, Basil Dmytryshyn, and Richard Pipes have also written on the topic.[2] A number of works in French and German, mostly by Ukrainian émigrés, have appeared.[3] Outstanding among the more numerous Ukrainian-language publications, also by émigrés, is Vsevolod Holubnychy's short study of the Ukraine within the United Nations.[4]

Soviet Ukrainian writers have also produced a substantial body of scholarly and official literature on the Ukraine's foreign activity. In 1959 and 1966, respectively, there appeared the first two volumes of *The Ukrainian SSR in International Relations,* containing Ukrainian-language translations of "international agreements, conventions, covenants, and other acts, of which the Ukraine was a participant" between

[1] Vernon V. Aspaturian, *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy* (Geneva, 1960); Konstantyn Sawczuk, *The Ukraine in the United Nations Organization: A Study in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1944–1950* (Boulder, Colorado, 1975); Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra, 1970).

[2] Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1964), pp. 264–82, 436–40; Roman Szporluk, "The Ukraine and the Ukrainians," in Zev Katz, ed., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York, 1975), pp. 29–31; Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917–1957* (New York, 1962), pp. 245–62; Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918–1953* (New York, 1956), pp. 173–74; Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1974), pp. 250–54, 263–66, 269–76.

[3] See, in particular: Vasyl Markus, *L'Ukraine soviétique dans les relations internationales, 1918–1923* (Paris, 1959); Romain Yakemtchouk, *L'Ukraine en droit international* (Louvain, 1954); Stefan Horak, *Ukraine in der internationalen Politik* (Munich, 1957); Jürgen Arnold, *Die nationalen Gebietseinheiten der Sowjetunion: Staatlichkeit, Souveränität und Autonomie im Sowjetföderalismus* (Cologne, 1973), pp. 132–47.

[4] Vsevolod Holub, *Ukraina v Ob"iednanykh natsiiakh* (Munich, 1953).

1945 and 1966.[5] There followed in 1970 a collection of essays by prominent Soviet Ukrainian scholars entitled *The Ukraine and the Foreign World,* which covered the period from 1917 through 1969.[6] The publications of L. O. Leshchenko also stand out as examples of above-average Soviet scholarship.[7]

Of greatest value to study of the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations are the volumes of "documents and materials" published under the title *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena.* As of this writing, four volumes have appeared. The first (published in 1963) covers the years 1944–1961; the second (1966) deals with 1917–1923; the third (1977) covers 1962–1970; and the fourth, covering 1971–1975, was published in late 1981 and is still unavailable in the West.[8] The volumes contain documents relating to Soviet Ukrainian foreign-affairs institutions and officials, rather than to the international organizations with which the Ukraine is associated. In other words, the series tries to shed light on the Ukrainian SSR's own contribution to the "international arena."

In discussing the Ukraine's foreign relations, it is important to specify what precisely one is looking at, lest conceptual confusion produce analytical confusion. One can, for instance, examine the role Ukrainians play in the foreign affairs institutions of the USSR. Or one can study the influence of the Ukrainian SSR on Soviet foreign policy formulation, as Hodnett and Potichnyj did with respect to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Or one can adopt the approach that is taken here — investigation of the Ukrainian SSR's own foreign relations, particularly with non-Soviet countries and in the United Nations. The specific question posed is whether Soviet Ukrainian foreign relations are or can be in any way distinctly Ukrainian.

[5] *Ukrains'ka RSR u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh: Mizhnarodni dohovory, konventsii, uhody ta inshi dokumenty, iaki skladeni za uchastiu Ukrains'koi RSR abo do iakykh vona pryiednalasia (1945–1957)* (Kiev, 1959); *Ukrains'ka RSR u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh: Mizhnarodni dohovory, konventsii, uhody ta inshi akty, uchasnykom iakykh ie Ukraina (sichen' 1957–hruden' 1965 rr.)* (Kiev, 1966).

[6] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit* (Kiev, 1970).

[7] See, in particular, L. O. Leshchenko, *Ukraina na mizhnarodnii areni, 1945–1949* (Kiev, 1969). An exhaustive, although somewhat outdated, discussion of Soviet Ukrainian works on the Ukrainian SSR's international role is provided by A. V. Santsevych, *Problemy istorii Ukrainy pisliavoiennoho periodu v radians'kii istoriohrafii* (Kiev, 1967), pp. 203–22. Also very valuable is *Soviet Ukraine* (Kiev, 1969), pp. 548–61.

[8] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv 1944–1961 rr.* (Kiev, 1963); *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv* (Kiev, 1966); *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i*

The Ukraine's current foreign relations are, for all practical purposes, confined to participation in the United Nations and other international organizations, and to ties with the East European and several Third World countries.[9] As a founding member of the United Nations, the Ukraine holds a permanent seat in the General Assembly; at various times it has been a member of the Security Council (13 November 1947 to 31 December 1949) and of the Economic and Social Council.[10] Currently the Ukraine belongs to the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid and to the Committee on the Implementation of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.[11] The Ukraine has been a member of UNESCO since 1954 (which, in 1980, endorsed a resolution on participating in Kiev's 1,500th anniversary celebrations in May 1982),[12] and has permanent representations at the United Nations (since 1958) and other international organizations in New York City, Paris, and Geneva.[13] A Soviet Ukrainian source describes the Ukrainian SSR's role in the United Nations thus: "Together with the delegations of the USSR, Belorussia, and the fraternal socialist countries [Ukrainian delegations] have come out in defense of peace, have fought against the threat of another world war, for general and complete disarmament, for enhancing international friendship and cooperation."[14] The passivity implicit in this bland description is somewhat mitigated by initiatives taken in 1958 and 1961, when the Ukrainian SSR proposed the holding of the International Year of Health Protection and co-authored the United Nations resolution approving the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, respectively.[15]

By 1980, the Ukrainian SSR was signatory to over 120 international agreements, treaties, and conventions (many of which are translated in

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*materialiv 1962–1970 rr.* (Kiev, 1977); *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv 1971–1975 rr.* (Kiev, 1981).

9 On the Ukraine's relations with Eastern Europe, see *Ukrainskaia SSR i zarubezhnye sotsialisticheskie strany* (Kiev, 1965); and Borys Lewytzkyj, "Die Sowjetukraine und die europäischen volksdemokratischen Länder," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, 9, no. 1–2 (1961): 189–200.

10 *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), p. 530.

11 Volodymyr Martynenko, "Ukrainian SSR in International Organizations," *News from Ukraine*, 1981, no. 42, p. 4.

12 Martynenko, "Ukrainian SSR," p. 4.

13 Stanislav Lazebnyk and Pavlo Orlenko, *The Ukraine Today* (Kiev, 1980), p. 69.

14 Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today*, p. 68.

15 Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today*, p. 68.

the volumes of *The Ukrainian SSR in International Relations*); it was, moreover, "a member of 15 inter-governmental organizations and their 55 permanent and temporary bodies" — most important of which are the International Labor Organization (which it joined in 1954) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (1957).[16] The number jumped after Stalin's death: the Ukrainian SSR belonged to 14 international organizations in 1953, and to 29 just two years later, in 1955.[17]

Article 74 of the Ukrainian SSR's Constitution grants it the right to "enter into relations with other states, conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and consular representatives and take part in the work of international organizations." But the Ukraine has not, as Roman Szporluk diplomatically puts it, "taken advantage of its constitutional prerogative to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and foreign consuls in Kiev are there through arrangement with the USSR government."[18] At present, Kiev is host to the consulates-general of only the East European countries — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia — whereas Odessa seats the consulates of Bulgaria, Cuba, India, and, until recently, Egypt.[19] Numerous foreign delegations (Soviet sources include "delegations" of collective farmers, dancers, athletes, and the like) visit the Ukraine annually. Expressly political delegations, however, appear to make stopovers in Kiev not for reasons of state, but more as courtesy calls while en route to or from Moscow.

Cultural matters are an important aspect of the Ukraine's relations with the outside world. The vehicles for maintaining cultural ties are the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, founded in 1925, and the more important Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad (also known as the Ukraina Society), founded in 1960. The Ukraina Society, reputed to have connections to the KGB, publishes a variety of Ukrainian- and English-language brochures (mostly denunciations of the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist" émigrés) and two tabloids, *Visti z Ukrainy*

[16] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 69. For a list of international organizations of which the Ukraine is a member, see *Soviet Ukraine,* p. 552.
[17] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 413.
[18] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 69; Szporluk, "Ukraine and Ukrainians," p. 30.
[19] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 69; Szporluk, "Ukraine and Ukrainians," p. 30.

and *News from Ukraine.*[20] It also broadcasts programs intended for foreign audiences on Radio Kiev.[21]

Ukrainian contacts with the Third World are confined to the activities of Ukrainian educational, technical, and scientific (presumably including military) specialists working abroad under the auspices of all-Union institutions. "Education experts" from the Ukraine have worked in Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Cuba, Guinea, Iraq, Indonesia, Algeria, Mali, the United Arab Republic, Syria, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, and Ethiopia, whereas "economic specialists" have worked in India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Guinea.[22] Although this involvement probably has little effect on the Ukraine's standing in the countries of the Third World, it may mean a good deal to the Ukrainian intelligentsia and contribute to national consciousness and pride.

## III.

Although the Ukrainian SSR, founded on 25 December 1917, did not bind itself militarily and economically to Soviet Russia until three years later, on 28 December 1920, two circumstances severely limited its potential for independent action from the outset: first, the nationalists, and not the Bolsheviks, exerted the greater degree of control in the Ukraine during these years;[23] and second, the Communist party of the Ukraine — unlike the social-revolutionary and social-democratic versions of the Ukrainian Communist party — did not, initially, represent indigenous Ukrainian forces, but was largely an *agentura* of the Russian Communist party.[24] Furthermore, after bilateral treaties be-

[20] The circulation of *News from Ukraine* was 18,000 in 1971. Szporluk, "Ukraine and Ukrainians," p. 33.

[21] Lazebnyk and Orlenko, *Ukraine Today,* p. 74.

[22] *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* pp. 429, 483.

[23] Foreign relations were not the exclusive domain of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, however: extensive ties were maintained at various times by the Central Rada, the Directory, the West Ukrainian People's Republic, and Skoropads'kyi's Hetmanate.

[24] Indicative of the Ukrainian SSR's limited diplomatic capacities in 1920, even prior to its treaty with the Russian SFSR, was that Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the former head of the Directory who desired to enter the Ukraine in order to join the Soviet struggle against Petliura, had to travel to Moscow from Vienna and engage in fruitless negotiations with Chicherin before being allowed to go to Kharkiv. See Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk, 1911–1920* (Edmonton, 1980), pp. 427–82.

tween the non-Russian republics and the Russian SFSR were signed in 1920–1921, "the close relations established with the R.S.F.S.R. rendered any independent foreign policy virtually impossible. The bulk of the diplomatic relations of the Republics consisted of activity among themselves . . . and where non-Soviet powers were concerned, the diplomacy of the Republics was conducted jointly with the R.S.F.S.R. or with its explicit approval."[25] In testimony to the Ukraine's economic and political importance, however, its treaty with the RSFSR was, as Aspaturian notes, "loosest" and provided for the most diplomatic leeway.[26] By this time, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were determined to preserve their prerogatives. Thus at the Twelfth RCP Congress (17–25 April 1923) the "Ukrainian delegation . . . proposed that the Constituent Republics in the Union retain not only their separate diplomatic establishments, but suggested that the Foreign Trade Commissariats be decentralized as well. . . ."[27]

During this period the Ukrainian SSR had its own People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, consisting of a collegium and four departments — general-secretariat, diplomatic, economic-legal, and press and information — which maintained diplomatic relations with Poland, Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as, unofficially, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey, and Italy.[28] After the Treaty of Union of 30 December 1922, however, the Ukrainian SSR's consular and diplomatic services were merged with those of the Russian SFSR (on 5 August 1923) and its Foreign Commissariat was abolished (on September 20). While the 1924 Constitution of the USSR did not allow for republican foreign commissars, it did grant the republics the right to appoint representatives, counselors, and secretaries to represent their interests at Soviet consulates and embassies abroad.[29]

As formally circumscribed as the Ukrainian SSR's capacity to engage in foreign relations was, its external involvement nonetheless attests to a not inconsiderable diplomatic weight, as borne out by volume 2 of *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena* (1917–1923). The fluidity of the existing political and military situation, and the Ukraine's direct involvement in the fighting between pro- and anti-Soviet forces, could not but have increased the scope of its

[25] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 35.
[26] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 34.
[27] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 37.
[28] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* pp. 38–39.
[29] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 41.

diplomatic maneuverability and, indeed, forced it actively to participate in events of vital concern to its survival. Testimony to this is the Ukrainian SSR's many official letters, notes, and protests addressed to the governments of Poland and Romania, which were abetting, directly and indirectly, the anti-Soviet activity of Ukrainian "counter-revolutionaries." The spring and summer of 1920, the time of the Piłsudski-Petliura offensive, marked the high point of this diplomacy of protest. Another, somewhat smaller crisis demanding feverish note-sending occurred a year later, in November 1921, when Petliura's forces, backed by Warsaw and Bucharest, launched a shortlived intervention in northwestern Ukraine.

To a great degree, the Ukrainian political emigration in Poland, Romania, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and France, ever toying with interventionist schemes, continued to concern the Ukrainian SSR's government and its representatives abroad throughout the interwar period.[30] In this sense, a Soviet Ukrainian "foreign policy" can be said to have existed even after 1923. In the mid-1920s, for example, in keeping with its "Ukrainization" policies at home, the Ukrainian government hoped to divide the émigrés with a campaign of "re-emigration" to the Ukrainian SSR, and did, in fact, succeed in attracting a large number of prominent émigré political and literary activists formerly opposed to Soviet rule. Most prominent of the "re-emigrants" was Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, at one time president of the Central Rada.[31]

Attempts at political rapprochement, however, were supplemented by infiltration and subversion of émigré organizations. The latter tactic appears to have become dominant after the founding of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929 — a revolutionary movement whose right-wing ideology, undisguised militancy, and willingness to cooperate with German military and intelligence circles posed a clear threat to the Ukrainian SSR. (Not surprisingly, defendants at the Ukrainian purge trials of the 1930s were often accused of having ties to the OUN.)[32] Soviet countermeasures were most successful in 1938, when an agent who had infiltrated the nationalists'

30 For a study of the Ukrainian emigration in the 1920s, see Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), pp. 23–60.
31 Motyl, *Turn to the Right,* p. 59.
32 See Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine* (Munich, 1960).

innermost circles by posing as an escapee from the Ukrainian SSR assassinated the OUN leader, Ievhen Konovalets'.[33]

## IV.

The Ukrainian SSR's diplomatic powers were revived on 1 February 1944, when the USSR Supreme Soviet amended the Soviet Constitution with a "Law Granting the Union Republics Plenary Powers in the Sphere of Foreign Relations and on Reorganizing the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in this Connection from an All-Union into a Union-Republican People's Commissariat."[34] Six days later, on February 7, the prominent Ukrainian writer Oleksandr Korniichuk, then deputy foreign commissar of the USSR, was appointed foreign commissar of the Ukrainian SSR.

The February amendments opened the door for Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on 28 August 1944 that all sixteen Soviet republics be admitted to the future United Nations organization. Following initial Western opposition and continued Soviet insistence, a compromise was finally reached, whereby only the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR were to be granted United Nations status. In spite of continued disagreement as to their exact role, both Soviet republics came to the San Francisco conference the following May and became founding members of the United Nations.[35]

In the years that followed, the Ukrainian SSR's enhanced diplomatic status allowed it to negotiate directly with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), participate at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, sign peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Italy, and Finland in 1947, and play a not insignificant role at the Danube Conference in 1948. Perhaps in recognition of the Ukraine's greater international role (or, perhaps, "more in jest than in earnest"),[36] the British ambassador to Moscow suggested to Molotov in 1947 that "London was interested in exchanging represen-

[33] For a detailed account of events preceding the assassination, see Iaroslav Kut'ko, *Pekel'na mashyna v Rotterdami* (New York, 1952–1953).

[34] Another amendment granted the republics the right to have their own Commissariats of Defense and military formations. For the text of both amendments, see Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* pp. 215–17.

[35] For a detailed discussion of these events, see Sawczuk, *Ukraine in the United Nations,* pp. 3–48.

[36] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 197.

tatives with the Ukrainian Republic," but "Molotov retorted with evident annoyance that Kiev was not interested in expanding its diplomatic contacts."[37]

A controversial question among Western scholars — usually, alas, formulated imprecisely — is what motivated Stalin to grant the Ukraine (as well as, of course, Belorussia) enhanced international status.[38] Answers generally fall into two categories: (1) international — that Stalin, with an eye on the future United Nations organization, was primarily motivated by diplomatic concerns; (2) national — that he desired to appease Ukrainian national aspirations or to utilize Soviet Ukrainian statehood for legitimating his annexation of the Western Ukraine. Much of the resulting debate on the question has tended to be more scholastic than scholarly. A general flaw has been the inability to distinguish between two distinct stages in the Ukraine's elevation to international status: the Ukrainian SSR was *first* granted certain diplomatic prerogatives in February 1944, and only then, some months later, was the proposal made that it, along with the other republics, join the United Nations. If these two stages are collapsed, Stalin is made to appear either largely oblivious of the advantages of additional representation in postwar international organizations or remarkably prescient in appraising their importance. Of course, both sets of motivations were probably present at both stages; nevertheless, separating the two stages allows one to make analytic distinctions and to perceive whether each had a different primary motivation.

Yaroslav Bilinsky does not differentiate between the "reasons for admitting the Ukrainian SSR to the UN" and the question of "why Stalin granted a modicum of international representation to the Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics" in the February amendments.[39] Adam Ulam treats the granting of diplomtic powers in early 1944 as little more than a preface to the more interesting events of the next year. With regard to the Soviet demand that "*all* sixteen of the Soviet republics be represented in the General Assembly," he notes: "the

[37] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* p. 197.

[38] The Soviet explanation is not very helpful: "With the development of the specific economic and cultural needs of the union republics, the existing forms of external ties were no longer satisfactory. These needs could have been better satisfied by establishing direct ties between the republics and foreign countries. The entrance of the Soviet republics onto the foreign-political arena acquired special significance in connection with the approaching end of the war, which was to be marked by the creation of a new international organization of security" (*Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 327).

[39] Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic,* p. 269.

Supreme Soviet had passed some time before — and this was undoubtedly done with a view to such a contingency — a constitutional amendment enabling the republics to have their own foreign and defense ministries."[40] Dmytryshyn is more guarded in his argumentation, but he, too, confuses the uses of the Ukraine's enhanced diplomatic status with the reasons for it. According to him, the "concessions" made to the Ukraine prior to and during February 1944 "were also aimed at the foreign audience. They served as important factors in extracting Western agreements for the UkSSR and the Belorussian SSR to have seats in the new world organization. . . ."[41] Aspaturian and Sawczuk recognize that both sets of motivations were important, but appear to be uncertain as to what motivation was primary at what stage. On the one hand, writes Aspaturian, "the constitutional innovations of 1944 were designed to enable Soviet diplomacy to exploit . . . the wide latitude provided by international law for the creation and manipulation of fictional entities in the pursuit of vital state interests"; on the other, the "architectonic design of the two Amendments was to transmute serious separatist forces released by the German occupation into useful levers of centripetalization. . . ."[42]

As suggested earlier, the way out of this confusion lies in treating the constitutional amendments and the question of admittance to the United Nations as two analytically distinct issues, with analytically distinct sets of motivations. Robert Sullivant, although only peripherally concerned with the question of the Ukraine's international status, comes closest to understanding its complexity. He correctly sees that the amendments were part of the chain of "modest concessions to demands for greater republic autonomy and authority" granted the Ukraine (and the other republics) before February 1944.[43] Hence Molotov was probably sincere in saying "We cannot help but see in this [the amendments] a new important step in the political working-out of the national problem in our multi-national Soviet state."[44] Once the amendments were passed, however, the republics could be used to implement Soviet diplomatic and international ends. Whether the proposal at Dumbarton Oaks was intended to increase Soviet voting strength or to enlarge the scope of Soviet diplomatic maneuverability

[40] Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67* (New York, 1973), p. 373.
[41] Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and Ukraine,* pp. 173–74.
[42] Aspaturian, *Union Republics,* pp. 20, 53.
[43] Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* p. 245.
[44] Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* p. 245.

is probably indeterminable and, for present purposes, unimportant. Again, Sullivant has come closest to understanding this: "For the Ukraine and Belorussia a further remarkable concession came twelve months later when Stalin and Molotov pressed successfully at the Yalta Conference for United Nations membership for the two republics. It seems clear that Stalin was interested chiefly in enlarging the Soviet Union's role in the United Nations."[45] Admittedly, this analysis implicitly views both sets of motivations as centering on the Ukraine. But considering the Ukraine's vital importance to the USSR in general and to the Soviet war effort in particular — an importance of which Stalin was very well aware — is that view unreasonable or unjustified?

## V.

Volumes 1 and 3 of *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena* deal with the period from 1945 to 1970. They make for dry reading and, at first glance, appear to offer conclusive proof that the search for distinctly Ukrainian foreign relations is bound to be futile. *The Ukraine and the Foreign World* supports this gloomy view: "The Ukrainian SSR, as an integral and inseparable part of the Soviet Union, completely supported and furthered the implementation of the Leninist foreign policy of the USSR."[46] Or: "In all questions examined at the UN, as well as in other international organizations, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR always acted together with the delegations of the USSR and the BSSR, jointly defending the interests of the Land of the Soviets, the interests of peace and security in all the world."[47] Yaroslav Bilinsky has arrived at a similarly depressing conclusion: "a careful reading of a dozen or so speeches by the Ukrainian delegates to the UN have convinced this writer that they contain very little of what might affect Ukrainian patriots."[48] Likewise, he writes, "A scanning of the accounts in the Soviet Ukrainian press . . . from 1946 to 1962 leaves the impression that the activity of the Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations does not differ in any significant way from that of the delegation of the USSR."[49] A close

45 Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* p. 246.
46 *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 374.
47 *Ukraina i zarubizhnyi svit,* p. 382.
48 Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic,* p. 280.
49 Bilinsky, *Second Soviet Republic,* p. 266.

reading of the works under review, however, suggests that the reality of the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations is far more complex than that.

Volume 1 of *The Ukrainian SSR on the International Arena* (1944–1961) contains a section on "The International Ties of the UkSSR" (for some reason, the section does not appear in volume 3) consisting primarily of press reports of visits to Kiev by foreign statesmen and politicians. The foreigners are usually met at the airport or train station by high-level Soviet Ukrainian government officials, greetings and welcoming speeches are exchanged, the guests laud Kiev's beauty, and, as far as one can tell from the communiqués, very little of substance is conveyed by either side. Nevertheless, the *pattern* of foreign visits to the Ukraine reveals a great deal about the Ukrainian SSR's ability to engage even in this, the most superficial kind of foreign relations.[50] Between 1945 and 1948, a time of growing East-West tension, for example, Kiev was visited by seven foreign dignitaries: significantly, six were from Eastern Europe, while the seventh, Harold Stassen, was from the United States. Between 1949 and 1953, the height of the Cold War and of the Stalinist terror throughout the entire Soviet bloc, no visits appear to have been made. Following Stalin's death, the pattern changes once again: in 1954, one East European and two Western (here somewhat arbitrarily defined as including Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand) dignitaries visited the Ukrainian capital. The number rose to nine in 1955: one East European, six Westerners, and, for the first time, two dignitaries from the Third World. Indeed, following 1955, the year of the Bandung Conference, when Soviet efforts to court the countries of Asia and Africa increased, a steady stream of Third World statesmen visited the Ukraine: three in 1956, two in 1958, seven in 1959, four in 1960, and seven in 1961. East European contacts jumped to six in 1956, then dropped to two in 1957 (due to events in Poland and Hungary?) before leveling off at three in 1958, two in 1959, two in 1960, and two in 1961. The number of Westerners visiting Kiev fell to three in 1956 and to none in 1957–1958 (due to the chilling in Soviet-Western relations that followed the Polish-Hungarian revolts and the Suez Crisis?), rose to three in 1959, and then dropped to two in 1960 and one in 1961. After a twelve-year hiatus, Americans appeared in Kiev twice in 1959 and

[50] A recent visitor to Kiev has been United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, who, on 7 May 1981, held "talks" with the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, V. Shcherbyts'kyi (Martynenko, "Ukrainian SSR," p. 4).

once in 1960 and in 1961 — undoubtedly reflecting the improvement in American-Soviet relations at the time.[51] Clearly, then, the extent of the Ukrainian SSR's foreign relations is a function of the international environment: in times of heightened international tension, the Ukraine is forced into isolation; in times of reduced tension, the Ukraine has the opportunity, however slight, to assert its foreign relations identity. For instance, the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev consular agreement came at the height of Amerian-Soviet détente.

Another indicator of Ukrainian distinctiveness in foreign relations is the speeches by Ukrainian delegates at the United Nations General Assembly in 1946–1970. Of the ten speeches delivered between 1946 and 1955, only one, by D. Z. Manuil's'kyi in 1947, gives an expressly, even if superficially, Ukrainian perspective on an issue. In the rest, the term "Ukrainian SSR" appears only perfunctorily, first as an introduction and then to express support for the USSR's position.[52] Indonesia, for example, was usually discussed in language that barely indicates that the speaker represented not the USSR, but the Ukrainian SSR.[53] Starting with 1956, however, every speech (except for three made in 1959, 1961, and 1968) provides the Soviet Ukrainian government's perspective on world issues:[54] "The Government of the Ukrainian SSR considers . . ." and "The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes . . ." are typical of this phraseology. Is it merely coincidental that the Ukrainian SSR's profile at the United Nations sharpened in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech at the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 1956?

Study of the speeches reveals an additional, probably not insignificant, nuance. From 1946 to 1961 and from 1965 to 1970, the speakers almost invariably invoke the "Ukrainian SSR." Only very rarely does the phrase "delegation of the Ukraine" or "government of the Ukraine" arise. Between 1962 and 1964, on the other hand, the

51 This information has been compiled from *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), pp. 431–528.
52 *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* pp. 123–99.
53 Sawczuk explains Manuil's'kyi's propensity to "speak on behalf of the USSR" as a "conscious effort to impress on UN members and the world that in the Soviet federal state, not only does the Soviet Union speak for its members, but Soviet Union republics can also speak on behalf of the USSR." (Sawczuk, *Ukraine in the United Nations,* p. 141.) My study suggests, instead, a conscious effort to keep the Soviet Ukrainian profile low at a time of Cold War tensions and Stalinist repression.
54 Information derived from *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), pp. 200–65; *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1977), pp. 23–116.

standard usage is not "Ukrainian SSR," but the more nationally-minded "Ukraine."[55] Is the change in usage simply a matter of chance, or does it reflect a heightened Soviet Ukrainian awareness of the Ukrainian SSR's distinctly Ukrainian international role? If the latter is true, the changes that occurred between 1961 and 1962 and between 1964 and 1965 are surely attributable at least in part to changes in the internal Soviet political climate — that is, to the 22nd Communist Party Congress in October 1961, which gave an additional impulse to de-Stalinization, and to Khrushchev's ouster and replacement by Brezhnev and Kosygin three years later, in October 1964.

The preceding analysis suggests that Soviet Ukrainian foreign relations are a variable phenomenon, responsive to both the international and the internal Soviet contexts. Even if this proposition is only marginally true, Western policymakers would do well to address themselves to the Ukrainian SSR's potentially significant foreign-relations role and to attempt to influence the course of its development. Ideally, a far-sighted Western policy would treat the Ukrainian SSR's pretensions to international politics as an excellent opportunity for promoting Western interests *within* a context of reduced East-West tensions.

## VI.

The question raised at the beginning of this study — does the Ukrainian SSR enjoy distinctly Ukrainian foreign relations? — has been answered only in part. Obviously, the Ukraine's membership in the Soviet Union greatly restricts the scope of its activity in the international arena. Nevertheless, there is one foreign actor with whom the Ukraine may reasonably be argued to have its own relations —namely, the Ukrainian emigration in North America and Western Europe. Indeed, Soviet Ukrainian actions towards the emigration resemble the kind of relations the Ukrainian SSR might enjoy with a bona fide state. Public relations, propaganda, cultural and educational exchanges, and "foreign aid" are supplemented with attempts to "interfere" in the other's "internal affairs" via subversion and assassination attempts. Largely missing from this scheme, of course, is reciprocity, since the émigrés, despite their pronouncements to the contrary, for the most part lack anything even closely resembling a "foreign policy" capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Ukraine.

[55] *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1977), pp. 23–46.

As noted previously, the émigrés remained a constant Soviet Ukrainian concern throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This concern appears to have increased after World War II, because of the existence in the western oblasts of an armed Ukrainian nationalist underground with strong ties to the émigré community. Significantly, Manuil's'kyi made use of an international forum, the United Nations General Assembly, on 22 September 1947, to denounce émigré nationalists.[56] Although the underground was liquidated by the mid-1950s, the dissident movement that followed in its wake in the 1960s and 1970s found strong resonance among Ukrainians abroad, thereby aggravating the Ukrainian SSR's difficulties with the émigrés. The United Nations continued to serve as a forum for attacks on them: in his speech of 10 October 1960 at the General Assembly, Nikolai Podgorny denounced the émigré "Hitlerite scum which committed crimes against the Ukrainian people."[57] On 11 October 1966, the foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR, D. Z. Bilokolos, chastized the "traitors of the Ukrainian people, who, together with the Hitlerite fascists, escaped from the Ukrainian land and found haven in the United States and West Germany."[58]

Current Soviet Ukrainian émigré "foreign policy" is specifically directed at three more or less distinct groups: (1) the so-called "progressives," that is, openly pro-Soviet Ukrainians who receive various forms of material support from the Ukrainian SSR; (2) the relatively apolitical majority, whose support is courted by the Ukraina Society's propaganda and visits by dance ensembles, choirs, and the like; and (3) the "bourgeois nationalists," whom the Soviets continue to try to neutralize by disinformation, infiltration, diversion,[59] and assassination.[60] At this point, the case for the Ukrainian SSR's pursuit of its own émigré "policy" becomes blurred, since the orders for neutralizing anti-Soviet groups probably come as much or more from Moscow as from Kiev.

56 *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), p. 134.

57 *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1963), p. 250.

58 *Ukrains'ka RSR na mizhnarodnii areni* (1977), p. 70.

59 Yaroslav Dobosh and Andrew Klymchuk, two young Ukrainian tourists caught "red-handed" in the 1970s while trying to contact dissident circles in the Ukrainian SSR, appear to have been "set up" by Ukrainian KGB operatives working abroad. The Dobosh case, in particular, served as a pretext for the 1972 crackdown on Ukrainian dissent. Regarding Dobosh, see Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era* (The Hague, 1980), pp. 197–99.

60 The last nationalists to have been assassinated, both in West Germany, were OUN leaders — Lev Rebet, in 1957, and Stepan Bandera, in 1959. Their assassin was a Ukrainian from the western oblasts, Bohdan Stashyns'kyi.

Is the Ukrainian SSR's policy toward Ukrainian émigrés really a form of "foreign policy"? The answer, of course, is both yes and no. On the one hand, the émigré community is the object of tactics usually reserved for legitimate foreign policy concerns; on the other hand, the Ukrainian regime probably views its struggle with them as an integral part of its struggle with oppositionist elements at home. Seen in this light, the Ukrainian SSR's "foreign policy" toward Ukrainian émigrés is an extension of its domestic "anti-bourgeois nationalist" policy: the former may be pursued because it does not overstep the limits placed on the Ukrainian SSR's international involvement.

Extending these limits, however, lies at least partly within the powers of the West in general and the United States in particular. Western insistence on consulates in Kiev, on expanded cultural, scholarly, and tourist relations with the Ukrainian SSR, and on a more active Soviet Ukrainian role in international forums would be consistent with the Ukrainian SSR's formal prerogatives and with the kind of foreign relations it has enjoyed at various times in the past. The coming years should offer the West a particularly good opportunity to pursue these ends: with the Kremlin preoccupied with the USSR's economic difficulties and the succession crisis sure to erupt after Brezhnev's departure, the Ukrainian SSR may very possibly come to enjoy a greater degree of political "breathing space." At that point, American willingness to expand this space will prove crucial for the Soviet Ukraine. But will the United States be sufficiently foresighted to advance such a policy? In view of the current administration's Manichean view of East-West relations, the prospects for such a development appear, alas, doubtful.

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# CHRONICLE

## *Zdzisław Stieber, In memoriam* (7 June 1903 – 12 October 1980)

GEORGE Y. SHEVELOV

Zdzisław Stieber's biographical ties with the Ukraine were limited. His childhood and early years of scholarly work were spent in Little Poland, and his first contact with the Ukraine came only in 1937, when, at the age of 34, he was nominated associate professor at the University of Lviv on the recommendation of Witold Taszycki. Stieber remained at that post until 1945, when Poles were expelled from the Western Ukraine. Polish-Ukrainian personal contacts did not flourish in Lviv during the intervening eight years: under the *Polska sanacyjna* the two communities lived there side-by-side, but with backs turned. The situation worsened in the years of German occupation. Nevertheless, Stieber did not shun Ukrainian colleagues. Later, recalling that he "knew, appreciated, and loved Simovyč," Stieber added: "When Simovyč died Taszycki and I went to his funeral. But the mood at the cemetery was such that we could not but withdraw quickly" (3 January 1978).[1] Ukrainians were among Stieber's students, and they can better report on his relations with Ukrainian colleagues.

Stieber's contacts with Ukrainian peasants had begun earlier. While researching the Eastern Slovak dialects he had met Lemkians and developed an interest in the Lemkian dialects. His first studies on the subject were published in 1935 ("Wieś ruska w Gemerze," "Wschodnia granica Łemków" — 26, 27).[2] In 1934 and 1935, Stieber wan-

[1] I am citing from Stieber's letters to me, which are now in the Bakhmeteff Archive at Columbia University. References to the letters are by their date.

[2] A bibliography of Stieber's publications up to 1963 appeared in *Studia z filologii polskiej i słowianskiej,* vol. 5 (Warsaw, 1965), and for the years 1962 to 1971 in his *Świat językowy Słowian* (Warsaw, 1974). Here reference to his articles is by their

dered extensively in the Lemkian region, collecting dialectal and toponymic data. By 1939, he had completed the monograph *Dialekt łemkowski,* but its publication was interrupted by the outbreak of the German-Polish war in September of that year, and the manuscript was lost. His collected data were preserved, however, and when, in 1945, Stieber moved to Central Poland after a short stay in Cracow, they went with him. The postwar years in Poland were not favorable for the publication of books on Ukrainian topics, due to the continuing Polish-Ukrainian conflict and pressures from the Soviet Union. But in 1948–1949, Stieber managed to publish, in two parts, his *Toponomastyka Łemkowszczyzny,* followed in 1956–1964 by eight fascicles of his *Atlas językowy dawnej Łemkowszczyzny.* He also maintained personal contacts with some Ukrainian colleagues in the Ukrainian SSR.

From 1958, when we met in Warsaw, we maintained a correspondence. Our second and last meeting took place in London in May of 1978. He came to the small Arab-run hotel at Queen's Gate where I was staying, and we spent the whole day in friendly discussion there and at a nearby Italian restaurant. Our personal conversations thus totaled only several hours, but our friendship developed well through correspondence, as was reflected by the form of address in his letters, which changed from "szanowny kolego" to "drogi kolego" to "kochany Jurij." I wrote to him in Ukrainian, he to me in Polish. These letters, if published, would be not only a document of friendship, but a source for Stieber's biography and for the history of Slavic and Ukrainian studies in Poland over twenty years.

Stieber was always interested in Ukrainian scholarly projects in Poland. Even after his retirement from university teaching and from the Polish Academy, in 1973, he closely followed work on the atlas of the Bojkian dialects, on the dictionary of the Hucul dialects, and on the atlas of the Belorussian and the adjacent Ukrainian dialects in Northeastern Poland. It was, incidentally, at his insistence (as well as that of some others) that the latter, originally to be titled "An Atlas of Belorussian Dialects in the Białystok Area," appeared as *Atlas gwar wschodniosłowiańskich Białostocczyzny,* which as Stieber tersely commented, was "according to the factual state," although "it was necessary to break a certain oppostion (*pewne opory*) among some

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number in the first list and, in italics, in the second list. Publications appearing in the years 1972 to 1977 are covered in *Slavia Orientalis,* vol. 17, no. 2 (1978).

collaborators on the atlas" (5 February 1976). Volume 1, edited by St. Glinka, A. Obrębska-Jabłońska, and J. Siatkowski, appeared in 1980; Stieber had been its pre-publication reader and reviewer.

When in 1977 the Polish government replaced the traditional Ukrainian place-names in the Lemkian region with artificial Polish ones, Stieber wrote to me (I had not raised the issue): "You may be interested to know that two committees of the Polish Academy of Sciences (linguistic and historical) unanimously adopted resolutions in which they asked the relevant authorities to restitute the changed historical place-names. Each committee comprises all experts in its field. That of linguistics has fifty members" (3 January 1978). His next letter informed me: "The intervention of the two committees of the Polish Academy of Sciences has had a certain effect. At any rate, in the press [and] in semiofficial announcements the place-names are used as before (*w dawnym brzmieniu*)" (18 February 1978). He did not mention who had initiated the Academy's action.

Stieber's attitude toward such questions stemmed from his concept of patriotism. When he read my article about the high number of Polonisms in Ukrainian (in *For Wiktor Weintraub,* The Hague, 1975), he asked me whether I was attacked by Ukrainian patriots, adding, "As concerns the Poles, they have completely broken themselves of connecting such problems with patriotism (except for a few persons, who, after all, are not among linguists). I consider myself a patriot, but it would not trouble me in the least if it were proved that there are twice as many Ukrainianisms in Polish than is usually accepted" (27 August 1975). Also, remembering being bitterly attacked by some Slovaks in his younger years for maintaining that Eastern Slovak was a mixed Slovak-Polish dialect, he hinted at the Slovaks' refusal to help collect data for the atlas of Bojkian dialects: "We stumbled again upon the hyperpatriotism [of some Slovaks], this time in connection with Ukrainian studies" (5 November 1975).

At present, the greater part of Stieber's studies on Ukrainian subjects, which focus on the Lemkian dialects, are collected in three books. The earliest, chronologically, is his *Toponomastyka Łemkowszczyzny,* part 1: *Nazwy miejscowości* (Łódź: Towarzystwo naukowe, 1948) and part 2: *Nazwy terenowe* (Łódź, 1949). The bulk of the work consists of a list of place-names, in their official and popular forms, with tentative etymologies. In part 1, materials from Old Polish written records are also adduced. The conclusions are few and concern mainly the history of settlement in the region. Stieber suggests that

most territorial names there are of Ukrainian origin, but that the names of settlements in the western half of the area are about evenly divided between Ukrainian and Polish origin, which indicates that the Ukrainians who came in the wake of Wallachian colonization found some Polish villages already existing there. In both halves of the region there are also some Romanian and several Hungarian and Slovak names. Conclusions on the geographical distribution of roots and on morphological makeup are given only in part 2, and then only very selectively. Among reviews of the book are those by Ivan Pan'kevyč (*Slavia* 21, no. 1 [1952]) and J. Stanislav (*Jazykovedný sborník* 4 [1950]).

The eight-part *Atlas językowy dawnej Łemkowszczyzny* (Łódź: Towarzystwo naukowe, 1956–1964) was also based on Stieber's field work of 1934–1935 in the area. It comprises 416 maps with data from 72 settlements in Poland and 8 in Slovakia. Most of the maps (which are all in black and white) are devoted to a specific word, but some proceed from a notion to words and some show morphological forms. Phonetic features have no special maps, but these can be deduced from the suitable lexical maps, which is facilitated by the index of phonetic features in the last fascicle. This was the first Slavic regional dialectal atlas to concentrate on entirely Ukrainian data, if one sets aside the five maps (with 39 isoglosses) supplementing I. Pan'kevyč's *Ukrajins'ki hovory Pidkarpats'koji Rusy i sumežnyx oblastej* (Prague, 1938). Stieber's work is especially valuable because the speakers of Lemkian were dispersed in 1945, and thus the atlas contains minute-to-midnight information. The reviews of the atlas by J. Dzendzelivs'kyj (*Kratkie soobščenija Instituta slavjanovedenija,* vol. 38, 1963) and F. Buffa (*Jazykovedný časopis* 16, no. 2 [1965]), are noteworthy; the former, in particular, is very detailed and incisive.

The third book by Stieber which should be on the shelves of a Ukrainian linguist is his *Świat językowy Słowian* (Warsaw: Państwowe wydawnictwo naukowe, 1974), which is a collection of selected articles (in a letter of 23 April 1974 Stieber wrote: "I do not like the title, but it is not my invention. The cover is hideous"). Part 4, entitled "The Eastern Slavic Languages," is devoted virtually entirely to Ukrainian and, more specifically, Lemkian (one article deals with Belorussian; another treats Bojkian and Sjan as well as Lemkian dialects). Also, part 1, "Theoretical and General Slavic Studies," discusses much Ukrainian material, particularly in the articles "Z badań porównawczych nad słownictwem Karpat," "L'allongement

compensatoire dans l'ukrainien et le haut sorabe," and "Małoruskie ǯ < *dj* and czeskosłowackie ʒ < *dj*." The latter two articles are important for the historical phonology of Ukrainian; the Lemkian cycle presents, in a sense, synthetic conclusions to the data collected in Stieber's books on toponymics and in his atlas. One article treats the history of Lemkian ("Z fonetyki historycznej dialektu dawnej Łemkowszczyzny"), two discuss its last (by 1945) vocalic and consonantal systems ("Systemy wokaliczne dawnej Łemkowszczyzny," "Systemy konsonantyczne dawnej Łemkowszczyzny"), one delineates Lemkian vis-à-vis the neighboring Ukrainian dialects ("Gwary ruskie na zachód od Oporu"), and one presents Lemkian in its contacts with Polish and Slovak ("Wpływ polski i słowacki na gwary Łemków").

Several articles by Stieber on Ukrainian problems were not included in the collection. Perhaps Stieber thought some were less important or their ideas were presented in more detail in other articles; others were written after the collection went to press. In any case, these articles deserve to be mentioned here: "Wieś ruska w Gemerze" (26), "Wschodnia granica Łemków" (27), "Pierwotne osadnictwo Łemkowszczyzny w świetle nazw miejscowych" (37), "Wschodnia granica Łemków" (43), "Materiały akcentowe z dawnej Łemkowszczyzny" (177), "Nowe osiągnięcia gramatyki porównawczej języków słowiańskich" (*28*); along with two reviews — of *Symbolae in honorem G. Y. Shevelov* (Slavia Orientalis 23, no. 3 [1974]) and of my *Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language* (published posthumously in *Rocznik slawistyczny* 42, no. 1 [1980]). Finally, one should note Stieber's etymological miscellanea, e.g., on the stream name *Bustryk* in Tatry (*Rocznik Naukowo-Dydaktyczny Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Krakowie* 47 [1973]) and on the names *Hucul* and *Kolomyja* (*Opuscula Polono-Slavica* = Festschrift St. Urbańczyk, Wrocław, 1979), which were usually ingenious and written in a light, humorous vein.

For all his interest in Ukrainian, particularly Lemkian, language studies and his deserved place in the history of Ukrainian linguistics, this field was not central in Stieber's scholarship. Stieber began to work in Slavic linguistics in 1926. His teachers were Jan Łoś in the history of Polish, Jan Rozwadowski in Slavic comparativistics, and Kazimierz Nitsch in Polish dialectology. Nitsch, the actual founder of Polish dialectology, who for several decades made Poland the Slavic leader in dialect studies, developed a peculiar brand of dialectology based on indefatigable field work and minute observation of local varieties of Polish speech. It subordinated, in the long run, all col-

lected data to research in language history. Employing positivist precision of observation, Nitsch's method strived to reconstruct the Polish historical and prehistorical past and was ultimately, in that sense, romantic. Łoś was primarily a collector of facts, whereas Rozwadowski, a good and reliable scholar, remained (except in his toponymic studies) an imitator of the German Neogrammarians. Nitsch's was an original, personal synthesis of Neogrammarian precision with linguo-geographical know-how which allowed the interpretation of seemingly atomistic dialectal data in broad historical generalizations. In the first half of the twentieth century Nitsch dominated Polish linguistics deservedly. No wonder that Stieber, as a young turncoat from chemistry (which he studied in 1921–1926) to Slavic linguistics, found himself under Nitsch's spell. In later years, Stieber did not write on Łoś or Rozwadowski, but he did devote a whole series of articles to Nitsch.

Stieber's earliest research, dating from 1929, concentrated on Slovak dialects, especially Eastern Slovak. His theory on the origin of that dialect underwent some modifications, but, essentially, he believed that the Eastern Slovak dialects were genetically of mixed Slovak-Polish character. When that view met with fierce objections in Slovakia, Stieber emphasized repeatedly that he intended no political implications. But even today some Slovak scholars pass over Stieber's views in silence.

No such passions blazed up among the Sorbians, the second Slavic group to attract Stieber's interest. It is probably not accidental that Stieber's numerous studies on Eastern Slovak were not published as a book (most of them are included in his *Świat językowy Słowian,* but that book appeared about forty-five years after the first article was published), while the Sorbian studies gave rise to *Stosunki pokrewieństwa języków łużyckich* (Cracow, 1934), which is generally considered a fundamental work on the origins of Lower Sorbian, Upper Sorbian, and other Sorbian dialects.

The series of small monographs on Slavic border dialects (all based on his own fieldwork) was completed with the appearance of *Geneza gwar laskich* (Cracow, 1934), which dealt with Polish-Czech transitional dialects. By that time Stieber had accumulated a number of observations on Slavic mixed and transitional dialects that allowed for certain generalizations. His first article of that character appeared in 1936 (33). In the years 1929–1937 work on mixed dialects that had been formed in contacts of two or more Slavic languages logically led

Stieber to the problem of similar relationships of various dialects within a language. Turning to Polish facts he concentrated on the phenomenon of the Central Polish dialects around Łęczyca and Sieradz, where Great Polish, Little Polish, and Mazovian dialects met and interacted. This resulted in the publication of several articles and a small monograph, *Izoglosy gwarowe na obszarze dawnych województw łęczyckiego i sieradzkiego* (Cracow, 1933). Ground was now readied for some theoretical generalizations, which were formulated in another small monograph, *Sposoby powstawania słowiańskich gwar przejściowych* (Cracow, 1938). In it facts on Polish, Slovak, Czech, Sorbian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian collected and discussed in the preceding years constituted a broad background for a tentative typology of the Slavic transitional dialects.

After World War II Stieber's scholarly interests shifted toward history, more specifically, the historical phonology of Polish. (His postwar publications on Lemkian were essentially prepared before the war). Two important innovations are noticeable in these works. While further using rich dialectal material, Stieber for the first time turned to the data of written records. Until that time he was primarily a representative of the school of linguistic geography as interpreted and adapted to Polish conditions by Nitsch. Now adherence to the "Nitsch line" was joined by adherence to the other traditional line in Polish linguistics, the philological one represented by Stieber's teacher Jan Łoś. (Nitsch had also written several articles in that vein, but they remained marginal in his scholarly output.) The second innovation was Stieber's growing interest in phonemics, both in the description of dialects and, especially, in the explanation of historical facts. In pursuing this direction Stieber was stimulated somewhat by the Polish tradition of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay, but more by his acquaintance with the work of the Linguistic Circle of Prague.

In joining the phonemic trend, Stieber was cautious and moved slowly. The first edition of his historical phonology of Polish, *Rozwój fonologiczny języka polskiego* (Warsaw, 1952), still followed the Neogrammarian tradition of considering separately the development of vowels, sonantic clusters, and consonants, and admitted phonemic explanation mainly within each segment and even there rather timidly. The modifications in the second edition of the book (1958) were few but significant: a brief introduction on phonemics was added, and phonemic aspects were mentioned more outspokenly. But the general outline of the book remained unchanged, as was the case with the third

edition (1962) and the fourth (1966); the latter, however, had a supplement on the phonemics of Modern Standard Polish.

The real breakthrough came when Stieber undertook, at my suggestion, a substantial rewriting of the book for its republication as volume 5 in the series *Historical Phonology of the Slavic Languages* (*A Historical Phonology of the Polish Language*, Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1973). Added were chapters on the history of studies in the field, on the newest developments in the Polish language (after 1945), on foreign influences on the Polish phonemic system and its development, as well as an outline of the history of Polish spelling (written, on Stieber's suggestion, by Jan Siatkowski). Also, over two hundred specific minor and not so minor changes were introduced. Most importantly, the original isolated treatment of vowels, sonants, and consonants was abandoned. Instead, the entire evolution of the language was presented synthetically and, naturally enough, the analysis of the interaction of changes in vowels and in consonants so closely interconnected in Slavic historical phonology shed new light on the entire evolution of the Polish language. All these alterations and substitutions were discussed at length in the correspondence between Stieber, the author, and myself, the editor. The texts of these letters would be of value for reconstructing the spread of the phonemic approach in Polish historical linguistics.

As a rule Stieber gladly made the suggested changes; there were, however, two exceptions. He wanted to preserve intact at any price a short chapter on the phonemic status of *y* in Modern Polish. To the argument that this is really part of synchronic description and that the allophonic status of *y* in Polish is no longer a problem in international linguistics, he stubbornly answered that in Poland the view still had opponents and therefore it must be put to rights again. The second point of disagreement concerned the interaction of Polish phonemic developments with those in adjacent languages, related and unrelated. This interaction seemed almost incomprehensible to him. Instead of remarking on each particular instance of common development, he offered a chapter on foreign influences on Polish.

With the exception of these two points Stieber was satisfied with his discussions with the editor and with the resulting further "phonemicization" of his book. On 25 June 1971 he wrote: "You are a demanding (*surowy*) editor, but I cannot but be in the most heartfelt way grateful to you for this."

Stieber also worked on the historical phonology of the Czech lan-

guage, but his *Gramatyka historyczna języka czeskiego* (Warsaw, 1957), written in collaboration with T. Lehr-Spławiński, was methodologically less interesting.

The last large-scale historical project which Stieber undertook and completed was his *Zarys gramatyki porównawczej języków słowiańskich* (*Fonologia,* Warsaw, 1969; *Fleksja imienna,* Warsaw, 1971; *Fleksja verbalna,* Warsaw, 1973). In the preface to the first part, he deliberately emphasized the by then obsolete character of the work of Jan Rozwadowski (one of his teachers), the lack of attention to newer trends in historico-comparative studies in Poland, and his ties with my *Prehistory of Slavic.* These ties, however, should not be overestimated. The desire to make his work condensed, easy to read, and a serviceable reference work made Stieber relapse into a more atomistic treatment of vocalism, prosody, and consonantism. In fact, he was no less influenced by A. Vaillant, a scholar who despised theoretical phonemics but often spontaneously used a phonemic approach (without its terminology) to particular questions. Stieber acknowledged his debt and expressed his gratitude to Vaillant in the forewords to the second and third parts of his work.

The acceptance of phonemics, even in a moderate version, and, by the same token, of regularity in the development of the language, especially in phonology, logically led Stieber to the problems of causality and predictability in phonetic changes. The importance he attached to these problems is reflected in the fact that three articles devoted to them introduce his *Świat językowy Słowian.* Also, in 1969 he published an article on the predictability of phonetic changes (*46*).

It was this deepening interest in the regularities of language changes that helped broaden his fields of interest in general Slavic studies. As shown above, Stieber began with languages around Polish, to wit, with Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Sorbian. That route took him to Polish itself, which he perceived not in isolation but within its historical connections and exchanges. Once he had mastered this wide regional complex, he felt ready to venture into general Slavic problems. Hence came his switch to all-Slavic comparativism. During the last years of his life he included Russian as well as Serbo-Croatian among his topics, starting with dialects (e.g., on the reflexes of the second palatalization of velars in Russian dialects — 33) and proceeding to a study of Old Rusian texts (e.g., in *Onomastica* 23 [1978], and in *Rocznik slawistyczny* 38, no. 1 [1977]).

In his extensive review of my *Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian*

*Language,* his last or nearly last work, composed while he was gravely ill ("in difficult conditions," as he put it) and sent to me in typescript because Stieber doubted that he would live to see it published (alas, he was right in that; it appeared in *Rocznik Slawistyczny* 42, no. 1 [1980]), he identified himself as a comparativist (p. 61). In a sense, this was a self-summation of his scholarly development. He began as a linguogeographer and dialectologist, Nitsch-style; he continued as a toponomast, becoming a language historian in the phonemic current; and, finally, broadening his perspectives, he arrived at an all-Slavic comparativism which came to fruition in the seventh and eighth decades of his life.

Thus as a comparativist he was, despite his age, a novice who was not granted the time to overcome the danger inherent in comparativism. J. Kuryłowicz gave this pitfall an appropriate name, "fictions of comparative linguistics," and devoted an article to it ("O nekotoryx fikcijax sravnitel'nogo jazykoznanija," *Voprosy jazykoznanija,* 1962, no. 2). In brief simplification, the "illness of fictitiousness" consists of taking as genetically kindred similar features of related languages without first establishing their chronology and their place as innovations in the phonemic systems of the respective languages at particular times. I point out this weakness in Stieber's approach because if he were alive, we would discuss the matter and perhaps he would revise his stand on it, as he often did after such discussions. I present the critique realizing that such a dialogue, to my great loss, is no longer possible.

In my historical phonology of Ukrainian, I denied any phonemic role to the lengthening of *o* and *e* (if any) followed by a weak *jer,* as well as, in the Southwestern dialects, the diphthongization of these vowels, following, in the main, V. Hancov and O. Kurylo. Objecting to this view, Stieber referred to Upper Sorbian, in which *o* and *e* are said to have changed in precisely the same conditions as in Ukrainian (the initial stage and the distribution are the only conditions that matter here; present-day reflexes, *i* in Ukrainian, *ó* and *ě* in Upper Sorbian, are quite different), e.g., Ukr. *dvir* — USo. *dwór,* Ukr. *pič* —USo. *pěc.* In the argument he cited the 1967 article, "L'allongement compensatoire dans l'ukrainien et le haut sorabe," reprinted in his *Świat językowy Słowian.*

Indeed, the similarities are often striking, e.g.

| | |
|---|---|
| Ukr. *hora — hirka — hirs'kyj* | USo. *hora — hórka — hórski* |
| *vin* | *wón* |
| *dvir — dvora* | *dwór — dwora* |
| *kin' — konja* | *kóń — konja* |
| *plit — plota* | *płót — płota* |
| *viz — voza* | *wóz — woza* |
| *nič — noči — ničnyj* | *nóc — nocy — nócny* |
| *pič — peči* | *pěc — pjecy* |
| *mir — moru* | *mór — mora,* etc. |

But the situation is not nearly as simple as such examples would indicate. Even if we dismiss as secondary such cases as Upper Sorbian *koš, kow, hrom, dom, pomoc, wot, wječor, wokno, wowca, wosobny,* the suffix *-osć* (e.g., *radosć*), the ending of the gen. pl. *-ow,* a.o., where Ukrainian does or would have *i,* by attributing such "deviations" to levelings-out, borrowings, and peculiarities of stress (although such instances are numerous), we cannot disregard the fact that Upper Sorbian has changed its *o* and *e* in three cases in which Ukrainian normally preserves the original vowels unaltered. These three cases are: (1) counterparts in Upper Sorbian to Ukrainian pleophony (e.g., *prózdny, stróžel* 'fear', *króć, krótki, chłód, prěni* 'first', *prěd, hród,* etc.); (2) under the original Rising and/or New Rising pitch (e.g., *móže, wróćić, króna, dróha, póda, móhło,* etc.); (3) *e* before a weak ъ. Stieber, of course, knew of cases (2) and (3), although he paid little attention to case (1). Yet, led on by the striking though illusory similarities in other positions, he took these latter as decisive, without projecting them onto the process of historical development of the two languages. In Upper Sorbian, the new *ó* and *ě* do indeed seem to be deducible from the distribution of length and pitch. But the triple development or lack thereof in Ukrainian — namely, the lack of a change under Rising and/or New Rising pitch (*može, doroha,* etc.), the lack of the change in pleophonic groups (*porožnij, korotkyj, xolod,* etc.), and the presence of the change of *o* before weak ъ and ь and of *e* before a weak ъ — cannot be explained from the binary opposition long vs. short. That development becomes understandable solely under the assumption that phonemic quantity and pitch distinctions in Proto-Ukrainian had been lost prior to the loss of weak *jer*s (which also follows from all other facts originating at that time).

Stieber raised a very interesting problem. An exhaustive comparison of the Upper Sorbian and the Ukrainian situation would certainly produce a better understanding of the historical developments of the two languages. Of course, it cannot be discussed at length here, where it has been adduced only to illustrate the tribute paid by Stieber to the fictitious side of comparativism, which always happens when that approach is not adjusted to and by historical method. Had Stieber lived and worked longer, he most likely would have introduced this adjustment, as he did others, into his phonology.

A pioneer in historical phonemics in Poland and, to a great extent, in Slavic historical linguistics in general, Stieber nevertheless did not betray his initial scholarly field, linguistic geography, including toponymics. Slavic linguistics is indebted to him for several substantial works in this field. Stieber headed the scholarly team that produced the *Atlas językowy Kaszubszczyzny i dialektów sąsiednich* (he was editor-in-chief of volumes 1 to 6 [1964–1969]; the project was completed with volumes 7 to 15 (1970–1978] under H. Popowska-Taborska). Unsurpassed in any Slavic country, the thirteen-volume, all-Polish atlas (*Mały atlas gwar polskich,* 1957–1970), begun by K. Nitsch and completed under the guidance of M. Karaś, had Stieber as an editorial board member for volumes 1 and 2, and after Nitsch's death, as head of that board for volumes 3 to 13. Stieber was also the inspiration behind and consultant for similar large projects, such as A. Zaręba's *Atlas językowy Śląska* (under publication since 1969), the above-mentioned *Atlas gwar wschodniosłowiańskich Białostocczyzny* (vol. 1, 1980), and the first two volumes of J. Rieger's *Atlas gwar bojkowskich* (volume 1 appeared in 1980, volume 2 in 1981, and others are in the course of publication).

Not only did Stieber give invaluable advice to such projects, but also he influenced changes in the very methodology of mapping. The "one-facet" map typical of Nitsch, i.e., the map presenting one specific feature, was replaced by the "multi-facet" map of Stieber. Using various colors and/or systems of signs (such as isoglosses, broad area colorings, and markers for where recording was made), it could better reflect the complex realities of language. Nitsch's maps are more plastic and, in most cases, immediately provide the most essential data; Stieber's maps are less obvious and require a careful, painstaking reading, but they reward the user with a wealth of information.

Thus, both in the scope of linguogeographical work he performed

and in the methods he applied Stieber will remain a respected figure in the history of Polish and Slavic — including Ukrainian — linguistics.

Stieber's personal history can be better told by his colleagues and students in Poland. Here I present only a few facts. He was born on 7 June 1903 in Szczakowa, west of Cracow. He studied Slavic linguistics at the university in Cracow after his defection from chemistry in 1926 (I myself have always perceived a psychological affinity between chemistry and phonology!). His M.A. was granted in 1928, Ph.D. in 1929, habilitation in 1934. From 1933 to 1937 he taught at the university in Cracow, from 1937 to 1945 in Lviv, from 1945 to 1952 in Łódź, from 1952 to 1967 in Warsaw. He was elected corresponding member of the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1945 and became a regular member in 1971. From 1956 to 1973 he was the director of the Zakład słowianoznawstwa of the academy. In Poland he was decorated with two government medals and two orders, and he twice received state prizes. He also received decorations in Bulgaria (1963) and in Czecho-Slovakia (1968). He died in Warsaw, on 12 October 1980.[3]

A promoter of new methods in dialectology, linguogeography, and language history, Stieber was very critical of post-structuralism trends. In a letter of 15 November 1973, responding to my use of the word "modern" in relation to linguistics, he wrote: "To be sure, I do not consider you or myself a 'modern' linguist. I admit that there are some achievements there, but one has to dig them out from a deluge of hoax (*z potopu blagi*)." He was endowed with a sense of terse humor toward himself and others. After having read my review of J. B. Rudnyc'kyj's *An Etymological Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language,* he wrote: "I went through your review of Rudnyc'kyj's dictionary. I think it must have a positive effect, but one never can tell" (5 May 1969). His English, he always insisted, was a unique "Stieber-English" which then had to be translated into plain English (e.g., 17 October 1971). In speaking of the difficulties he had with promoting the atlas of the Bojko region for publication, he related that one American had told Kuryłowicz: "We Americans settle difficult things at once, impossible things somewhat later," and commented: "We [in Poland] are not so energetic. We settle difficult things in a certain time, the impossible things much later — but we do settle them" (2 February 1976). Speak-

[3] I am indebted for these data to the article by J. Siatkowski in *Poradnik językowy,* 1975, no. 5; to the obituary of Stieber by M. Lesiv (Łesiów) in *Naša kul'tura,* 1980, no. 11; and to information kindly sent to me at my request by J. Rieger.

ing of our two meetings, which had occurred at an interval of twenty years, he commented: "From our experience hitherto, one must conclude that our next meeting will take place in May 1998. No doubt, in the Elysian fields" (26 May 1978; previously he had wanted us to meet in Paris, which has it own Champs-Elysées). In the preface to his Slavic comparative grammar, he compared my 662-page *Prehistory of Slavic* with his 91-page phonology of Slavic and apologized for his "organic unfitness to write thick books." His letters, too, were brief, each paragraph succinct, with commentary implied rather than stated. His books and articles, particularly the latter, were characterized by clear logic, conciseness, academic humility, few references, still fewer — or, more often, no — footnotes, matter-of-factness, and cautious advancement of his own views and theories.

In twenty years of our correspondence, only once did he complain: "You cannot imagine what effort is required for present-day life in Poland. One must grab for all the possibilities to introduce various beneficial changes. This requires continuous attention and continuous intervention. We are told, 'Shout, so that you are noticed!' Well, to shout one must know what to claim, and this leads to an infinity of conversations, conferences, etc., from the most official to those entirely private." And that was all he had to say on the subject.

It is amazing how much Stieber achieved in between "shoutings" and while in constantly deteriorating health. I am looking forward to our meeting on the Elysian plains. We shall discuss modern trends in linguistics to our hearts' content.

*New York*
*November, 1981*

# REVIEWS

BIBLIOHRAFIČNI DŽERELA UKRAJINS'KOHO LITERATUROZNAVSTVA: PUTIVNYK. By *L. I. Hol'denberh.* Kiev: "Vyšča škola," 1977. 198 pp.

Lev Izrailovyč Hol'denberh is well known for his *Ukrajins'ka literaturna bibliohrafija* (Kiev: "Naukova dumka," 1971) and *Literaturoznavča knyha v Ukrajins'kij RSR* (Kiev: "Naukova dumka," 1980), as well as for his important work as a teacher of bibliography at the Rivne branch of the Kiev Institute of Ukrainian Culture. The book under review here is his bibliographical guide to Ukrainian literature for students and teachers at universities and pedagogical institutes. It has the following sections: Marxist-Leninist works dealing with Ukrainian literature; general historical-literary bibliographical sources; bibliographical sources dealing with ethnography; biobibliographical dictionaries; *personalia* bibliographies for Ukrainian literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; general bibliographical sources dealing with Soviet literature; biobibliographies for Soviet Ukrainian authors; sources for current bibliographical information; and reference tools.

The introduction sets forth the work's methodological presuppositions and includes this statement: "some compilers, striving toward a formal, interpretive, and exhaustive registration of materials, departed from the Leninist principle of the *partijnist'* of bibliography, and included in their works methodologically flawed studies which had long ago lost historical-literary significance" (p. 9). The introduction also contains a brief, selective survey of Ukrainian literary bibliography and Hol'denberh's own reflections on bibliographical work.

The compilation includes reviews, but not historiographical articles, recommendatory (or didactic) bibliography, or acquisitions lists (p. 11). Nonetheless, Hol'denberh performs a valuable service by listing fugitive rotaprint indexes to Ukrainian serial indexes (pp. 11, 121, 130–31), and by providing certain information in his annotations (p. 125). For example, he notes (p. 123) that during the period of Ukrainization, Kost' Dovhan', then secretary of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Bibliology, worked along with other bibliographers at the Ukrainian National Library on a major bibliography of literature on Ivan Franko, only a portion of which was published. In another

annotation (pp. 79–80), he deftly criticizes the tendentiousness of the *Ukrajins'ki pysmennyky* series.

Despite these positive aspects, the book's value is reduced by the exclusion of such categories as Western reprints and bibliographical guides to literature published by Ukrainian émigrés. It is also marred by the failure to register works that appeared during the period of Ukrainization, e.g., Kyryljuk's study of Pantelejmon Kuliš (1927).

The work has an author index (pp. 192–197).

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INFORMACIONNO-BIBLIOGRAFIČESKAJA PERIODIKA ZARUBEŽNYX STRAN V FONDAX BIBLIOTEK AN URSR. ANNOTIROVANNYJ UKAZATEL'. Compiled by *L. I. Gol'denberg* (*Hol'denberh*) and *N. I. Maloletova.* Edited by *K. D. Bakulin.* Kiev: "Naukova dumka," 1975. 201 pp. 1100 copies.

"Informational-bibliographical" publications are understood to be national bibliographies, abstract journals, bibliographical annuals, signal information, and informational publications appearing every two or three years. This union list includes not only the publications held by the Library of the Academy of Sciences in Kiev, but also those in the collections of the Lviv Research Library and the various institutes and organizations that constitute the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

The introduction, by the compilers, cautions the reader about the differences in character and structure between Soviet and Western reference works, and warns against the ideological and methodological dangers of using Western publications in the social sciences.

The greater portion of the listing (pp. 5–[158]) gives 390 general and subject periodicals arranged according to the classification system used by Soviet research libraries. National bibliographical publications of the socialist countries are grouped together. Within each subsection, Cyrillic publications are listed first; Western language publications then follow, with translations into Russian. Each of the periodicals is given a short characterization, and the holdings for each title are noted. The work concludes with an index (pp. 159–172) of titles and an appendix (pp. 173–199). Shelfmarks are not given consistently, and holdings seem to be incomplete for many publications. Nonetheless, when used in conjunction with other holding lists which have

appeared in recent years, this work gives important information about the types of foreign reference tools available to Soviet Ukrainian scholars.

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ANTYNARODNA DIJAL'NIST' UNIATS'KOJI CERKVY NA UKRAJINI: BIBLIOHRAFIČNYJ POKAŽČYK. Compiled by *L. I. Il'nyc'ka.* Edited and with an introduction by *Ju. Ju. Slyvka.* Lviv: L'vivs'ka naukova biblioteka im. V. Stefanyka, AN URSR, 1976. 116 pp. 600 copies (rotaprint). 30 kopecks.

In this work, L. I. Il'nyc'ka lists scholarly, literary, and publicistic works published in Russian and Ukrainian between 1965 and 1975. The bibliography includes basic monographic and thematic collections published between 1946 and 1964, as well as West Ukrainian newspapers (articles in periodicals are not included). While all of the entries have been described de visu, only those items whose titles do not indicate contents are annotated.

The work is divided into the following sections: (1) religion and atheism, Marx and Engels, Lenin, government decrees, leaders of the Communist party; (2) the reactionary nature of the Uniate church (arranged thematically and then by collections of documents, separate editions, journals, and newspaper articles; (3) the struggle of the workers against the Union and clericalism; (4) anti-clerical works; (5) foundation of a scientific-materialistic world view and overcoming religious vestiges.

In the introduction, Ju. Ju. Slyvka asserts the need for this bibliography as a tool for historical research and atheistic education. He argues the highly debatable thesis that the Uniate church was an ally of foreign powers, socially conservative, and repressive of the best historical traditions. He also attempts to refute the idea that religion must be identified with a people.

Despite the reproachable fact that it does not include the works of Western bibliographers of Ukrainian religious culture (e.g., Michael Wawryk, Isydor Patrylo), this work's references to dissertations (no. 229) and useful analytics of miscellanies (no. 384) make it of value to researchers. The reader should note, however, that in their ideological zeal, the compilers occasionally overstepped the limits of logic and good sense, as when they included the seventeenth-century monk Ivan Vyšens'kyj (no. 265) as a proponent of the "anti-national role" of the Uniate church.

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ETYMOLOHIČNO-SEMANTYČNYJ SLOVNYK UKRAJINS'KOJI MOVY. By *Metropolitan Ilarion (Ivan Ohijenko)*. Edited by *Jurij Mulyk-Lucyk*. Vol. 1: A–D. Winnipeg: Instytut doslidiv Volyni (39), 1979. 365 pp.

In viewing Metropolitan Ilarion's activities, one must draw a clear line between the church dignitary and the linguist. To keep this distinction, and to deal with the linguist alone, I will refer to the author by his lay name, Ivan Ohijenko. This is all the more appropriate because the linguist's most important works were published as Ivan Ohijenko prior to his taking monastic vows in 1940.

Ohijenko's place in the history of Ukrainian linguistics and in the formation of the Ukrainian standard language still awaits objective evaluation. His credits in the normalization of the Ukrainian literary language, however, are indisputable. Ohijenko participated (alongside Je. Tymčenko and A. Kryms'kyj) in the first institutional regularization of Ukrainian spelling (May 1918) and he worked indefatigably to popularize the Central Ukrainian standard in the West Ukrainian lands. Yet even in these applied aspects of the language, his work was often marked by parochialism, an obsolete approach, lack of strict method and of acquaintance with modern scholarly trends, arbitrariness of judgment, and excess of patriotism. These features increased markedly after his arrival in 1947 in Canada, where he lived until his death in 1972. There he lacked access to materials and most of his time was taken by ecclesiastic matters, so that his linguistic interests were relegated to a hobby.

The dictionary under review covers the six initial letters of the Ukrainian alphabet. The entries for A were completed by or in 1964–1965 and published by the author in the monthly *Vira j kul'tura* (Winnipeg). The remaining letters, B–D, were not ready for publication at the time of his death. The editor, Jurij Mulyk-Lucyk, had to deal with an incomplete set of cards (some were lost) which contained various excerpts, some etymological, some semantic, and some quoting from sources. Often there were several cards for the same entry and many repetitions: e.g., in materials on the word *blahyj,* the same quotation from Pamva Berynda (1627) appears three times (pp. 145–147).

In view of their differing situations, the letter A and the letters B through D are here evaluated separately. In the first, a somewhat more systematic approach is evident. The compiler tried to combine the general semantic characterization of a word with its brief etymology. Since in Ukrainian all words beginning in *a-* (except for interjections and conjunctions) were borrowed from foreign languages, the etymologies for these words consist basically of references to the source languages and to the approximate time of borrowing. More often than not, this information is drawn mechanically from the etymological dictionary of the Russian language by Šanskij (1963). Out of many examples, a few are adduced here: *abonement* — from French, early

19th c. (p. 22; 15);* *abstrakcija* — from Latin, early 19th c. (p. 24; 22); *avdytorija* — from Latin via Polish, early 18th c. (p. 27; 174); *aha* — from Turkish, since 1517 (p. 32; 38); *al'manax* — from French via German, 16th c. (p. 55; 85). Sometimes the transference of Šanskij's data has led to blatant mistakes. For instance, Šanskij derives Russian *aktër* from French *acteur,* since 1711; Ohijenko writes that the word "came to us [i.e., Ukrainians, presumably] from French in the early 18th c.," which is the same information slightly paraphrased. But the Ukrainian form has *o* in the second syllable, which cannot derive from French *eu*; this leads, indisputably, to Latin *actor,* probably via Polish (p. 48; 48). The reference to Greek *aktōr* is out of place because in Greek the word means "leader, commander."

What is more important, *all* the data mechanically drawn from Šanskij's dictionary are wrong for Ukrainian. Some are also wrong for Russian, for Šanskij's etymological dictionary is one of the poorest Russian dictionaries of its type; it is derivative and frequently lacks critical judgment. The Russian dating, of course, is not binding for Ukrainian; also, when one of the two languages may have had a French source, the other may have had a German, Polish, or Latin one. In addition, for part of the eighteenth century and for the whole of the nineteenth, Ukrainian had no direct contact with French and little (except in Austria) with German. Nearly all Western borrowings of that time came into Ukrainian through Russian mediation and, hence, at a somewhat later date than they had penetrated into Russian.

Ohijenko's uncritical recourse to Šanskij's data, then, makes all the information on the letter A unreliable or misleading.

Outright errors are also present. Again to adduce only a few out of many examples: *aby* should be confronted not with 1st per. sing. *a byxъ,* but with 2nd-3rd per. sing. *a by* (p. 21); *adept* derives from Latin *adipiscor,* not from a non-existing *adipisar* (p. 38); *Azov* (the genuine Ukrainian form would be *Oziv*) is based not on the name of a Polovtsian prince Azak but, as Vasmer (p. 67) rightly states, on Turkic *azak* 'low place' (p. 43); the derivation of the river name *Amur* (in Asia) from Spanish(?) *Ta-Mur,* which allegedly means "great river" (p. 60), is completely fantastic; Greek *Adrianos* does not mean "valiant, courageous" (p. 65); by far not "all dialects" of Ukrainian preserve the dual forms of the type *dvi vikni, dvi korovi* (p. 89).

A positive feature in the selection of entries is the inclusion of baptismal personal names and of words which belong to the ecclesiastic language, which are too often omitted from Soviet dictionaries, e.g., *avva* (p. 25). But out of place, certainly, are foreign geographical names which have no relation to the Ukraine, e.g., *Altaj, Amur, Arktyka, Astraxan', Ašxabad, Albanija* (which, incidentally, is said to originate from "Caucasian" *alb*; what

* Here and in subsequent references, the first number is the page in Ohienko, the second, in Šanskij.

is this unknown "Caucasian" language? — p. 50). Why not include, then, the entire gazetteer?

Starting with the letter B, an entirely different kind of chaos sets in. Etymologies as such appear only exceptionally (see, e.g., *bajduže* — p. 113, *balakaty* —p. 115, *viddil* — p. 225, *d'ohot'* — p. 365 among the many cases where none are given). Neither the length nor content of entries have any uniformity. As already noted, the same headwords sometimes reappear (e.g., *Volyn'* twice — p. 243, *hroši* twice — p. 305 a.o.), sometimes in a different form (e.g., *vil* — p. 231, and *voly* — p. 243; the entry for *vil* consists entirely of a parallel drawn from the Bible and the title of Panas Myrnyj's novel *Xiba revut' voly, jak jasla povni?* whereas the entry for *voly* gives merely the interjections for driving oxen. Some entries are several pages each of encyclopedic information (e.g., *hist'* — p. 277, *hreky* — p. 301), or go deeply into theological matters (e.g., *blahyj* — p. 147, *blahočestyvyj* in its relation to *pravoslavnyj* — p. 149, *Boh* — p. 160), or list phraseological units (e.g., *hora* — p. 289), or indulge in puristic advice (e.g., *davniše* — p. 319), or contain bare excerpts from Old and Middle Ukrainian records (e.g., *dosyt'* — p. 352) or materials from the history of spelling (e.g., *g* [as a letter] — p. 313) or data on botanical terminology (e.g., *harbuz* — p. 264). Entries for mythological and some historical names retell generally known Greek myths and legends (e.g., *Danajiv dar* — p. 321, *Herostratova slava* — p. 271, *bočka Danajid* — p. 171).

Essentially, the entries for the letters B–D are a collection of haphazard, often anecdotal materials reflecting the free associations of the compiler — an involuntary analogy in linguistics to James Joyce's stream of consciousness in literature. In addition, the spellings are neither Soviet nor those used by the Ukrainian emigration: e.g., *grono, grotesk* are given as *hrono, hrotesk* (p. 305), but, for some obscure reason, *genij, geometrija* appear instead of *henij, heometrija,* the generally accepted forms. (Does this follow Pamva Berynda's pattern of 1627? — cf. p. 388 of his *Leksykon.*)

Faced with the lack of systematization and consistency, the editor had to choose whether to impose some order or to adhere strictly to Ohijenko's cards. He chose the latter option, perhaps the natural one under the circumstances. To try to put this material into even relative order would, perhaps, have been tantamount to compiling a new dictionary. But the editor should at least have tried to decipher properly the source abbreviations and to give, in a line or two, a characterization of the sources Ohijenko chose to use. In some cases this information would be crucial for an acceptance or rejection of Ohijenko's views, because apparently some of his sources were Russian, which would have led to distortions in the history of some Ukrainian words. The (unidentified) *azbukovniki, Slovar' raznojazyčnyj,* Timašev (p. 15) and possibly some others appear to be Russian sources. In general in Ohijenko's cards an oversensitive Ukrainian patriotism coexists curiously with an accept-

ance of Russian materials as Ukrainian (compare again the use of Šanskij's data for the letter A noted above).

Numerous factual mistakes in the entries for the letters B–D make use of the book perilous even for a layman interested in amusing stories associated with words. Again a few random examples: *baba* 'grandmother' is strangely defined as "brother's or sister's mother" (p. 108); Lat[in] *bognas* does not exist in Latin (nor in Latvian if the abbreviation "Lat." stands for that language; p. 111); *bajdyky byty* 'do nothing' in no way derives from *bajdak* 'a kind of boat' (p. 113); *bekeša* 'cloak' comes from Hungarian *bekes,* not *bekeš* (p. 130; there is no letter *š* in the Hungarian alphabet); *bereh* 'shore' is a Common Slavic word, not a borrowing from Church Slavonic (p. 132); *buda* 'cabin' is derived from Germanic *buode,* not *Buede* (p. 181); German *Wetter* is 'weather', not 'wind' (p. 204); *verhaty* comes from *vьrgati,* not *vrъgati* (p. 209); *grono* 'cluster' certainly did not come from German *grön* 'green' (actually *grün,* Old Saxon being *gröni* — cf. Kluge s.v.), but is a Common Slavic word with the regular vowel alternation *o* : *a* (e.g., in Bulgarian *granka* 'twig', cf., e.g., Sławski, fasc. 4, published in 1955, i.e., theoretically available to Ohijenko at the time he was working on his dictionary; but he used neither that work nor Vasmer's Russian etymological dictionary nor Rudnyc'kyj's Ukrainian one); *dopiru* 'recently' cannot be derived from Old Ukrainian *to pьrvo* (p. 349); *doč(ka)* 'daughter' had the Indo-European form **dhukt-* ~ *dhugat-* and not an impossible **ghught-* (p. 355). Some of these cases have probably resulted from misprints (which are numerous), but one cannot be certain where the inadequacies of the original text end and the negligence of the editor or the printer begins.

This book is printed on good paper, but the lack of a Church Slavonic and a Greek character set makes the typography inadequate (especially the Latin transliteration of Greek, which disregards distinctions of long and short *o* and *e* and renders ypsilon as *u*).

In sum, etymologists may disregard this publication, for it is not designed for them. On the other hand, laymen will find its data too unreliable to be used with confidence.

Ohijenko was never a high-brow linguist but primarily a popularizer and normalizer. In this book, even in this capacity, he appears at his weakest.

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RETHINKING UKRAINIAN HISTORY. Edited by *Ivan L. Rudnytsky.* With the assistance of *John-Paul Himka.* Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the University of Alberta (Distributed by the University of Toronto Press), 1981. x, 268 pp. $14.95 cloth; $9.95 paper.

For the book under review Ivan L. Rudnytsky has assembled most of the presentations made at the Ukrainian Historical Conference held 29–31 May 1978 at the University of Western Ontario. The contributions fall essentially under three headings: Ukrainian elites before and after Khmel'nyts'kyi's uprising; the demographic, social, and national evolution of Ukrainian cities from the nineteenth century to the present; discussions of the temporal and geographic "parameters" of Ukrainian history, in an effort to better define that history's contents and to periodize its course. As with any collective volume, the contributions vary in depth and breadth of coverage as well as in suggestivity. All, however, are informative and invite further research and reflection on East European as well as Ukrainian history.

The Ukrainian elites are dealt with in two articles. The first, by Frank Sysyn ("The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648," pp. 29–102), provides a meaty description and discussion of the several elites that dominated Ukrainian society in 1569–1648 (Sysyn actually starts his story earlier). The main thrust of the essay is to point out the divergent pulls and conflicting pressures, political as well as social and cultural, to which these elites were exposed. While the absence of a discussion of the Cossack *starshyna* is cause for surprise (although the author ably defends that decision), the transformations and ambivalences experienced by the elites are described fully and documented extensively in notes stressing the historiographic and methodological literatures. Sysyn emphasizes the ethnic-cultural diversity of the Ukrainian elites and the changes in their ethnic make-up over periods of time, which largely explain the diverse patterns of behavior and values among the ruling strata of Ukrainian society. It is regrettable, however, that Sysyn

does not at any point explicitly address the question of the functions of these elites, although his account makes clear not only that determining these functions presents problems, but also that the functions underwent significant changes in the period studied (not to speak of preceding eras). Yet, Sysyn implies that the functions did not change — that is, landownership and military-political governance continued within the framework of the larger political units that lorded over Ukrainian lands. But how about the elites' autonomous roles on the local level, or their socio-cultural leadership with respect to the peasantry or the urban "patriciate" (if any — but surely an interesting problem in mid-seventeenth century Kiev)? Sysyn's avoidance of these issues explains the omission of the Cossack elite, but is it justified, even though he breaks off his story abruptly in 1648?

The shorter article by Zenon E. Kohut ("Problems in Studying the Post-Khmelnytsky Ukrainian Elite, 1650s to 1830s," pp. 103–119) treats a single theme with great clarity: the integration of the Ukrainian elites into the officialdom and *dvorianstvo* of Imperial Russia in the eighteenth century. Kohut has dealt with the problem in much interesting detail in his unpublished dissertation ("The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy, 1763–1786: A Case Study in the Integration of a non-Russian Area into the Empire," University of Pennsylvania, 1975), of which this can be considered an extended abstract, whereas the impact of Ukrainian integration on the Russian establishment and culture has been convincingly assessed in the as yet unpublished dissertation of D. B. Saunders ("The Political and Cultural Impact of the Ukraine on Great Russia, c. 1775–c. 1835," Oxford University, 1978). An important caveat made by Kohut is that the elite of Polish origin did not disappear during and right after Khmel'nyts'kyi's uprising, but that it became "ukrainized" before becoming subsequently russified, too.

The three informative articles dealing with Ukrainian cities are substantial contributions whose value and interest are enhanced by Peter Woroby's comments on them and the authors' responses (Patricia Herlihy, "Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 135–155; Steven L. Guthier, "Ukrainian Cities during the Revolution and the Interwar Era," pp. 156–180; Roman Szporluk, "Urbanization in Ukraine since the Second World War," pp. 180–202; Peter Woroby, "The Role of the City in Ukrainian History," pp. 203–215). Since I am unfamiliar with urban and demographic studies and lack the *bosse statistique,* I cannot in all fairness give a critical evaluation of their main arguments and data. The striking fact is, however, that it was the very process of urbanization that gave rise to and pushed to center stage all the problems of modern national consciousness and ethnic-cultural diversity. The energetic pace of urbanization in the second half of the nineteenth century was set mainly by non-Ukrainians, so that the cities became Russian (or multi-ethnic) islands set in the rural Ukrainian sea. The Revolution, Civil War, and early Soviet rule changed this trend and brought about the ukrainization of the cities

(thanks to the massive influx to the factories of Ukrainian peasants). In recent times, however, particularly during the so-called Brezhnev era, we observe again the displacement of Ukrainians (and the Ukrainian language) from the main cities, especially in the Eastern Ukraine. The important cultural consequences of the latest trend, as well as their problematic impact on the future of the multi-ethnic polity, are particularly well brought out in Professor Szporluk's brilliant article. In the framework of modern urbanized society we seem to witness a repetition of the tensions between different ethnic, cultural, and political loyalties that have been observed among elites in the sixteenth to eighteenth century. To be sure, the cultural poles of attraction are different, and, more important still, the social and technical means at the disposal of the "imperial power" are much more potent.

Under the third heading fall two articles and a round table discussion on problems of periodization and the ethno-geographic limits of Ukrainian history. The substance of the discussion can be summarized as follows: Ukrainian history, by whatever geographic and ethnic definition, is remarkable for the number and significance of discontinuities within its course, which put into question the very idea of a single Ukrainian historical development from the founding of Kiev to the present day. There is even disagreement as to the time and nature of these breaks and discontinuities. Thus, for example, Omeljan Pritsak ("Kievan Rus' and Sixteenth-Seventeenth-Century Ukraine," pp. 1–28) argues persuasively that the major break in pre-modern Ukrainian history was not the Mongol invasion, but the Lithuanian conquest in the fourteenth century. He also sees radical qualitative differences between the socio-political (and hence also cultural) systems of Kievan Rus', Galicia-Volhynia in the thirteenth to fifteenth century, and the realm of the Cossack Host in the sixteenth to seventeenth century, not to mention those of later West and East Ukrainian lands. For his part, George Y. Shevelov ("Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," pp. 216–234), who identifies the key periods and their characteristics differently, retraces the complex and multifaceted development of what was to become, in the nineteenth century, the modern Ukrainian literary language and carries the story forward to present, Soviet, days.

The round table discussion touches on all these problems and raises a number of methodological and terminological issues with rather more stimulating disagreement than sterile consensus. All the participants agreed on the great need for up-to-date, scholarly, comparatively based and intellectually respectable teaching aids. Quite clearly, whatever breaks and discontinuities in Ukrainian history are identified and however they are evaluated, a basic choice has to be made between an approach based on territorial unity or one resting on ethnic (socio-cultural) unity. In either case, difficult problems have to be faced and resolved without regard to contemporary ideological pressures or politically induced sensitivities. As the twentieth century draws to a close, we recognize more and more that in the absence of statehood, units for

historical investigation and teaching are extremely difficult to identify and to agree upon. One thing is clear, as stated *expressis verbis* by Professor Sysyn (p. 71): it is unhistorical, unscholarly, and in the long run sterile to project modern and contemporary notions of national identity and consciousness onto earlier times. I, for one, am not convinced that a genetic thread can be drawn from pre-modern notions of group identity based on religion, way of life, and tradition to the ingredients of modern, post-Romantic nationalisms, whatever the outward formal similarities.

Rich with information and varied points of view, the volume's title should perhaps imply not so much a rethinking of Ukrainian history as a stimulus for serious reflection on and investigation of the history of the Ukrainian people and their lands.

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HISTORIA UKRAINY. By *Władysław Serczyk*. Wrocław, Warsaw, etc.: Ossolineum, 1979. 500 pp.

For a Polish historian, the chance to publish a survey of Ukrainian history is a rich but rare opportunity. As Serczyk points out in an all too brief preface, the past of Ukraine was "entwined" not only with Poland but also with Russia. Regrettably, the opportunity has been missed in this work. Almost all the controversial points have been glossed over. The debate on the ancient homeland of the Slavs, the problem of the divergence of Russians and Ruthenians, the Ukrainian character of Kievan Rus' are subjects not judged worthy of mention. In the modern period, developments are explained exclusively in the implausible Marxist-Leninist terms of faceless class struggle; for the twentieth century, the reader is presented with a summary of trite Soviet propaganda which attributes all to the genius of the (Russian) bolsheviks or to the obstruction of assorted "kulaks" and "bourgeois nationalists." The murder of several million Ukrainians during the collectivization campaign of the 1930s is dismissed with the statement that "the introduction of new economic methods in the countryside was not always pursued on the basis of consent." The Soviet annexation of the Western Ukraine in 1939, which was accompanied by the deportation of some two million Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish inhabitants, is described as a peaceful, democratic process. The postwar period is reduced to a catalogue of such crucial events as "the unveiling of a statue of Lenin in Kiev" or "the completion of the reconstructed Tractor Factory in Kharkiv." All in all, this must be the weakest volume in the Ossolineum series, which aims to enlighten the general reader about countries

as varied as Mali or Mongolia. There is no attempt to balance the negative aspects of Polish-Ukrainian relations with the positive aspects, nor, indeed, to explore the theme of a common heritage. Most regrettably, by sticking slavishly to the official Soviet line, Serczyk pays the Ukrainians the gratuitous insult of failing to mention the Ukrainian point of view on most points of their history. His volume no doubt pleased the censors, but is nicely calculated to offend both his Polish and his Ukrainian readership.

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THE POLISH BRETHREN: DOCUMENTATION OF THE HISTORY AND THOUGHT OF UNITARIANISM IN THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH AND IN THE DIASPORA, 1601–1685. By *George Hunston Williams.* 2 parts. Harvard Theological Studies, 30. Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press [now in Chico, California], 1980. 773 pp., 17 plates and a pullout map.

The episode of the Polish Brethren is one of the noblest in the history of Poland. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was the most tolerant country in the age of the Reformation. In any other country of Europe in the sixteenth century, the Polish Brethren would have gone to the stake for their Unitarianism. The Brethren were indeed expelled in the 1660s, but not because the seventeenth-century Counter-Reformation had made Poland Catholic. Rather, when Lutheran Sweden and the Commonwealth made up of Catholics, Orthodox, Lutherans, Czech Brethren, and Calvinists were at war, the Brethren sympathized with the Swedes. When the invaders were driven back, the Brethren were ousted for political reasons. Many went to Ducal Prussia and Holland, whence their influence reached England.

This group is important in the history not only of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth but also of Christianity itself. The Brethren modeled their life on the pattern of the early Church, often with the sharing of goods and the renunciation of war, in disciplined churches in which women were prominent. They were as cosmopolitan as the Christians at Pentecost and used many languages. Several leaders operating in Poland were by extraction Italian, Swabian, Prussian, Austrian, or were Polonized native Germans. The nine-volume *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum* (Amsterdam, 1665–1692) had only one ethnic Pole among its authors. Among converts to the Minor church of the Brethren from Ukrainian Orthodoxy the most important was George (Iurii) Nemyrych, who is represented by two documents. He did not espouse their prevailing pacificism. The Brethren had a high intellectual standing, especially

at their two centers, Raków and, after 1638, Kyselyn in Volhynia, each of which had an academy and a polyglot press. The Brethren greatly advanced Polish culture in several areas, including the natural sciences.

Never before have we had such a collection as this of contemporary documents translated into English from Latin, Polish, and German, meticulously annotated and placed in their historical setting. The material selected is quite varied: biography, autobiography, private and public confessions of faith, debates, theological treatises, discussions of rules for war, peace, police, regulations for pupils and teachers, polity, ordination, believers' baptism by immersion, the observance of communion and the ban, the relations of church, state, and school.

This comprehensive work should be in every major library in English-speaking countries and in every library of a theological seminary which seeks to understand the diverse forms of Christianity at different places and times.

Regrettably, the printer has made many errors, clearly not the fault of the author. The work has four indexes, and the user of them must be cautioned to subtract 4 from all index references to page 363 and following. A printed errata slip comes with the set, or may be obtained from the editor of the Harvard Theological Review, 45 Francis Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

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THE COSSACK ADMINISTRATION OF THE HETMANATE. By *George Gajecky*. 2 vols. Sources and Documents Series. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1978. 775 pp., 13 maps. $18.50, paper.

The origin of the Hetmanate can be traced to 1648, when Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Zaporozhian army revolted against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and gained control over most of the Ukraine. In 1654, by the terms of the Pereiaslav agreement, Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi placed the Cossack Ukraine under the suzerainty of the Russian tsar. After a series of prolonged wars, the Right-Bank Ukraine (west of the Dnieper River) was reincorporated into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Left Bank (east of the Dnieper) remained a separate political entity under the tsar. It is this truncated Left-Bank successor to the polity established by Khmel'nyts'kyi that is usually referred to as the Hetmanate. Although its autonomy was seriously curtailed after Hetman Mazepa's alliance with Sweden (1709), the

Hetmanate maintained its own institutions until the 1780s, when it was subjected to Russian imperial laws and administration.

During its long period of autonomy, the Hetmanate developed a unique system of government which was closely linked to the military organization of the Cossack host. Regiments and companies of the Zaporozhian army became attached to specific territories, and Cossack officers assumed administrative, judicial, and fiscal duties. The hetman and his staff served as a central government, whereas regimental and company officers functioned as provincial and local administrators. These officials quickly amalgamated into a social stratum which in many respects resembled a landed nobility.

The Cossack officials are the subject of George Gajecky's study. Contrary to what the title suggests, the book is not an analysis of the formation and development of the Hetmanate's administration. In fact, the description of the hierarchical structure and function of the various offices is so brief as to be cursory. Instead, the author has searched with painstaking care through a formidable array of published sources, and on the basis of that research has compiled the names and dates of tenure of approximately 6,000 officials in the Cossack administration.

Gajecky follows a set format in dealing with each of the Hetmanate's ten regiments. First, he gives a brief historical-geographical sketch and a map of the regiment's territory. There follows a chronological list of all the regimental officers, as well as the name of each company comprising the regiment and its captain. Since company officials other than the captain played an important role in local affairs, a list of them, even if incomplete, would have been valuable. The last chapter deals with officials of the central administration. Names of Russian officers are given in an appendix.

In addition to the ten regiments of the Left-Bank, the work deals with several ephemeral units and the nine Right-Bank regiments that survived to the end of the seventeenth century. Traditionally, historians have not considered these to be part of the Hetmanate, but I believe that Gajecky is justified in including them. These regiments, like those of the Left Bank, originated with the Khmel'nyts'kyi revolution. When the Cossack administration on the Right Bank collapsed, their surviving members crossed the Dnieper and settled permanently on the Left Bank. Thus, while the Right-Bank regiments were for a time under a different political system, they were nevertheless closely connected to the Hetmanate in origin, administrative structure, and personnel. Unfortunately, the records of these units are fragmentary, so that Gajecky was able to establish the identity only of the colonels and of those captains listed in the Zboriv register (1649).

The crucial test of any compilation is its comprehensiveness and accuracy. Gajecky seems to have examined the published sources thoroughly, and probably only archival research will yield any significant additions to his lists.

Variations in spelling and dates are probably due in part to discrepancies in the sources. There are, however, over 60 typographical errors, and some names are corrupted beyond recognition. Users of the publication should take care to consult the errata sheet prepared by the author that is distributed with the volumes.

Beyond its obvious utility as a reference tool for the specialist of the Cossack Ukraine, this study also provides scholars with much data about the Ukrainian elite. If it had been possible to name all company officials, then virtually all officeholders in the Hetmanate would have been identified. Such a register would, however, need to be supplemented by a list of members of the Society of Notable Military Fellows — hierarchical ranks (with three subdivisions) held by the elite when not in office. These two compilations would fully identify the elite. We could then ascertain what families were entering the elite, the degree of social mobility, family control of certain positions, and the relationship between political power and social status. Gajecky has already provided us much of this information. Even in a casual perusal of his work, the reader is struck by how one family controlled the office of colonel in a regiment or the captaincy of a company.

Gajecky breaks new ground in one other respect — the introduction of English terms for the institutions, offices, and officials of the Hetmanate. Since the original terminology stems from the peculiarities of the Cossack system, choosing appropriate English equivalents is difficult and at times arbitrary. Although I do not agree with all of Gajecky's terms, I find them acceptable. The choices, made over a long period of time, were debated at a terminological seminar held at the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University. If scholars continue to introduce English terminology at will, utter confusion will result. The inherent dangers are evident in a comparison of Gajecky's work with the English translation of Leo Okinshevich's masterful work, *Ukrainian Society and Government, 1648–1781* (Munich, 1978): the English terms appearing there differ from Gajecky's. Considering the novelty of English terminology on this subject and the importance of establishing it, Gajecky should have included either tables giving Ukrainian and English equivalents or an alphabetical glossary.

The author must be commended for prodigious effort in compiling such an extensive register. There is little doubt that his work will become an important reference tool not only for the historian of the Cossack Ukraine, but also for the scholar of Eastern Europe and Russia. Its deficiencies are few and readily correctable. The work may well stimulate further study of Ukrainian elites, and the Ukrainian layman may find it a fascinating guide for tracing his ancestry.

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SOVIET HISTORIANS IN CRISIS, 1928–1932. By *John Barber*. Studies in Soviet History and Society. *R. W. Davies*, general editor. New York: Holmes & Meyer Publishers, 1981. xiii + 194 pp. $34.50.

The present work, which grew out of a dissertation, represents an important contribution to our understanding of the so-called cultural revolution — that murky period when the Communist Party unleashed all sorts of self-proclaimed guardians of militant Marxist orthodoxy against any manifestation of independent thought. Dr. Barber emphasizes how contentious Communist historians were and rejects the simplistic view that they represented anything resembling a united front dominated by M. N. Pokrovskii, thereby drawing on studies by Roman Szporluk, Bernard Eissenstat, and Soviet scholars of the Khrushchev period. Unfortunately, his almost exclusive attention to Communist historians in Moscow and Leningrad leads him to slight some of the most important themes of the period.

The most important legacy of the cultural revolution was the destruction of the intelligentsia as a component of what is often called civil society, as thought and culture were supplanted by rigidly organized "detachments" of this or that "front" of the class war. Along with the controversies among various Communist trends, there were unremitting attacks on "bourgeois" historians, usually culminating in their arrest by the political police. In this connection, Dr. Barber makes a good faith effort by referring to the document on the treatment of Soviet scholars published by Professor V. V. Cherniavin in 1933. This document, however, was more concerned with ichthyologists than historians and could well have been supplemented by the contemporary German-language accounts of the specific situation of Soviet historical scholarship published by Hans Jonas and R. Salomon (*Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte,* 1931, no. 1, pp. 66–83, and 1932, no. 3, pp. 385–402).

One major innovation of the period was completely ignored by Barber, a circumstance especially puzzling because it stares out from every Soviet history textbook: the replacement of national histories by the rubric *History of the USSR*. The change was proclaimed by Pokrovskii in the 1930 preface to the Czech translation of his *Brief History*. The preface, which announced that national histories were now to be considered obsolete because Soviet historians were speaking in terms of a history of the peoples of the USSR, was published as a lead article in *Istorik-marksist* (vol. 17). It provided the general banner under which Piontkovskii launched a vicious attack on Russian historians, while Skubitskii and Iugov did the same on their Ukrainian and Belorussian counterparts. This was, in my opinion, a direct result of the campaign against the Ukrainian historian Matvii Iavors'kyi, which Barber makes a serious if not quite successful attempt to elucidate. And it was this strand — not, as Barber suggests, the issue of commercial capitalism — which in all

likelihood constituted the real reason for Pokrovskii's posthumous fall from grace in 1934. The importance of this event Dr. Barber would have been better able to appreciate had he read the commentaries on the crucial 1934 decree in *Bor'ba klassov,* the journal that functioned as the party's prime means of directing those who taught history in Soviet secondary schools. For, although Pokrovskii was not criticized by name in the text of the decree itself, the *Bor'ba klassov* commentaries make it clear that Pokrovskii's textbooks and their practice of purging the history of great men and events of Russian national significance were no longer acceptable. This, in turn, led to the revival of the old imperial *skhema* of *obshcherusskaia istoriia* with a full complement of traditional Russian heroes and villains under the new rubric of *istoriia SSSR.* The remarks on Peter I (and by implication, other outstanding figures in Russia's past) in Stalin's 1930 letter to Demian Bednyi and 1931 interview with Emil Ludwig show that the dictator himself was thinking along these lines long before the change became obligatory for historians in the mid-1930s. The collection of documents, with an excellent introduction by Erwin Oberländer, that was published as *Sowjetpatriotismus und Geschichte* and Roman Szporluk's introduction to M. N. Pokrovsky, *Russia in World History,* provide much information on this development.

The Iavors'kyi affair was quite complex, and Dr. Barber can hardly be faulted for his failure to elucidate all its aspects. It seems to have begun with an obscure controversy in the Ukrainian Istpart organ about an article by Iavors'kyi's student Volodymyr Sukhyno-Khomenko, and thereafter to have developed a character which had implications far beyond historical scholarship. The fact that Kossior, the first secretary of the Communist Party (bolshevik) of the Ukraine, ultimately felt compelled to publish a letter to the editor in *Pravda* (6 April 1930) on the matter shows that the Iavors'kyi affair affected the highest political circles in the Ukraine.

The first direct attack on Iavors'kyi was made at the first All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians, held over the Christmas-to-New Year holiday of 1928–1929. A careful reading of the conference's transcript shows that Pokrovskii was not even in command of his own followers at this point. For one thing, in addressing the conference, Pokrovskii insisted that Marxist historians had to become more academic, to which the assemblage responded by passing a resolution condemning "all manifestations of academicism." During the discussion of Iavors'kyi's report, Pokrovskii responded to Pavel Gorin's attack on Iavors'kyi by attempting verbally to pull the disputants apart. Later, Pokrovskii stated that he had come to the conference favoring a federation of Republic societies of Marxist historians and was convinced only at the conference itself to support the option actually adopted, the creation of a single All-Union Society of Marxist Historians. It was only later, when the anti-Iavors'kyi campaign had picked up considerable momentum, that Pokrovskii lent his name to it.

Barber cites Gorin's brutal review of Iavors'kyi's textbook in *Pravda* from March 1929, but he fails to draw the proper implications from it. The gratuitous attack which Gorin at that time made on the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education, and implicitly on Mykola Skrypnyk, shows that someone quite high up and beyond the historians themselves was behind the campaign. For Gorin could hardly have been allowed to publish in *Pravda* even an implicit attack on such a powerful party satrap as Skrypnyk without the approval of the all-Union political leadership.

The basic issue in the Iavors'kyi controversy involved the very structure and nature of the Soviet Union. As was so often the case in Soviet politics of the period, the real target and implication of the campaign did not become apparent until the campaign itself was well underway. Thus the attack on Bukharin was preceded by a campaign against a nameless "right deviation" and that on Skrypnyk by a similar attack on a nameless "national deviation." In the Iavors'kyi controversy also, the initial criticisms were merely straw men, but the real issue became clear in a 1929 review of Iavors'kyi's work in *Istorik-marksist* (vol. 12, p. 285), which stated: "The basic error of Comrade Iavors'kyi's book is that it portrays the history of the Ukraine as a distinctive process." This phrase was often quoted elsewhere, and the political implications were ominous: if the Ukraine was not a country with its own history, then there was no need for it to be treated differently. The attack on Iavors'kyi thus became the opening salvo in the campaign against the Ukrainian political leadership that culminated in Skrypnyk's fall in 1933.

While these issues are of central importance to those of us who are primarily interested in the larger issue of the transformation of the Soviet Union after the period of indigenization (*korenizatsiia*) into a centralized Russian empire, they should not be allowed to obscure the fundamental value of Dr. Barber's work. It is, all in all, an extremely praiseworthy first book.

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ZATVORSKA I SIBIRSKA SJEĆANJA (1926–1957). By *Julius Baranovski.* Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1981. 272 pp. 400 ND.

Over the past decade or so, Yugoslav publishers have brought out several sensational memoirs by a handful of Yugoslav survivors of Stalin's concentration camps. A recent example of this genre, which waxes strong during the periodic downturns in the relations between Moscow and Belgrade, are the

dramatic recollections of Julius Baranovski (b. 1904), a Yugoslav-born Ukrainian who emigrated to the USSR in 1926.

Baranovski's parents were first-generation Ukrainian settlers in Stara Dubrava, near Prnjavor (northwestern Bosnia). A shoemaker by trade, Baranovski joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) in 1924. (This was not an unusual step for settler children; some of the KPJ's leading cadres hailed from the settler population of Bosnia, including two of the party's secretaries — Anton Mavrak, a Slovene, and Josip Čižinski [pseud. Milan Gorkić], a Ukrainian.) In 1926, the KPJ leaders decided to send Baranovski to the USSR, where he was to be trained in the Comintern schools. The mission was botched. After visiting his relatives in Bučač (Galicia), Baranovski illegally crossed the Soviet frontier near Kamjanec'-Podils'kyj and was promptly arrested. Although his position was regularized by 1929, when he was introduced to the VKP(b), Baranovski was nevertheless kept in Voronezh, his original place of exile, where he started a family. Somewhat later, in 1931, Baranovski was sent to Moscow where he finished a four-year course in forestry engineering. From 1935 until his arrest as a Bukharinite in 1937, he worked in various administrative posts in Gor'kij, Xerson (as harbor director), Leningrad, and Kalinin.

Baranovski's thirteen years in the camps of Arxangel'sk oblast (notably Njandoma, Pojamenka, Ostrovno, Ercevo, and Mexreńga) and subsequent seven years of exile in Siberia (Krasnojarsk area) were not lacking in solitary horror, not unlike the grim fate of so many other victims of Stalinism. Still, this memoir merits examination apart from the body of similar literature because of the author's perceptive growth in Ukrainian national feeling and his numerous testimonies about Ukrainian solidarity in the camps. Particularly interesting is the account of Lt. Col. Didorenko, an NKVD operative in Alekseevka, who greatly improved the camp conditions of Baranovski and some of the other Ukrainian inmates and even shared his huge disdain for the NKVD with Baranovski (pp. 189–191). Equally important is Baranovski's testimony about the refreshing defiance demonstrated by the postwar Ukrainian inmates, the *banderivci,* who were generally not only young, educated, and politically sophisticated, but also uncommonly daring. At Mexreńga, in 1949, they killed a number of informers and criminals in the service of the camp administration, in broad daylight and in view of the other prisoners. On one occasion they killed an informer in the presence of the head of the camp unit (p. 220).

Baranovski was rehabilitated in 1956 and repatriated to Yugoslavia in 1957. Back in Zagreb, where he had originally joined the KPJ, he reentered the Communist party and worked in Croatia's secretariat of forestry until retirement. His report from the grimmer latitudes of socialist experiment is instructive and informative. It is also an example of the cruel predicament which so

many sincere Communist militants encountered in their attempts to reconcile the promise of national and social equality with the practice of Stalinism.

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ANTOLOHIJA UKRAJINS'KOJI LIRYKY. By *Orest Zilyns'kyj.* Part 1: Do 1919. Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, for the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1978. 440 pp. $6.95, paper.

While anthologies are legion, anthologies of Ukrainian poetry are few and — except for the volume under discussion — not readily available. Accessibility, however, is the least of this work's legitimate claims on our attention.

Orest Zilyns'kyj's subject is Ukrainian lyric poetry. Its uneven and arduous development over a period of three centuries is discussed thematically and chronologically in an informative and critically perceptive introduction. The texts, arranged in ten thematic categories, each chronologically, reflect not only the quintessential but also the typical, thus illustrating the historical scope and development of the genre. Moreover, this collection of some 400 poems suggests the wide range of Ukrainian poetic expression and includes most of the notable poetic figures of the pre-1919 period. Inclinations to quibble about the inclusion or omission of this or that poem, poet, or theme are dispelled by Zilyns'kyj's invocation of the compiler's privilege of subjective selection, as well as by the realization that all anthologies are, after all, confessions of faith. Nonetheless Zilyns'kyj offers an astonishing spectrum which in its parts is also fairly representative.

The anthology's ten thematic categories — Love, Fate, People, Land, The Past, Horizons, The City, Moments, Creation, Struggle — provide a satisfying medium for avoiding confusion within profusion and for revealing, convincingly, universality within regionalism and unity within diversity. The compiler is a pathfinder who invites the reader to join him in exploration and discovery. By this method he reawakens and brings to life anew representative strains in Ukrainian poetry of the distant as well as recent past.

Although stressing poetry over poets in its approach and format, the anthology gradually identifies the Ukraine's foremost bards. Not surprisingly, Taras Ševčenko, Ivan Franko, and Lesja Ukrajinka (represented by 48, 29, and 28 poems, respectively) emerge as the lyric triumvirate *sans pareil.* Ten folk songs and seventeen anonymous poems together form the next largest group. Collectively, the above account for one-third of the collection — a not unrealistic reflection of the major sources of significant pre-1919 Ukrainian lyric poetry.

The volume is well edited, with few errors or misprints, and its layout is attractive. There are, to be sure, missing quotation marks (p. 132, end of the first stanza of I. Franko's "Vivere Memento") and omitted commas (ibid., second stanza, verse 9, before and after *može,* and p. 135, "Ne mynaj . . . ," after *može* in each stanza; cf. I. Franko, *Zibrannja tvoriv u pjatydesjaty tomax,* Kiev, 1976, 1: 35–36, and 2: 130, respectively), as well as misleading dates: the publication date of Hrabovs'kyj's "Ja ne spivec' . . ." (p. 345), for example, is cited as 1894, the year the first version of the poem appeared; the text published here, however, is a considerably revised version which appeared in 1898 in the collection "Kobza." In general, the compiler's reliance on "the latest critical editions" (p. 32) for the texts and the absence of a textual apparatus raise questions about its authoritativeness. Deprived of archival sources, the editor appears to have taken the printed texts as sacrosanct and textual variants as nonexistent. Yet, verse two of Lesja Ukrajinka's *Contra Spem Spero* begins here with *Bož* (p. 380), whereas the 1975 Kiev edition (1: 56) and the 1953 New York collection (1: 23) of her works read *To ž* and *Tož,* respectively. While here the difference to the poetry is minimal, that is not always the case. The texts of Skovoroda's poetry present special problems of authenticity and orthography; however, Western scholars have the unique opportunity to study the originals of some of Skovoroda's poems because the manuscripts have been reproduced and published. Thus a comparison of Zilyns'kyj's text of "Vsjakomu horodu nrav i prava" (pp. 109–110) with the manuscript copy reveals the inclusion of verses which the poet wrote to the right of the main text, in the upper portion of the manuscript page (see Hryhorij Skovoroda, *Povne zibrannja tvoriv u dvox tomax,* Kiev, 1973, 1: 68). Zilyns'kyj, following the 1961 edition of Skovoroda's works, retains these added verses before the final stanza, which in effect alters both the poem's content and structure.

Textual problems such as these remain for specialists to resolve. In all other respects, this representative anthology displays its late compiler's sensitive and responsible attitude toward Ukrainian lyric poetry and offers renewed opportunities for its study and appreciation. Warm personal reminiscences by Zilyns'kyj's wife, Eva Biss-Zilyns'ka, and a comprehensive essay about the editor's life and work (including a bibliography) by Mykola Mušynka round out this welcome volume.

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THE MODERN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET LITERATURE. Edited by *Harry B. Weber.* Volumes 1–4 [A–Co]. Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1977–1981.

At first blush this encyclopedia (MERSL) is confusing. The cover of volume 1 describes it as a work on "Russian and Soviet Literature." The title of volume 4 heralds it as a work on "Russian and Soviet Literatures" and parenthetically explains that the MERSL also "includ[es] non-Russian and emigre literatures." Harry B. Weber, editor of the encyclopedia, corrects this ambivalence in his foreword by pointing out that only Russian émigré literature falls into the purview of the MERSL — not "emigre literatures" in general. "Soviet Literatures" in the title refers to the fact that the MERSL also accommodates on its pages literatures of other cultures of the USSR; this does not mean, however, that reference is limited to their Soviet period alone. Nonetheless, one cannot conclude that the MERSL is an encyclopedia of Russian and non-Russian literatures. Instead, it is an encyclopedia of Russian literature which, as the cover states, only "includes" non-Russian literatures. The distinction is worthy of note not for pedantry's sake, but because it reflects the true aim of the MERSL, which is to provide a cultural profile of "Russia and the Soviet Union" — not of Russia and the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations. Consequently, in the MERSL non-Russian literatures are not in and of themselves an object of study; their presence is somewhat incidental, serving to complement Russian literature so as to provide a view of what is called the "totality of Soviet cultures."

Leaving aside "Soviet culture," a phrase that is not very enlightening in this context, it can be said that as an encyclopedia of Russian literature, the MERSL has much to offer. The title does not do justice to the wide range of topics —from the obvious to the obscure — that the publication covers. The largest number of entries are devoted to individual Russian writers (some of whom are simply called "Soviet"). These entries are either short, unsigned, biobibliographical presentations of data culled from contemporary and pre-revolutionary sources, or else essays consisting of a critical overview of a writer's career. The second type is normally signed and much longer and more detailed than the first.

Besides containing information on writers, the MERSL also includes entries (signed and unsigned) about genres, literary periods and movements, literary journals, literary criticism, and even folklore. There are essays on major deceased literary scholars, as well. Linguistic topics are also given selective coverage, especially in articles surveying the various languages of the Soviet Union. The MERSL has no pretensions to exhaustiveness in all these areas, but some omissions are surprising (for example, there is no entry for "baroque"). On the whole, however, Russian literature is covered thoroughly and

systematically. More importantly, the entries strike one as both sound and informative.

Satisfaction with the MERSL quickly fades when one focuses on the non-Russian (Soviet?) entries, however. The four initial volumes make reference to writers of no fewer than 35 nationalities. Significantly, the average non-Russian entry is much shorter than the Russian, and even when taken together, they fail to equal the total number of Russian entries. Moreover, while the latter is approached from a variety of perspectives, the non-Russian literatures are represented (with a few minor exceptions) by either the bio-bibliographical entry for an individual writer or the general survey article for that particular literature. In most instances, the information is very rudimentary, and if any "cultural profile" of the nationality emerges, it is vague indeed.

There is, however, something more troubling and fundamentally wrong about the non-Russian entries than their relative superficiality. The problem lies in that the majority of them is based on Soviet scholarship and hence is tainted by its inadequacies. The Russian entries, on the other hand, were written primarily by scholars working in the United States and Canada. Consequently, the non-Russian literatures fall under a Socialist Realist exegesis, whereas Russian literature is examined in light of Western criteria. The net result is hardly comparable. Russian literature emerges as a serious humanistic endeavor, while the non-Russian literatures appear to be extensions of the Soviet ministry of propaganda. What is particularly shocking is not the poverty of the Soviet contributions (that can hardly amaze anyone), but the fact that in his foreword the editor of the MERSL totally fails to recognize the existence of this double standard or to warn the reader about its implications. There is not a single word about the nationality problem in the USSR or even a passing acknowledgement that the non-Russian cultures labor under very particular strictures and limitations. If the editor deemed the Soviet contributions on non-Russian literatures necessary, he should have explained the nature of this East-West cooperative venture, rather than merely list the names of the Soviet contributors on the inside cover. The lay readership, who presumably will be the majority of the encyclopedia's users, will hardly be able to discriminate between the two contradictory scholarly approaches. It is not unlikely that the mediocrity of the entries on non-Russian literatures will be attributed not to the drawbacks of Soviet literary scholarship, but to the literatures themselves.

As one reads through the non-Russian entries, one basic theme emerges. These literatures, from the earliest times and even in their folklore, betray class antagonisms. The histories of their peoples amount to a longstanding struggle for social justice and Realism. Annexation by Russia brings untold benefits to the natives, who, in time, join their Russian democratic brethren in a common struggle against tsarism. A flowering of native culture occurs after the onset of Soviet power (i.e., writers greet the October Revolution "enthusi-

astically"). Progressive writers struggle against reactionaries and nationalists and in 1932 they painlessly join the Writers' Union. Stalinism, for all pratical purposes, does not effect the natives, who continue to sing about the fraternity of nations and the kind, guiding hand of the Communist party. (One contributor states: "The author of this entry believes that the directives of the Party aided in the successful development of the young [Bashkir] literature along the path of Socialist Realism." — vol. 2, p. 116).

Of course, even within the parameters of this mythic and fruitless scheme, readers will undoubtedly stumble on some valuable information. But to accept this type of tendentious writing as objective literary scholarship would be more than naive. There are some good, conscientious entries on the national literatures written by Western scholars in the MERSL, but, unfortunately, they are too few to undo the overall drab effect.

The Ukrainian entries number only about two dozen, and the majority is plagued by factual errors or mistakes in transliteration. The unsigned entries were obviously compiled by non-specialists, for the data are assembled without any sense of their relative importance. The height of such ignorance and carelessness is the entry on Mykola Bazhan. Rife with errors, its catalogue of publications accompanied by three or four-word characterizations will never reveal to anyone that Bazhan is a leading poet of the twentieth century. One exception, however, is the informed and analytical entry on Dmytro Čyževs'kyj, written by an American scholar.

In short, the MERSL is far from an unequivocal success. Readers needing a practical guide to Russian literature can consult it without fear. But those who are interested in the non-Russian literatures must be cautioned to approach the MERSL with scepticism.

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SVIATYI VASYLII VELYKYI I KHRYSTYIANS'KE ASKETYCHNE ZHYTTIA. By *Paul I. Fedwick (Pavlo I. Fediuk)*. Zapysky Ch.S.S.V., ser. 2, sect. 1. Rome and Toronto: PP. Basiliani, 1978. 230 pp. $6.00 (U.S.)

This is an excellent scholarly work that deserves translation into a language of wider currency. The author's credentials in Byzantine studies are outstanding, including a Ph.D. dissertation (Univesity of St. Michael's College, Toronto) published under the title *The Church and the Charisma of Leadership in Basil of Caesarea* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies [Studies and Texts, 45], 1979). Dr. Fediuk was the organizer and executive secretary of the

St. Basil Symposium held in Toronto in June 1979 with the blessing of the Holy See of Rome and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. Currently he is working on a *Critical Chronology of the Life and Works of Basil of Caesarea* and on a six-volume *Comprehensive Guide to All the Manuscripts, Ancient Quotations, Editions, Translations, and Studies of the Works of Basil of Caesarea* (as reported in *Theological Studies* 41 [1980]: 173–74). Dr. Fediuk is a junior fellow at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto and teaches at the Toronto School of Theology.

The work under review is the result of a historical and linguistic analysis of all the works of St. Basil. In the introductory chapter the author rejects the traditional view that Christian eremitism preceded cenobitism, and argues that asceticism developed spontaneously out of the sacramental life of the local Christian communities in Syria and Cappadocia. Despite Cassian's claim to the contrary, asceticism was originally not opposed to the church hierarchy, but was simply one form of practicing the teachings of Christ and of serving the Christian community. Basil wholeheartedly embraced this type of Christianity, and objected strongly to teaching the Gospel in seclusion or on the fringes of the ecclesiastical community. He was aware of the form introduced by Pachomius, which was a quasi-eremitical asceticism, and himself followed Eustathius of Sebaste, who introduced community-type asceticism in Asia Minor.

Fediuk briefly analyzes each work in chronological order. He sees Basil's main achievement as being not so much devising a new type of asceticim as perfecting the existing one, linked closely to the local Christian community. Against certain abuses of the followers of Eustathius (e.g., the Council of Gangra, whose twenty canons are given in translation on pp. 73–76), Basil emphasized four things: (1) fidelity to the Bible (against the claims of some Eustathians to direct revelations from the Holy Spirit); (2) loyalty to the church (his communities were to be the exemplaries of the local churches); (3) centrality of the charisma of love of God and of one's neighbor (a repudiation of all attempts to separate the two precepts); (4) superiority of cenobitism over eremitism (in fact, an exploitation of the riches of the Pauline concept of charisma as the disposition and readiness to serve others; see *Erotapokrisis* 7 of Basil's *Great Asketikon*).

The main merits of this study are the interpretation of Basil's teaching against the historical background of his time and the use of sources (chapters 2 and 3 are a painstaking analysis of all the writings of Basil and his contemporaries and of the *Scholia* first published by Gribomont in 1953). The author ably recreates the thought of Basil and its subsequent interpretation in light of the historical and social context. Unlike Gribomont, Fediuk thinks that Basil wrote the Moral Rules last, sometime in the mid-370s.

Basilian asceticism came to Kiev in the first half of the eleventh century. Precisely by disclaiming that Basil of Caesarea is the founder of any specific religious order the author shows that Basil's ideal of cenobitic asceticism

survived in Byzantium and then was transplanted to the Slavic lands by Theodosii Pechers'kyi. Unlike Antonii Pechers'kyi, a hermit who had only a few followers in Kiev (although later many more in Russia), Theodosii adopted the cenobitic ideal. The Typicon that he received from the monk Michael, who came to Kiev from Constantinople, was that of Patriarch Alexios, who in fact sympathized with eremitism. Alexios, although a disciple of Theodore the Studite, abandoned some of the most significant tenets of his teacher. It is known that Theodore tried to revive Basil's ideal of the cenobitic life during the iconoclastic controversy. His disciple Alexios tried to accommodate his Typikon to suit the character of the Byzantines, who were prone to individualism. It is not known how Theodosii restored the original insights of Theodore and hence of Basil himself. At any rate, the most popular form of asceticism to develop in Kiev was the form closest to Basil (although not mentioning his name). A new period began in 1617, when Basilian ideals found new expression in the rules for Eastern-rite religious orders patterned on Western models. This was the beginning of the Order of St. Basil the Great (OSBM).

Fediuk's work is richly illustrated with representations of St. Basil and some of his followers, as well as of contemporary Cappadocia and Pontus. There is also a summary in English and an extensive bibliography.

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